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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims to determine how support for both the status quo and reform emerged 
in post-1998 Muhammadiyah, and what caused these tendencies to emerge. To respond to 
these two research questions, I employ Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and crisis 
as well as the post-colonial perspective on the emulation of Western culture by non-Western 
people. I collected various post-1998 works by Muhammadiyah’s members on the issue of 
reform, and interviewed leaders and members of the organisation from Jakarta, Yogyakarta, 
and Malang during my three month period of field research. From my research findings, I 
determined that members of Muhammadiyah share a reflective predisposition, marked by 
their inclination to look at the world as an entity that can be rationally understood and acted 
upon. Their belief in the potential of human rationality leads some members of 
Muhammadiyah to claim that truth in human life does exist and it has been preserved within 
the teaching of Muhammadiyah since its inception in 1911. I refer to these members of 
Muhammadiyah as the supporters of the status quo. The same belief in human rationality 
convinces other members of the same organisation that the truth does exist but that it is tied 
to specific contexts and that it is a human obligation to understand these contexts. I refer to 
these members as the supporters of reform. 
I find that the perceptions of Muhammadiyah’s members towards what they see as the 
West plays an important part in shaping their opinions. On the one hand, the supporters of the 
status quo tend to see the West as an inimical entity that aspires to corrupt, and thus weaken, 
Islam. Using Bourdieu’s vocabulary, what they perceive as a crisis within Muhammadiyah is 
the weakening of the boundaries of their field by the intrusion of Western perspectives. The 
solution to the crisis, therefore, is the reconsolidation of these boundaries and the purification 
and consolidation of Islam as a civilisational entity. On the other hand, the supporters of 
reform within Muhammadiyah see the West as both an ally in a common struggle of 
humanity and also a victim of misguided perceptions, as also is Islam. For them, Islam can 
learn from the West and vice-versa. The crisis of the field perceived by the supporters of 
reform is, therefore, not the breaking down of the old field’s boundaries but the persistence of 
those boundaries and the refusal of some Muhammadiyah’s members to extend those 
boundaries to encompass new ways of thinking. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
I hope that the next thirteen members of Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership for the period of 
2010-2015 will be willing to accommodate Aisyiyah’s aspiration to include women in the central 
leadership.1 
Men and women are surely not the same. Let us not be easily mesmerised with that term 
“gender” from the West. The women already have Aisyiyah. Aisyiyah was Muhammad’s wife. If 
women wish to be in Muhammadiyah, it means they want to be Muhammad.2 
 
The forty-sixth National Meeting of Muhammadiyah (or muktamar, the national meeting 
of Muhammadiyah to elect its national chairman and formulate the organisation’s five-
year programmes – see Appendix 1) held in Yogyakarta from the third to the eighth of 
July of 2010 was considered special for the organisation as it marked its centenarian 
anniversary. Anxiety was widespread in this meeting as to who would be elected as the 
thirteen people to lead the organisation for the next five years and in what direction these 
leaders would lead this organisation in the future.  
 Taking into account the change from what Mulkhan sees as the era of 
revitalisation of the reform ethos of Ahmad Dahlan (1995-2005) to the era of puritanism 
in Muhammadiyah (2005-2010),3 the supporters of both views represented in the quotes 
above had reason to worry. Supporters of each view were consequently active in 
supporting their causes in the 2010 meeting.  
The issue of women’s leadership in Muhammadiyah was one of many hotly 
debated topics in this forum. As described succinctly in the two quotes above, some 
members wished to see the presence of women in the central leadership while others felt 
                                                 
1 Syafii Ma’arif, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Muhammadiyah Alami Ketegangan,” July 6, 2010. 
2 Ali Dinar Nurdin, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Masuknya Perempuan Ke PP, Ditentang: Komisi E 
Bahas Isu Keumatan dan Kebangsaan,” July 7, 2010. 
3 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Jejak Pembaruan Sosial dan Kemanusiaan Kiai Ahmad Dahlan (Jakarta: Penerbit 
Buku Kompas, 2010), 26-27. 
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satisfied with the current arrangement: the women already have Aisyiyah as an 
organisation and therefore do not need to be included in Muhammadiyah’s central 
leadership. This issue arose after a consideration was raised in the Muktamar as to 
whether it was necessary to add another six members to the central leadership of 
Muhammadiyah and bring the number to nineteen. The newly elected chairwoman of 
Aisyiyah, Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, in her response to this possibility, urged that 
among the additional six new leaders of Muhammadiyah, three would be female. At the 
end of the Muktamar, the number of people in the central leadership remained thirteen.  
The debate surrounding this issue, however, showcases the continuing schism in 
the organisation between the support for the status quo and reform that persisted after the 
2010 Muktamar. While those of the status quo view emphasise the importance of 
committing Muhammadiyah to the organisation’s century-long role in calling on human 
beings to “do good and avoid dishonour”4 and to preserve its traditional achievements,5 
those bent on reform insist on the need for the organisation to respond to the 
developments in the study of religious epistemology and philosophy, to search for a more 
substance-oriented rationality,6 and to be more inclusive.7 
Before elaborating details of my research plan, the first section of this chapter will 
discuss the relationship between democracy and Islam in post-1998 Indonesia. This 
section will serve as a context for my discussion of the support for both the status quo and 
reform within Muhammadiyah. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Din Syamsuddin, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Politik Muhammadiyah, Politik Harga Diri,” July 2, 
2010; and Yunahar Ilyas, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Pertahankan Jati Diri, Kian Berkualitas,” July 4, 
2010. This injunction can be found in various verses of the Qur’an but the one that is most often referred to 
in Muhammadiyah is Qur’an 3:104. For an example of the use of this verse, see Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah, Muqqadimmah Anggaran Dasar, 1961, art. 2. 
5 Bambang Sudibyo, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Tanpa Tim Sukses, Wajah Baru Surprise,” July 7, 
2010. 
6 Dawam Rahardjo and Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “Pembaruan Sistem Belum 
Optimal: Muhammadiyah Perlu Lakukan Evaluasi,” July 2, 2010. 
7 Muhammad Kustiawan, interview, Kedaulatan Rakyat, “PCIM, Muhammadiyah Wajah Baru,” July 8, 
2010. 
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1.1 Background: Democracy and Islam in Post-1998 Indonesia 
My main argument in this section is that in the post-1998 Indonesia the interaction 
between democracy and Islam within national politics has resulted in the convergence of 
three political tendencies: the support for electoral democracy, the de-Islamisation of 
formal politics, and the increase in shariah-based legislation (See Figure 1.1). The 
simultaneous presence of these three political trends is unprecedented in Indonesian 
history as for long period Indonesia was subject to authoritarian rule of the New Order 
when Islam had little political role. Indonesia once had a democratic political system with 
the demand for shariah-based legislation by Islamic political parties during the era of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1949 – 1959), although without any significant result with 
respect to legislations. During the last decade of the New Order period, when Soeharto’s 
regime had grown closer to Islamic groups, Indonesians witnessed a national politics that 
still shunned religious-based political parties but was supportive of shariah-based 
legislation in an undemocratic environment. While the 1949-1959 Parliamentary 
Democratic period saw the presence of both democratic procedures and increase in 
shariah-based legislation, as reflected in the demands of Islamic parties in that era to 
implement the Jakarta Charter with its imposition of Islamic shariah on Muslims, the last 
decade of New Order period showcased a combination between de-Islamisation of formal 
politics and the increase in shariah-based legislation, as reflected in the issuance of 
various Islam-friendly legislations, most conspicuous of which was the marriage law. The 
last possible combination – the presence of non-religious political parties in a democratic 
environment – is the common political character of secular democracies, which never 
occurred in Indonesia. However, Indonesia had never experienced a political system with 
the simultaneous presence of these three political trends.  
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Figure 1.1 Democracy and Islam in Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Support for Electoral Democracy 
While it is too simple to state that Islam is supportive of democracy, historically, the 
struggle of Islamic movements in Indonesia has often aimed at the creation of a 
democratic political system. During the struggle for independence, for example, 
Indonesia’s Islamic movements did not oppose democracy as a political ideology. They 
even cherished it, as can be discerned from a statement of a famous Islamic leader Agus 
Salim with respect to the democratic character of Islam.8 This democratic attitude can 
also be related to the appreciation of gender equality when during a meeting of Jong 
Islamieten Bond, a pre-Independence Islamic youth group in the Dutch Indies, Agus 
Salim “took off the curtain that separated the male and female attendees”.9  
 The two Islamic political parties, Masyumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama, competed in 
Indonesia’s first free general election on 29 September 1955. At this election, no 
competing party received a majority vote, and therefore coalitions were formed. In these 
coalitions, both the nationalist- and the Islamic-leaning leaders had their turn as prime 
ministers. A combination of the unsettled debate on national ideology, the incipient state 
                                                 
8 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 69.  
9 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 85. 
Support for Democracy 
De-Islamisation of 
Formal Politics 
Increase in shariah-based 
legislation 
1949-1959 Parliamentary 
Democracy  Secular Democracy 
Last decade of New 
Order Period 
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of the country’s democracy, and the grandiose personality of Soekarno contributed to the 
abolition of the parliamentary democratic system and the start of Guided Democracy in 
1959. 
 While there was no room for democratic politics during both the Guided 
Democracy and the New Order period, after 1998 Indonesia re-experienced a lively 
political system with various political parties emerging. After the fall of Soeharto, with 
the inclusion of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) into the formal democratic political 
system, Indonesia has seen support from Islamic political groups for democracy, as 
shown in three consecutive peaceful elections. Moreover, even Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 
mostly known for its rejection of democracy and other Western-inspired political 
systems,10 has also hinted at the possibility of joining the election and in fact has allowed 
its members to vote.11  
 
1.1.2 De-Islamisation of Formal Politics 
The second trend in Indonesian politics after 1998 is the increasing irrelevance of Islam 
as the ideological basis of political parties, which I refer to as the de-Islamisation of 
formal politics. Historically, this is not the first time it happened in Indonesia. Either 
voluntarily or under external pressure, various political parties in Indonesia had set aside 
Islam as their formal platform in the country’s history. During the New Order era, 
especially after 1984, Soeharto’s authoritarian government forced social and political 
organisations to accept Pancasila12 as their basic ideology. For Islamic organisations, this 
meant the abandonment of Islam as their formal ideology. 
                                                 
10 Hizbut Tahrir, Konsepsi Politik Hizbut Tahrir, Indonesian ed. (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009), 
12-13, 231. 
11 Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, “Between Revolution and Reform: The Future of Hizbut Tahrir  
Indonesia,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 2, no. 2 (2009): 76. 
12 Approaching the end of Japanese occupation and as a part of its pan-Asia campaign, Japan allowed 
leaders from the former Dutch Indies archipelago to formulate the basic requirements to build an 
independent Indonesia. There were ideas on the basic ideology that would base the future free country. The 
discussions eventually converged on the five principles that are now embodied in Pancasila (which literally 
means ‘Five Bases’); they are belief in one God, just and civilised humanity, unity of Indonesia, public 
participation through representation, and social justice. 
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If de-Islamisation occurred during the New Order era under official repression, in 
the democratic environment after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 the abandonment of Islam 
as organisational ideology has happened voluntarily and for a different reason. In this 
light, the acceptance by PKS on 4 February 2008 of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution 
as Indonesia’s national ideology and constitution is significant. 
PKS started to diversify its political agenda in anticipation of the 2004 General 
Election. Instead of urging the implementation of shariah among Indonesian Muslims, it 
had tried to increase its popularity to a broader mass and to improve the poor one per cent 
of votes it gained in the 1999 General Election with its slogan of “bersih dan peduli” 
(“clean and caring”). The party received over 7 per cent of votes in the 2004 Election.  
Striving to keep its political relevance in a democratic Indonesia and responding 
to accusations of sectarianism and proselytising among Muslims, the PKS decided at its 
National Meeting on 4 February 2008 in Bali to accept Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution as its ideology.13 By issuing this decision, the party formally abandoned the 
goal of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. With a similar campaign focus in its 
effort to further attract voters in the 2009 General Election, PKS managed to receive 
around 7 per cent of votes. Although still retaining Islam as its basic ideology,14 this party 
has developed a political image that respects plurality within the Republic of Indonesia 
under the 1945 Constitution.15 Moreover, the party has sometimes prioritised pragmatism 
over Islamist ideology in its parliamentary activities: it has abandoned the demand to 
bring back the Jakarta Charter, the initial draft constitution of Indonesia that obliges 
Muslims to follow the shariah law; it has worked with the religiously pluralist Partai 
Amanat Nasional in forming the Reform Faction after the 1999 General Election; and it 
endorsed Megawati Soekarno Putri as the nation’s first female president in 2001.16 
These moves by PKS are the result of political calculation by this Islamist 
political party. A trend that started under an authoritarian policy has continued into the 
                                                 
13 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Musuh dalam Selimut,” in Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam 
Transnasional di Indonesia, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 186. 
14 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Anggaran Dasar, 2005, art. 2. 
15 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani: Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan 
Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera (Jakarta: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008), 222. 
16 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 248, 285, 303. 
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present democratic era. One probable cause for this might be the political pragmatism 
introduced by the Soeharto’s regime. The developmentalist political agenda brought by 
this regime had produced citizens who are more attuned towards pragmatic results than 
ideological, and religious, causes. These same citizens experienced socio-economic 
mobility under Soeharto’s economic programs. Besides the government’s economic 
developmentalist approach, however, a new wave of Islamic thoughts in that authoritarian 
era should also be given credit. 
The late Nurcholish Madjid was influential in making Islamic organisations in 
Indonesia abandon their Islamist demands. The background of his intellectual work was 
the failure of political Islam to bring welfare and empowerment to Muslims. He attributed 
the failure of political Islam to pay attention to the more essential needs of the Muslims to 
its obsession with the establishment of an Islamic state.17 He then introduced the term 
“de-sacralisation” to refer to efforts to return various worldly concepts and institutions to 
their proper place in Islam. Political Islam’s vision of an Islamic state is considered as 
one of these concepts mistakenly understood as inherent in Islam, and therefore a target 
of Madjid’s de-sacralisation efforts.  
The effect of Madjid’s concept of de-sacralisation is felt in the present tendency 
of Islam to relax its political demands. The present unpopularity of Islamic political 
parties corroborates this argument. This situation may, at first sight, be seen as a 
showcase of further secularisation of Islam in Indonesian politics. But far from being 
disengaged from the public life of Indonesians, Islam has become more carefully 
articulated in Indonesia’s socio-cultural life.  
 
1.1.3 Increase in Shariah-based Legislation 
Islamic political parties in the post-Soeharto era have relinquished their demand to re-
install the Jakarta Charter. However, it does not mean they have totally abandoned their 
aspiration for shariah-based law-making. At present, these parties are directing their 
efforts at creating legislation that meet their vision of shariah at the local level. As we 
                                                 
17 Martin van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid: Indonesian Muslim Intellectual,” ISIM Review, 17 (2006): 
22. 
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have seen in the previous section, there is presently no formal demand from any political 
party to bring back the Jakarta Charter, a document that obliges Muslims to practice 
shariah. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan is still trying to portray itself as a “champion of 
shariah while downplaying the consequences of its constitutional recognition”.18 The 
only party with a consistent demand for this Islamist constitutional change is Partai Bulan 
Bintang, considered as the descendant of Masyumi in the post-1998 period. But this party 
did not manage to gather enough votes in the 2009 General Election to pass the electoral 
threshold. At the national level, Islamic political parties have not been able to work 
together to put forward this demand effectively19 and therefore are unlikely to provide 
any ideological challenge to Pancasila. 
The demand for the implementation of shariah has not passed away, however, but 
instead moved to lower levels of governance.20 Interestingly, the supporters of shariah 
by-laws are not only the Islamic-leaning political parties.21 The secular-leaning political 
parties in Indonesia (such as Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrat, and Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan) may have Pancasila as their basic ideology but have nevertheless 
tolerated the promulgation and implementation of shariah on local levels.22  
 There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. At the individual 
level, more than fifty per cent of parliamentary members elected in the 1999 General 
Election are alumni of the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), an 
organisation over which the late Nurcholish Madjid presided for two consecutive three-
year terms since 1966.23 Madjid’s thought on the de-sacralisation of political concepts 
and institutions had motivated HMI’s alumni to join secular-leaning political parties. This 
migration of HMI alumni has put Islamisation into the agenda of these parties, as can be 
seen in the rise of conservatism within Golongan Karya (now Partai Golkar) since the late 
                                                 
18 Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 325.  
19 Deliar Noer, “Masa Depan Politik Indonesia,” in Hajatan Demokrasi: Potret Jurnalistik Pemilu 
Langsung Simpul Islam Indonesia dari Moderat hingga Garis Keras, ed. Asrori S. Karni (Jakarta: PT Era 
Media Informasi, 2006), 267. 
20 Platzdasch, Islamism, 175. 
21 Asrori S. Karni and Anthony Djafar, “Cuaca Pekat Syariat,” in Hajatan Demokrasi, 336-38. 
22 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” South East Asia 
Research 10, no. 2 (2002): 123; and Platzdasch, Islamism, 332. 
23 van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid,” 23. 
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1980s24 and the efforts of Partai Demokrat and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
(PDIP) in the Reform era to show their commitment to religion.25 At present, despite the 
fact that Islam is almost nowhere to be seen in formal politics, it is strongly asserting its 
importance in shaping the socio-cultural identity of Indonesians. 
 Another possible explanation is related to the re-introduction of democracy in 
Indonesia. Democracy demands that politicians satisfy the demands of their electorates. 
As the late Abdurrahman Wahid asserted, shariah is a highly sought-after commodity in 
the present Indonesian politics26 and therefore has become a tool to boost candidates’ 
popularity in local elections. As moderate as Indonesians are in their voting behaviour, 
several polling results show a tendency towards more religious attitudes. In a survey 
conducted in 2007, even though fifty-seven per cent of Indonesian Muslims claim 
themselves to be secular, thirty-three per cent of Muslims surveyed identify themselves 
with Islamist values.27 Moreover, a more recent survey in 2009 shows that Indonesians 
are supportive of the legislation of religious norms in their society.28  
 In March 2007, fifty-three districts, or more than ten per cent of Indonesia’s 499 
regencies and municipalities, have reportedly implemented shariah-based regulations, an 
increase from only seven districts four years before. Most of these regulations do not use 
the term “Islamic” in their title and are issued using non-religious wording in the service 
of seemingly general moral values.29 The Islamic ambience surrounding them, however, 
can be felt as these regulations mainly aim at asserting Islamic identities, such as the 
obligation for women to don veils on their heads.30 Because of their general moral tone, 
the implementation of these regulations, therefore, does not contradict the 1945 
Constitution, especially after the issuance of Law Number 22 in 1999 (amended by Law 
Number 32 in 2004) granting more autonomy to the regions.  
                                                 
24 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies,” 123. 
25 Platzdasch, Islamism, 332. 
26 Wahid, “Musuh dalam Selimut,” 141. 
27 Lembaga Survei Indonesia, “Trend Orientasi Nilai-nilai Politik Islamis vs Nilai-nilai Politik Sekuler dan 
Kekuatan Islam Politik,” a survey result (2007). 
28 Lembaga Survei Indonesia, “Komunalisme dan Populisme Masyarakat Indonesia,” a survey result 
(2009). 
29 Platzdasch, Islamism, 325. 
30 Wahid, “Musuh dalam Selimut,” 139-40. 
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 The post-1998 period is thus an interesting time for Indonesia in terms of the 
relation between Islam and democracy. The country has been a democracy since 1998, 
with its Islamic-leaning political parties having abandoned the demand to make shariah 
the basic law on the national level regulating the laws of Muslims. The issue of Islamic 
law, however, has not disappeared from the political scene.  
 
1.2 Research Agenda 
In elaborating the convergence of those three political tendencies, I do not mean to imply 
that all Islamic movements in Indonesia support the simultaneous presence of these three 
political trends. The Nahdlatul Ulama as the largest Islamic group in Indonesia, for 
example, has formally stated its objection to the formalisation of shariah,31 while Laskar 
Jihad and Pesantren Gentur are intensively against democracy.32 Regardless of these 
opposing voices, however, the presence of these three political trends is evident. 
Where does Muhammadiyah stand in this configuration? As explained in the 
introduction of this chapter, Muhammadiyah’s members tend to be divided in their 
response to the call for reform in Islam in general and of Muhammadiyah in particular. 
This dissertation will look at these two opposite tendencies. The first question this 
dissertation asks is, how did these two opposite tendencies emerge? The second, and 
more ambitious, question is, why did they emerge? For the first question I am interested 
in establishing the process while for the second question I will look at the factors that 
triggered this process. The reminder of this section will serve as a further elaboration of 
these two research questions. 
My interest in this dissertation is influenced by my observation of the presence of 
opposing tendencies, namely the scripturalist and the modernist, in revivalist movements 
across religions. With respect to Christian Reformation, the work of Walsham tells us of 
the presence of both “desacralization” and “resacralization” tendencies within this 
movement, one that renders unsound the assumed linkage of the Reformation in Christian 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 190. 
32 Herry Mohammad and Sujoko, “Syariat Tak Pernah Padam: Eks Laskar Jihad,” in Hajatan Demokrasi, 
273-78; and G. A. Guritno and Sulhan Syafi’i, “Tiga Generasi Tanpa Warna: Pesantren Gentur,” in 
Hajatan Demokrasi, 295-99. 
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Europe to the rise of modernism and liberalism.33 With regard to Muhammadiyah as an 
Islamic modernist movement, as the Research Significance section in this chapter will 
show, the opposing tendencies of scripturalism and modernism since the 1980s have 
interested scholars on Muhammadiyah. Various explanations have been forwarded to 
explain these tendencies and my dissertation will try to offer an analytical framework 
that, to the best of my knowledge, has scarcely been used to explain the presence of these 
two opposing tendencies within Muhammadiyah. 
This dissertation employs Pierre Bourdieu’s analytical framework in investigating 
the two opposing tendencies in present-day Muhammadiyah, focusing on the notions of 
“habitus”, “field”, and “crisis”. The next section will supply details on these three terms 
and how I intend to use them to answer my research questions. In summary, I am 
interested in using a new perspective to look at an issue that has been characteristic of 
Muhammadiyah’s existence and that has been quite conspicuously present in the post-
1998 period. Pierre Bourdieu’s analytical framework has never been extensively used to 
investigate this phenomenon within Muhammadiyah but I believe that this framework 
may shine further light on it. 
The Bourdieusian framework, however, only suffices to answer the first research 
question. To answer my second question, this framework will be complemented by a 
post-colonial approach, focusing on the influence culture on Islam in general and 
Muhammadiyah in particular of what is perceived by Muhammadiyah’s members to be 
Western. This approach will analyse the reaction of Muhammadiyah’s members towards 
the influence of what is often referred to as Western perspectives, examining how this 
reaction can take the form of both imitation and rejection of the so-called West, and how 
the dichotomy of domination-resistance becomes blurred through the practices of 
imitation. 
The linking of the Bourdieusian framework with another that accommodates the 
practice of hybridity has been urged by a number of scholars of his work, such as McNay 
and Adkins. While McNay argues that Bourdieu’s concept of “bounded freedom” linked 
                                                 
33 Alexandra Walsham, “The Reformation and ‘The Disenchantment of the World’ Reassessed,” The 
Historical Journal 51, no. 2 (2008): 497. 
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to Bourdieusian framework provides a way to understand how the practice of emulating a 
dominant structure can contain the potential for resistance,34 Adkins asserts that the 
potential for ambivalence in the practice of mimicry and hybridity is unfounded in 
Bourdieu’s works and thus needs to be introduced into Bourdieusian framework.35 
Regardless of their different readings of Bourdieu, both works suggest the importance of 
linking a Bourdieusian framework with another one that problematises the dichotomy of 
dominance and resistance.  
There is one important issue that I need to address at the beginning of my 
dissertation: the use of the terms “puritanism” and “liberalism”. This dissertation avoids 
using these two categories because this kind of categorisation narrows one’s discussion of 
the attitudes of Muhammadiyah’s members to their views on the interpretation of 
scriptures. Support for the status quo might include the tendency to be more scriptural in 
one’s interpretation of religion, but this might not be its only tendency. In the same light, 
a reformist position might entail a less scriptural reading of the Qur’an but this 
dissertation does not focus solely on this particular understanding of reform. I will instead 
use the categories “status quo” and “reform” to refer to the opinions within 
Muhammadiyah.  
 
1.2.1 Habitus, Field, and Crisis 
To explain what the categories of status quo and reform refer to and therefore to help me 
answer the two research questions explained above, I will refer to the notions of 
“habitus” and “field” in Pierre Bourdieu’s work. As mentioned in the previous section, 
my choice of the Bourdieusian analytical framework is encouraged by what I consider to 
be its potential to explain the two opposing tendencies in Muhammadiyah. 
The first thing we should keep in mind about Bourdieu’s works is that his analysis 
is aimed first and foremost at the rejection of both objectivism and subjectivism in 
                                                 
34 Lois McNay, “Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity,” Theory 
Culture Society 16, no. 1 (1999): 104-5. 
35 Lisa Adkins, “Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender?” Theory Culture Society 20, no. 6 (2003): 37. 
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understanding human actions.36 Bourdieu’s sociology, on the one hand, rejects the 
assumption that individuals are mere products of the prescribed rules that belong to a 
social structure. On the other hand, he did not intend to take the structure out of sociology 
and let the individual gain absolute agency.37 As Bourdieu puts it, 
one has to escape from the realism of the structure, to which objectivism, a necessary stage in 
breaking with primary experience and constructing the objective relationships, necessarily leads 
when it hypostatises these relations by treating them as realities already constituted outside of the 
history of the group – without falling back into subjectivism, which is quite incapable of giving 
an account of the necessity of the social world. To do this, one has to return to practice….38 
From the above quote, we can understand, on the one hand, Bourdieu’s suspicion of 
subjectivism as stemming from what he sees as its disregard of the role of the social 
world in explaining human “objective relationship”. On the other hand, he also objects to 
objectivism due to its assumption of the existence of social structure outside the life of 
individuals. 
 His criticism of these two extreme opposites in social sciences, however, should 
be understood as a response to the dominance of structuralism in French intellectual 
milieu in the 1960s and the 1970s. In this light, we can understand his criticism of 
objectivism as:  
fall[ing] into the fetishism of social laws to which objectivism consigns itself when in 
establishing between structure and practice the relations of the virtual to the actual, of the score 
to the performance, of essence to existence, it merely substitutes for the creative man of 
subjectivism a man subjugated to the dead laws of a natural history.39 
Also in the light of the dominance of objectivism, we can still discern, despite his 
criticism of both positions, Bourdieu’s partiality in favour of objectivism. Loic 
Wacquant, considered to be Bourdieu’s intellectual pupil, has this to say about the issue: 
It should be stressed that, although the two moments of analysis are equally necessary they are 
not equal: epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist 
understanding. Application of Durkheim’s first principle of the “sociological method”, the 
                                                 
36 Loic J. D. Wacquant, “Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology,” 
in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, (Cambridge: Polity 
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37 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 139. 
38 Ibid., 52. 
39 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 84. 
 14
systematic rejection of preconceptions, must come before analysis of the practical apprehension 
of the world from the subjective standpoint.40 
There are two interesting points in the above quotations. First, to go beyond the 
objectivism/subjectivism debate, Bourdieu gives emphasis to the concept of practice, 
which he defined as “the site of the dialectic of … the objectified products and the 
incorporated products of historical practice; of structure and habitus”.41 Second, 
Bourdieusian framework insists on the need for any analysis of practices to be conducted 
by taking into account social structure. To put it differently, even though Bourdieu’s 
framework is critical towards both subjectivism and objectivism, it still favours the latter 
in its treatment of practices.  
Before I go any further in my elaboration of Bourdieu’s sociology, let me provide 
summarised definitions of Bourdieu’s key concepts of practice, doxa, field, habitus, 
crisis, and logos. Practice is both the mental tendency and physical behaviours of social 
agents while doxa refers to social agents’ predispositions that motivate this practice. Field 
is the perceived environment in which social agents live, while habitus is the whole set of 
social agents’ predispositions that relate them to their perceived field. Habitus creates 
harmony between social agents’ practices and their environment while a crisis represents 
the opposite situation, a situation in which social agents’ habitus are in conflict with their 
field due to changed circumstances in their environment. With regard to social sciences, 
due to the complicated nature of social agents’ practices, scholars task themselves with 
creating a mental map to explain their subjects’ behaviours. This mental map is called 
logos.  
 Bourdieu opposes practice to logos as he opposes speech (parole) to language 
(langue). The task of a grammarian is related to language while that of an orator is related 
to speech. While a grammarian is concerned with the language in order to codify it, an 
orator aims at constructing a speech. Associating people and their everyday lives with 
orators and their speeches, and scholars to grammarians and language, Bourdieu insists 
that social analysis should be concerned not with the mental map, or logos, which 
scholars tend to produce, but with the actual practice of individuals as understood at the 
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time it occurs and from the perspective of social agents; or, in other words, practice as 
bound in temporality.42 Due to this bounded nature of practice, individuals should be 
regarded as social agents rather than subjects, a concept that assumes that human beings 
have the ultimate freedom to make choices.43 Social agents perpetually face the objective 
world with their acquired predispositions, which Bourdieu refers to as doxa; their 
practices are the projection of their doxa onto the objective world.  
 Bourdieu provides a number of examples of this generative nature of habitus. In 
his study of the Kabyle Berber society in Algeria, he took the example of the matrimonial 
strategy employed by the members of the village. A father has three choices to marry his 
daughter: to a man of lower, equal, or higher status, depending on the father’s economic 
and social circumstances. Each of these decisions, however, has its common origin in his 
habitus, defined in this respect by Bourdieu as “the product of the structures that it tends 
to reproduce and which implies a ‘spontaneous’ submission to the established order and 
to the orders of the guardians of that order”.44 The principle for these matrimonial 
strategies, Bourdieu continues, 
is neither calculating reason nor the mechanical determinations of economic necessity, but the 
dispositions inculcated by the conditions of existence, a kind of socially constituted instinct 
which causes the objectively calculable demands of a particular form of economy to be 
experienced as an unavoidable call of duty or an irresistible impulse of feeling.45 
Comprehending practices, therefore, cannot be understood through the building of 
an “anthropological map” that creates a representation of the mentality of social agents in 
the forms of rules they submit to,46 a system of codification in language, a logos. Social 
agents are not emulators of linguistic codes; they are not practitioners of logos since there 
is not any set of rules to be implemented by social agents. Social agents have: 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
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conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain 
them.47 
These systems are what Bourdieu calls “habitus”. It is, simply put, a set of embodied 
dispositions that are, in turn, productive of practices. These embodied dispositions are the 
products of the history of specific social groups, as opposed to the field – the objectified 
history in which social agents find themselves.48 
 Habitus is a generating structure in the sense that it contains a set of 
predispositions instead of rules. Doxa function not in making social agents conduct 
predetermined tasks in a certain situation, but in acting as body and mental schemata for a 
set of possible practices. The social world influences the conduct of its agents through the 
bestowal of those schemata. Habitus is therefore creative and inventive but those 
schemata which habitus provides do not come out of a vacuum; they are reproduced 
within societies.49  
The realisation of habitus in practice, understood as the activation of a set of 
schemata is not, therefore, a conscious effort on the part of social agents. Habitus 
provides a “feel for the game”, not the game’s rules. In this sense, Bourdieu likens social 
agents to a gymnast to the extent that gymnasts do not treat their sport as a science of 
geometry but rather as an arena, a “field”, in which they are accustomed to move in a 
certain manner, following a certain set of predispositions, a habitus.50 
The embodiment of this habitus in the body of social agents marks the presence of 
social factors within those agents and therefore problematises the attribution of those 
agents’ practices to their cognitive calculation. Doxa, or acquired predispositions, are 
embodied in the bodies of social agents and not just their minds. The schemata in habitus 
are not only mental but also physical. To put it differently, Bourdieu’s sociology seeks to 
go beyond the mind/body dichotomy. In order to do this, the body should become the 
main locus of habitus. Because real practice takes the form of bodily movements, human 
bodies should be regarded as the repository of predispositions. In other words, mental 
predispositions demonstrate their forms in bodily movements. In its mental representation 
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of culture and its neglect of the embodied embeddedness of habitus, an anthropological 
map of culture, therefore, is detached from social agents in its efforts to be able to 
sufficiently explain their practices. 
 With the feel for the field, or the “game” if we use a sport metaphor once more, 
social agents as players do not participate in it to follow the rules; they are in the game 
because they are born in it. The game is their life and, as for the gymnast described 
above, they move in the game as they have learned all their lives. To judge whether 
Bourdieu’s social agents are either conscious or otherwise in their participation in the 
game is irrelevant. Consciousness in Bourdieu’s understanding is never unconditional. 
Certainly, participation in the game cannot be conducted unconsciously but 
consciousness for social agents is always conditional with their habitus as its 
conditioning factor. 
 There are rules in gymnastics that our gymnast has to obey but for Bourdieu, 
gymnastics will only become geometry and not a game for the gymnast if he does not 
embody those rules in their corporeal existence. The competition’s rules should not be 
seen as rules. The gymnast indeed has to deny the presence of these rules, but 
simultaneously embodies them, if he wishes to be in the game. In social life, Bourdieu 
refers to this feel for the game as “learned ignorance” (docta ignorantia): “a mode of 
practical knowledge not comprising of knowledge of its own principles”.51 
 The strategy employed by the players in the game, therefore, is not a strategy 
springing from the calculation of rational actors. Rather, the rationality of the actors is 
bound to their habitus, their understanding of what counts as rational or otherwise as 
habitually-bound. In this respect, habitus “is the source of practices which are objectively 
recognised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention – 
which would presuppose at least that they are perceived as one strategy among other 
possible strategies”.52 Elaborating habitus further through the perspective of religion, 
Bourdieu mentions that  
rites are practices that are ends in themselves, that are justified by their very performance; things 
that one does because they are “the done thing”, “the right thing to do”, but also because one 
                                                 
51 Bourdieu, Outline, 19. 
52 Ibid., 73. 
 18
cannot do otherwise, without needing to know why or for whom one does them, or what they 
mean….53 
For social agents, the fact that the game they play is the only game they are aware of frees 
them from explaining why they do what they do. In other words, the set of 
predispositions – doxa – contained in a habitus deems everyday experience for social 
agents self-evident. Doxa, in this regard, can be distinguished from “orthodox or 
heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or 
antagonistic beliefs”.54 
 But even if habitus should not be seen as a set of rules, it still has a unifying effect 
on the practices of social agents.55 Habitus still generates regularity in the practices of 
social agents sharing it, with regularity defined by Bourdieu as “what recurs with a 
certain statistically measurable frequency and from the formula which describes it”.56 The 
similar preferences and perceptions shown by social agents belonging to a certain social 
position57 are the enabling structures that produce the regularity of practices among them. 
The regularity is not a product of a submission to certain rules. Instead, it springs out of a 
similar system of preferences and perceptions. This system constitutes the modus 
operandi of social agents; this system is their habitus and it is an enabling potential for 
the practices of those agents.  
 Summarising Bourdieu’s sociological framework so far, we can look at this 
framework as an effort to avoid extreme opposites of subjectivism, as represented by 
rational theories, and objectivism or structuralism. Even though his framework is meant 
to be a more realistic tool to understand social practices, the reality of social practices for 
Bourdieu still favours objectivism. For him, social practices are influenced by social 
structure through the operation of habitus as a generative structure, and not a conformity-
seeking structure. 
 Employing the concept of habitus in analysing religious practices of social agents 
has resulted in an array of interesting findings. Using the notion of habitus in his analysis, 
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Talal Asad criticised the modern idea that “a (religious) practitioner cannot know how to 
live religiously without being able to articulate that knowledge”.58 The modern idea sees 
religion as a set of explicit rules about how to live a religious life. Modern men thus see 
religiosity as containing various obligations that one accepts. Habitus, by contrast, 
is not something one accepts or rejects, it is part of what one essentially is and must do. (The 
ethics of passionate necessity encompasses tragedy.) Oedipus puts out his own eyes not because 
his conscience or his god considers that he deserves to be punished for failing to be responsible – 
or because he thinks he does – but because (as he says) he cannot bear the thought of having to 
look his father and his mother in the eyes when he joins them beyond the grave, or to see his 
children, “begotten as they were begotten”. He acts as he does necessarily, out of the passion that 
is his habitus.59 
With regard to the Western way of understanding Islam, Asad’s criticism is directed 
against the tendency of the modern view to treat questions of morality in Islam beyond 
the social context and use the historical development of Christianity since the onset of 
Protestantism as the standard by which to judge Islam. In his view, this comparison is 
misplaced because, although Islamic law distinguishes between law and ethics, neither 
term should be understood in its modern, secular sense.60 In Asad’s understanding, 
religion, law, and ethics cannot be perfectly separated and therefore religious behaviours 
should be understood in terms of the passion, not obligation, that motivates them. 
 Saba Mahmood’s research on an urban women’s mosque movement in Cairo is 
another example of the employment of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in analysing 
religious practices in Muslim communities. Mahmood’s endeavour is aimed at 
problematising the common understanding of agency as resistance to social norms.61 
Using this understanding, the practice of veiling in women is usually considered as the 
sign of a lack of agency on their part. Her fieldwork in Cairo, however, shows a different 
picture. The women who belong to the mosque movement see veiling not as an 
expression of identity but as “a necessary, if insufficient, condition for attaining the goal 
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internal to that practice – namely, the creation of a shy and modest self. The veil in this 
sense is the means both of being and becoming a certain kind of person”.62 In other 
words, veiling for these women does not only constitute a reflection of their interiority; it 
is also the means by which this interiority is acquired.63 The same goes for the practice of 
the five daily prayers for these women, which they identify as “a key site for purposefully 
moulding their intentions, emotions, and desires in accord with orthodox standards of 
Islamic piety”.64 
 In this light, a moral habitus can be achieved by conscious practices, either 
through daily prayers, the veiling of the body, the listening to tape-recorded religious 
sermons,65 or just the practising of general Islamic teachings by new Muslim converts.66 
The valuable contribution of these works in extending Bourdieu’s concept of habitus lies 
in their treatment of the supposedly pre-reflexive habitus as a product of conscious 
socialisation. 
 But it would be wrong to conclude that the habitus that one either consciously 
learned or unconsciously acquired, and thus the divergence of Mahmood’s works from 
Bourdieu’s understanding, will always fit the field which one inhabits. Bourdieu 
anticipates the potential for a crisis situation to be disruptive of the “quasi-perfect 
coincidence between objective tendencies and subjective expectations”.67 A crisis occurs 
when there is a gap between one’s habitus and field. Social changes introduce 
transformation to the field. One example of a crisis given by Bourdieu is when a society 
is undergoing an economic liberalisation in which the expectation arising from an 
attainment of a level of education in a certain discipline is met with changes in the 
economy that no longer puts the same value on that particular discipline. In this situation, 
there is a discrepancy between the qualifications one achieves, along with the position 
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one expects from it, and the change in the economy in which there is an increasingly 
limited number of expected jobs available.  
Together with the emerging occupational insecurity that usually accompanies 
economic liberalisation, this crisis creates a margin of freedom for political action aimed 
at reopening the space of possibilities. 
Symbolic power, which can manipulate hopes and expectation, especially through a more or less 
inspired and uplifting performative evocation of the future – prophesy, forecast or prediction – 
can introduce a degree of play into the correspondence between expectations and chances and 
open up a space of freedom through the more or less voluntarist positing of more or less 
improbable possibles – utopia, project, programme or plan – which the pure logic of probabilities 
would lead one to regard as practically excluded.68 
But before that margin of freedom is able to envision a different future, when once again 
habitus fits the field, social agents will experience a condition that Bourdieu refers to as 
the “hysteria of habitus”, defined as the “incapacity to think historical crises in categories 
of perception and thought other than those of the past”.69 
 With regard to the case of Muhammadiyah, the above elaboration of works related 
to the use of the concepts of habitus, field, and crisis can provide us with preliminary 
hypotheses to the research questions this dissertation poses. Related to the question on 
how two totally opposing tendencies can arise within Muhammadiyah, I would argue that 
habitus as a generative structure allows this difference. Despite the differences between 
the two tendencies, I would explain that they arise from one shared predisposition among 
the members of Muhammadiyah; a predisposition which I dub ‘reflective’ and will be 
explained in the next section. 
 On the question of why the two tendencies emerged, I suggest that differences in 
the way each camp perceives a crisis in the field which Muhammadiyah inhabits informs 
us how each perception of crisis can produce different reactions. The differences between 
the two camps can be traced to two factors. The first factor is related to each camp’s 
definition of crisis in Muhammadiyah with respect to the change in their field of life. The 
second is the solution each of the camp offers to the crisis of the field.  
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 This crisis of the field, I propose, is related to the influence of Western cultural 
and ideological elements in the lives of Muslims. While the status quo camp sees the 
presence of the West as the cause of the crisis, the reform camp sees it as a symptom of 
the wider phenomenon of globalisation that is at the heart of this crisis.  
Furthermore, to complement this Bourdieusian framework, a post-colonial 
perspective might be propitiously employed to develop this framework in order to explain 
the causes of this crisis. In Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation I argue that the 
trigger to the emergence of two opposing tendencies in Muhammadiyah is the perception 
of the organisation’s members towards the presence and influence of a Western 
perspective in the life of Muslims. The elaboration of a post-colonial perspective on the 
practice of appropriation of what is perceived to be Western culture in Chapter Five will 
explain how both the emulation and the rejection of the West plays a pivotal part in the 
mind of non-Western people in forming their hybrid identities.  
The simplistic dichotomy of domination-resistance is not relevant here. The story 
of Muhammadiyah’s members in this dissertation demonstrates a more complicated 
narrative than the naïve associations of the practice of emulation to the act of submission 
and rejection to resistance. The adoption of a post-colonial perspective can shine a light 
on this blurred dichotomy and complement the Bourdieusian framework of the crisis of 
the field: while the proponents of the status quo relate the presence of the West as the 
cause of the crisis, and of their “hysteria of habitus”, those of the reform camp critique 
this “hysteria” and take advantage of the presence of the West to enunciate and criticise 
their own predispositions and therefore open up a margin of freedom through their 
various reform projects. 
 
1.2.2 Reflexivity and Reflectivity 
Two other key concepts employed in my dissertation are reflexivity and reflectivity. In 
the previous section I associated what I define as the status quo and reform camps within 
Muhammadiyah with each of their response to ‘hysteria of habitus’. This section will 
serve as a summarised discussion of the concepts of reflexivity and reflectivity, while the 
full elaboration will be conducted in Chapter Four. The main argument in this section is 
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as follows: reflectivity is a particular way for social agents to view their field; it is a 
particular predisposition or habitus.  
The general definition of reflexivity comes from George Herbert Mead. He 
defines reflexivity as “the turning back of the experience of the individual upon 
himself”.70 In other words, reflexivity refers to self’s reflection upon him- or herself, or 
the use of one’s thought to assess oneself. Writing in 2010, almost seventy years after 
Mead, Mouzelis introduces two forms of reflexivity aimed at giving clarity to the 
confusion of various scholarly definitions of reflexivity that have come up thus far.71 
Those two types are the cataphatic and apophatic (negative) ones.72 
The cataphatic, and the more common, understanding of reflexivity is based on 
active and means-ends calculation. The self-reflection in this form of reflexivity assumes 
a rational agent concerned about analysing oneself to achieve a conscious goal, namely a 
better and more secure self. Examples used by Mouzelis to elaborate this form of 
reflexivity are taken from Giddens’ works on reflexive modernisation.73 In Mouzelis’s 
view, Giddens’ theory treats the individual, faced with the decreasing role of the state in 
the age of reflexive modernisation with respect to the welfare of its citizens, as reliant on 
himself for his survivability. A rational, means-ends calculation is assumed to be the 
individual’s natural response to this situation. 
The apophatic form of reflexivity assumes a more spontaneous path to reflexivity. 
With respect to goals and identity, the apopathic reflexivity has these assumptions: 
Goals … are neither pre-given/pre-constituted (as in rational choice theory), nor externally 
imposed. The same is true about identity formation. Identities are neither ascriptive nor 
cataphatically constructed.74  
To put it differently, reflexivity in apophatic sense is intensely related to individual 
reflexes in the face of situations confronting him. The reason behind social agents’ self-
                                                 
70 George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1934), 134. 
71 Ray Holland, “Reflexivity,” Human Relations 52 (1999): 463. 
72 Nicos Mouzelis, “Self and Self-Other Reflexivity: Apophatic Dimension,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 13, no.2 (2010): 271-84. 
73 For works of Anthony Giddens in relations to his conceptualisation of reflexive modernity, see Anthony 
Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); Anthony Giddens, Modernity and 
Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); and Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1992). 
74 Mouzelis, 273. 
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reflection in apophatic reflexivity is more spiritual than rational; the way they reflect 
upon their own selves is more spontaneous than calculated. The spiritual dimension of 
this form of reflexivity is obvious when we look at Mouzelis’s use of Jiddu 
Krishnamurti’s spiritual writing as an example of apophatic reflexivity.75 
My usage of the term ‘reflexivity’ in this dissertation leans more toward the 
apophatic understanding of this concept. I define reflexivity as the capacity of social 
agents to immediately view their position within their field and to react almost 
instinctively to certain things or actions according to their predisposition. With regard to 
reflectivity, I define it as a particular sort of predisposition that inclines social agents to 
treat the world as divided between their selves as the subjects of action and their 
environment as the object of their analyses and actions. In this respect, reflectivity can be 
seen as one among various predispositions that can form social agents’ reflexivity. In 
other words, the way social agents react immediately to certain objects in their social 
world (their reflexivity) can take the form of reflectivity. 
 Bourdieu’s understanding of reflexivity is associated with a critical attitude 
towards one’s own predisposition, which falls closer to the cataphatic understanding of 
the concept. My definition of reflexivity, however, associates social agents’ 
predispositions with human reflexes. Social agents’ predispositions, in my understanding, 
are effected instinctively. This dissertation will use this understanding of reflexivity. It 
will see reflexivity as social agents’ predisposed view of the game in which they live. 
Social agents – to use Bourdieu’s own understanding when he was not talking about 
reflexivity – are not social scientists. They do not have the luxury of reflecting on their 
behaviours. Even when they reflect on their predispositions, they do it in a way their 
predispositions allow them to. 
 I will further elaborate my understanding of the concepts of reflexivity and 
reflectivity further in Chapter Four. My usage of this alternative understanding to the 
relation between reflectivity and reflexivity is to give a background to Chapter Four when 
                                                 
75 Four books of Jiddu Krishnamurti examined by Mouzelis are The Impossible Question (1972), 
Beginnings of Learning (1975), The Wholeness of Life (1978), and The Ending of Time (1985). All four 
books are published in London by Gollanez. 
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I talk about the reflective predisposition of Muhammadiyah’s members that forms their 
habitus.  
 
1.3 Research Significance 
Many works have been dedicated to the study of Muhammadiyah as the biggest and the 
most influential modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia. The first major publication in 
a canon of studies on Muhammadiyah is Deliar Noer’s The Modernist Muslim Movement 
in Indonesia 1900-1942.76 As its title shows, however, Muhammadiyah is not its sole 
subject. Noer’s is a historical study tracing the emergence and development of various 
modernist Muslim movements in Indonesia during the last four decades of Dutch rule. 
The book’s attention is on the contribution of these movements to the political cause of 
anti-colonialism and the construction of Indonesian nationalism.  
 Four more publications in this cannon touch upon the topic of Muhammadiyah 
but only in order to explain more general phenomena which form their main focus. Harry 
J. Benda’s The Crescent and the Rising Sun investigates the role of Islam in the formation 
of Indonesian nationalism77 with Muhammadiyah as one among various Islamic 
organisations within that formation. Lance Castles’ Religion, Politics, and Economic 
Behavior in Java traces the intermingling between Islam, politics, and economic 
behaviours in the cigarette industry of Kudus, a town in East Java. In this work, 
Muhammadiyah, again, is treated as one among various Islamic organisations 
representing Islam in Kudus.78 In a similar manner, Muhammadiyah is among 
organisations and societal groups in West Sumatra under Taufik Abdullah’s investigation 
in his School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933)79 
                                                 
76 Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement. 
77 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 
1942-1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 1. 
78 Lance Castles, Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry (Yale: 
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1967), 64. 
79 Taufik Abdullah, School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1971). 
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and receives an even smaller attention in Kahin’s Nationalism and Revolution in 
Indonesia.80 
 Related to the questions this dissertation poses, the first work that touches upon 
the nature of two seemingly conflicting tendencies in Muhammadiyah is Mitsuo 
Nakamura’s 1976 study The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the 
Muhammadijah Movement in a Central Javanese Town. In his conclusion on the 
development of Muhammadiyah’s movement in Kotagede, Nakamura argues that 
Muhammadiyah “looks exclusivistic when viewed from outside, but in fact it is 
extremely open when you are within…. It looks aggressive and fanatic, but in fact its 
ways of propagation are gradualist and tolerant”.81 The two seemingly different attitudes 
in Muhammadiyah in this work are its fanaticism and tolerance. 
 The work of Alfian also gives attention to the tension between fanaticism and 
tolerance in Muhammadiyah. In his research on the Muhammadiyah movement during 
Dutch colonial rule, Alfian finds different characteristics between different 
Muhammadiyah’s branches. The differences can be found between Muhammadiyah in 
Minangkabau and in Java: 
As religious revivalists, Muhammadiyah leaders and activists in Minangkabau were mostly 
concerned with the purity of the Faith more than with anything else, and this might have caused 
them to become politically less flexible and religiously more fanatic. Unlike Minangkabau, 
Muhammadijah leaders and activists in Java was much more concerned with the way to reconcile 
the Faith with the modern world.82 
                                                 
80 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1952). 
81 Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadijah Movement 
in a Central Javanese Town (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services: 1997), 320-21. Nakamura wrote about 
the more recent development of Muhammadiyah in the same town, Kotagede, in the second part of the 
2012 enlarged edition of the book. In this part of the book, he noticed a recent development in 
Muhammadiyah movement in Kotagede that gave birth to a stream of Muhammadiyah’s members that refer 
to themselves as part of “Cultural Muhammadiyah” as opposed to “Structural Muhammadiyah” in the 
leadership hierarchy in Muhammadiyah Kotagede (Nakamura Mitsuo, The Crescent Arises over the 
Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, c.1910s-2010, 2nd 
enlarged ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 339.) This dual categorisation of 
Muhammadiyah’s members in Kotagede is parallel to my categorisation between the supporters of the 
reform and status quo camps, respectively. The “Cultural Muhammadiyah” group in Nakamura’s study is 
comparable to the cultural project I discuss in Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
82 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch 
Colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), 353. 
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 Arbiyah Lubis’s dissertation on the mode of thought in Muhammadiyah tells a 
different story. She sees the presence of the tension between modernism and 
traditionalism in assessing Muhammadiyah’s religious outlook, but she insists that 
despite the modern educational system that the organisation has introduced to Indonesian 
Muslim communities, the organisation’s mode of interpreting Islam allows only a 
minimum role for human reason, and is therefore more scripturalist.83 The same tone was 
set by a more recent work by Pradana Boy. He believes that there is presently a struggle 
between the liberal and conservative wings within the organisation. The conservative 
group, however, seemed to be able to exert hegemony over the progressive Islamic 
groups in this organisation at the time of his writing.84 
 After investigating scholarly works on Muhammadiyah related to the issue of 
contradiction between modernism and puritanism, I will discuss three works which 
perceive no such contradiction. On the one hand, Alwi Shihab’s work on the emergence 
and development of Muhammadiyah shows us how the fear towards the issue of 
conversion to Christianity facilitated by the activities of Christian missions has motivated 
the activities of this organisation since its inception. Anti-Christian sentiment and not 
modernist aspiration, argues Shihab, is the driving factor in both the establishment of this 
organisation and its subsequent programs.85 Modern methods were only adopted as a tool 
to resist the efforts of Christian missions. On the other hand, Achmad Jainuri argues that 
in the period between 1912 and 1942, the formation of Muhammadiyah’s ideology 
resulted in “a particular religious outlook, worldview, and system of ethical values, in 
which openness, plurality, hard work, rational calculation, and a spirit of liberalism were 
all encouraged”.86 In this work, Jainuri establishes the characteristic of Muhammadiyah 
that is aimed at modernising the Muslims of the Dutch Indies and thus increasing their 
capacity to compete with other religious groups in performing “good deeds”.87 
                                                 
83 Arbiyah Lubis, “Pemikiran Muhammadiyah dan Muhammad Abduh (Suatu Perbandingan)” (PhD  diss., 
IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1989), 290-93. 
84 Pradana Boy, Para Pembela Islam: Pertarungan Kelompok Progresif dan Konservatif di Muhammadiyah 
(Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2009). 
85 Alwi Shihab, Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Misi Kristen di Indonesia 
sejak November 1912 hingga Masa Kini (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), 196-97. 
86 Achmad Jainuri, “The Formation of the Muhammadiyah’s Ideology, 1912-1942” (PhD diss., McGill 
University, 1997), 196. 
87 Ibid., 167. 
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 Jainuri’s comparison between Muhammadiyah and Calvinism is not new. Many 
observers have recognised similarities between Muhammadiyah and Christian Reformism 
in their members’ sense of mission in life. Peacock’s Muslim Puritans, for example, finds 
rational behavioural patterns historically associated with Christian Reformism within 
individual behaviours of Muslim reformists in Indonesia (Muhammadiyah’s members in 
Yogyakarta in particular), Malaysia, and Singapore. In his conclusion, even though 
Peacock sees Muslims reformists in these three countries as distinctively and 
simultaneously Southeast Asia and Islam, and having complex cultural orientation,88 he 
still sees these Muslim reformists’ behaviours as affirming the logic of Weber’s notion of 
rationalism.89 For Peacock, what distinguishes these Muslim reformists from other 
Muslims is first and foremost their rational attitude. Like Jainuri, he sees no distinctive 
contradiction in their behavioural patterns. 
 My dissertation observes this contradiction within Muhammadiyah, but differs 
from the works of Nakamura, Alfian, and Lubis in three ways. The first is related to the 
ground that constitutes the two opposing tendencies. Instead of looking at the two 
tendencies as comprising of individuals supporting either puritanism or modernism, this 
dissertation treats the two opposing tendencies with respect to their perception of the need 
for reform within this organisation. In other words, this dissertation is concerned with 
status quo and reform as the two opposing camps within Muhammadiyah. 
 The second difference is related to the source of the two different tendencies. 
Instead of looking at the two opposing tendencies as emerging from different situations, 
this dissertation argues that they stem from the same, shared, disposition of the members 
of Muhammadiyah. The habitus shared by the members of this organisation, in its 
generative capacity, can produce potentially various sets of practices among them. At the 
moment, this habitus facilitates the emergence of two tendencies in the organisation in 
the forms of the support for either the status quo or reform.  
But why does this habitus produce these two particular tendencies and not others? 
This dissertation’s third difference from previous works on Muhammadiyah attends to 
                                                 
88 James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 200, 206. 
89 Ibid., 206. 
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this question in terms of responses to the image of the West as the “Other”. These two 
different responses result in two different definitions of what constitutes a crisis and the 
solution to that crisis. While the status quo camp refers to the need for maintaining the 
present arrangement in Muhammadiyah as the solution, the reform camps sees the need 
to embrace changes in the field by incorporating foreign methods and values as the way 
out of the crisis.  
 In summary, my dissertation offers another perspective on the presence of status 
quo and reformist tendencies within Muhammadiyah through an elaboration of these 
three distinctive points: the nature of the two opposite tendencies, the embedded 
predisposition among the organisation’s members that facilitates these two opposites, and 
the role of an external factor that causes crisis that in turn invites opposite responses from 
the organisation’s members. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This research will employ a qualitative approach for its data analysis. It will use the 
preliminary theoretical framework elaborated above to initially shape its research 
questions.90 This research, as it proceeds, will use another perspective, namely the post-
colonial one, to complement Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field in order to fit my 
fieldwork findings better. In so doing, I will treat these theories to create a chain of 
interconnected thoughts as pertaining to these findings. Consequently, those theories used 
in this research will serve their purpose by explaining my research findings and not to be 
employed as a fixed model in order to be tested by these findings. 
 There are two methods used in my dissertation. The first is what Bryman calls 
qualitative content analysis.91 This method identifies the underlying themes in the 
materials being analysed. With respect to this dissertation, the data will come from the 
writing of Muhammadiyah’s members in various documents. The documents chosen will 
be the ones published around the beginning of the Reform period in Indonesian politics in 
                                                 
90 John W. Creswell, Research Designs: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publication, 1994), 94. 
91 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 392. 
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1998, up to the first year after the 2010 Muktamar. This dissertation chooses to start from 
the Reform period because the intense debate between the supporters of the status quo 
and reform projects started around this period and thus explains the intense publication of 
opinions from both camps since the 1998 Reform. Moreover, in this period Indonesian 
citizens have experienced more freedom to voice their various opinions. Opinions 
published during this period are likely to be more honest, straightforward, and varied. 
The documents published by members of Muhammadiyah in this period can thus be 
expected to serve as a record of their candid opinions. 
 The second method I employ is that of active interviews. Unlike the ‘vessel-of-
answer’ approach in more traditional interviews, they do not lead informants along a 
certain course according to a theoretical framework formed in the interviewer’s mind.92 
The technique of active interviews motivates informants to construct their own narratives 
and therefore do not see them as fixed repositories of knowledge and experience. In 
contrast to more traditional interviews, active interviews allow informants to construct 
aspects of realities in collaboration with the interviewer. The substance of the interviews 
evolves as informants interact with the interviewer; questions within active interviews 
evolve in accordance to informants’ responses to previous questions. 
 Pertaining to the second method, I interviewed 28 leaders and members of 
Muhammadiyah in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Malang. I chose those three cities due to 
their central role in the administration of Muhammadiyah. Jakarta and Yogyakarta are 
two cities where Muhammadiyah has its headquarters, while Malang has the largest 
Muhammadiyah university in Indonesia. During my fieldwork from 6 June to 6 
September 2011, I collected documents for my qualitative content analysis and 
interviewed not only key leaders of Muhammadiyah but also Muhammadiyah’s members 
who do not belong to the current leadership of Muhammadiyah but whose opinions are 
highly respected. Most of my informants in the second category used to be within the 
leadership rank of Muhammadiyah. I interviewed all of my informants at least once. For 
key informants, I conducted more in-depth interviews more than once (See Appendix 6).  
                                                 
92 Alan Bryman and Robert G. Burgess, Qualitative Research, vol. 2 (London: Sage Publication, 1999), 
109. 
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1.5 The Chapters 
This dissertation is basically divided into two parts. The first part responds to the first 
question of this research: how did two opposite tendencies of status quo and reform occur 
in Muhammadiyah? Chapter Two will explain a new way of writing history in 
Muhammadiyah. This new method uses narrative as the form of writing the 
organisation’s history and therefore creates a history of Muhammadiyah that is focused 
on its men and women. This chapter is concerned with the issue of narrative and how 
building the history of Muhammadiyah as a narrative has eventually created a 
formalisation of the belief in human consciousness and enlightenment surrounding the 
life of its founding father, Ahmad Dahlan. This belief formalises the Muslim habitus in 
Muhammadiyah. 
 The issue of habitus will be the main concern of both Chapters Three and Four. 
While Chapter Three will dwell on opinions from the status quo and the reform project 
camps with regard to the proper roles of this organisation, Chapter Four will explain these 
opinions in terms of a shared habitus among the members of this organisation and how 
the differences between the two camps can be explained in terms of a shared 
predisposition. Chapters Two to Four will thus answer the first question of this research. 
 The second part of this dissertation will address the question of why the two 
opposing tendencies occur in Muhammadiyah. Chapter Five will start with a significant 
complementary element to Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and field. This chapter argues 
that in order to understand better the sense of crisis as invoked by the change in the field, 
we need to incorporate the post-colonial concept of ‘hybridity’ in order to understand 
better the role which the presence of the West as the “Other” plays in constituting the 
change in the field. This presence of the West causes both admiration and weariness. This 
chapter will elaborate the potential effects of the presence of the West in terms of the 
story of the Buru Quartet written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 
 The next chapter will focus on the perceptions of the proponents of the status quo 
in Muhammadiyah with regard to the West while Chapter Seven is concerned with the 
perceptions of the proponents of the other camp in the organisation on the same issue. My 
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main argument in these two chapters is that the presence of the West as the “Other” has 
been the main cause for their two different approaches in understanding the ideal roles 
their organisation should take. The status quo’s sense of crisis as related to the intrusion 
of the West and the reform projects’ more positive view of the West are the difference 
that the two camps have in responding to the presence of the West as the “Other”. As 
Chapters Six and Seven will show, this difference is at the root of their opposite 
tendencies in responding to the necessity of reform within Muhammadiyah.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
FROM CHRONICLE TO NARRATIVE: 
MUHAMMADIYAH’S HISTORY OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
In order to explain a new understanding of Muhammadiyah’s history, this chapter will 
focus on the narrative of enlightenment displayed in the book published by the National 
Office of Muhammadiyah, The Profile of One Century of Muhamadiyah (Profil 1 Abad 
Muhammadiyah,1 “The Profile” hereafter), as well as other formal publications from the 
early twenty-first century that, in telling the organisation’s history, conspicuously create 
its narrative of “enlightenment”, or “pencerahan”, a word that has come to be used as 
code for both the ideological purpose of Muhammadiyah and for the set of principles to 
which the organisation adheres.  
In 2005 the national organisation released a statement affirming that 
Muhammadiyah’s historical role had been to ‘enlighten’ the Indonesian people.2 This is 
obviously not the first time that the word has made its appearance in official 
Muhammadiyah circles, but its use within the organisation certainly intensified after this 
statement was issued. More importantly, the term has also entered popular discourse on 
the political history of Islam in Indonesia and the role of Muhammadiyah in constructing 
a national identity: The public prominence of Muhammadiyah has increased particularly 
since the release in 2010 of the very popular film on its founding father Ahmad Dahlan, 
bearing the title of Sang Pencerah, “The One who Brought Enlightenment”.3  
                                                 
1 Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan Profil Muhammadiyah, Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010). 
2 The term seems to have first appeared in official Muhammadiyah circles following its 2005 National 
Meeting (Muktamar) in Malang, when the leadership issued “Statement of Muhammadiyah’s Ideas 
Approaching its First Century” (Pernyataan Pikiran Muhammadiyah Jelang Satu Abad). The word 
“pencerahan” can be found on Part A.2 of the document. This document can be found in Suara 
Muhammadiyah dan Majelis Pendidikan Kader PP Muhammadiyah, ed., Manhaj Gerakan 
Muhammadiyah: Ideologi, Khittah, dan Langkah (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2009), 239-52. 
3 Sang Pencerah: Cerita tentang K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, prod. Raam Punjabi and dir. Hanung Bramantyo, 
120 mins, MVP Pictures, 2010, digital video disc. The scenario of this movie was later made into a novel, 
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The arguments in this chapter are, firstly, that the story of enlightenment within 
Muhammadiyah centred on the figure of Ahmad Dahlan as the exemplary Man, a 
paragon of Islamic character considered worthy of emulation by the organisation’s 
members, had been present within Muhammadiyah long before the publication of The 
Profile. This narrative has served as one of several sources for a unique habitus that 
belongs to Muhammadiyah’s members, as will be described in Chapter Four. Secondly, 
the writing of The Profile reproduces and formalises this narrative through a new form of 
telling Muhammadiyah’s history. Thirdly, the need to reproduce this narrative through 
Muhammadiyah’s formal history was encouraged by the perceived threat towards the 
survival of Muhammadiyah’s various charity organisations from the intrusion of The 
Justice and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS).  
I will elaborate those three arguments above through four sections in this chapter. 
The first section is a summary of Hayden White’s categorisation of annals, chronicle and 
narrative, which forms the theoretical basis of this chapter; White’s categories are used to 
differentiate the mode of history writing in The Profile from that found in previous 
historical accounts in Muhammadiyah. The second section tells the mode of history-
writing in Muhammadiyah that produced chronicles of the organisation’s history before 
the publication of The Profile. In its third section, this chapter then turns to the narrative 
mode of history-writing employed in The Profile and a narrative surrounding the ideas of 
the “exemplary Man”, “Transcendental providence”, and “enlightenment”. The fourth, 
and last, section explains the reason behind the change from a chronicle towards a 
narrative mode of history-writing as stemming from a perceived threat from PKS, an 
Islamist political party widely perceived to be ideologically close to Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
2.1 The Change of Mode 
The significance of the 2010 publication The Profile is that it was amongst the first of 
several official publications that marked a new way of recounting the history of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Akmal Naseri Basral, Sang Pencerah: Novelisasi Kehidupan K. H. Ahmad Dahlan dan Perjuangannya 
Mendirikan Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2010).  
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organisation. Previously, publications such as the 1993 History of Muhammadiyah Part 1 
and the 1995 History of Muhammadiyah (hereafter “Part 1” and “The History”) use what 
their authors call the method of critical history (sejarah kritis).4  Sources are checked for 
their originality, authenticity and scientific accountability, but the two publications are 
basically a chronology of events.  The 2010 publication is similar in many respects, for it 
contains much of the information contained in both Part 1 and The History. The 
difference lies in how the story is told.  
Perhaps the first indication of this new mode of story-telling can be found in the 
debate about when the organisation was born. According to The Profile, the history of 
Muhammadiyah did not begin on 12 November 1912, when Ahmad Dahlan proclaimed 
the birth of the organisation. Nor did it start on the 22 August 1914, when “Raden 
Dwijoesewoyo … rose to the podium and read the official [colonial government’s] decree 
stating that Muhammadiyah had been formally established”.5 For The Profile, the 
question of when the history of Muhammadiyah started does not concern the debate over 
the de facto and de jure foundation of the organisation for Muhammadiyah’s timeline 
started in 1868, when “Ahmad Dahlan was born in Kauman District in Yogyakarta with 
the name of Muhammad Darwis”.6 In other words, the history of Muhammadiyah as told 
in The Profile starts with the story of a man. 
 Whereas the two previous books are simply chronicles of events, we can consider 
The Profile to be a full narrative, for it also explains the significance of those events in 
terms of moral values they generate. In differentiating a narrative from a chronicle, it is 
useful at this point to employ the distinctions made by Hayden White. In The Content of 
the Form White explains that a narrative is a story made by “feign(ing) to make the world 
speak itself and speak itself as a story”.7 For White there are three kinds of historical 
representation: annals, chronicles, and history proper. The annals are a form of historical 
                                                 
4 The term appears in both books: Majelis Pustaka Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Sejarah 
Muhammadiyah Bagian 1 (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1993) and Majelis Pustaka 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Sejarah Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 
1995), on pages 4 and iv respectively. These two texts and the 2010 Profile clearly possess the imprimatur 
of the organisation, for none of these publications provides the details of its authors.  
5 Tim Penyusunan, 11. 
6 Ibid., 57. 
7 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 2. 
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representation that completely lacks a narrative. It does not aim to tell a story, but simply 
consists of a set of events listed chronologically. The chronicle does seem to tell a story 
and thus strives to achieve a degree of narrativity, but fails to achieve a closure to the 
story. The full presence of a narrative can be found in the form of what he calls “history 
proper”, whereby stories have a beginning, middle, and end.8 The history proper therefore 
creates meanings by constructing a story, either a story of the prevailing of humanity over 
the world (as in a romance) or of the (not-so-promising) fate of humanity in its struggle in 
the world (as in a comedy, tragedy, or satire).9 White’s category of “history proper” is 
therefore assumed to constitute the full mode of historical representation, for it is only in 
this mode that a full form of narrative exists.10 
For White, a narrative can take different forms. On the one hand, a “romance” is a 
narrative which is constructed in such a way that it tells the tale of humanity’s success in 
overcoming the obstacles people face. It is “fundamentally a drama of self-identification 
symbolised by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, 
and his final liberation from it”.11 On the other hand, people may fail to realise the goals 
that they have set themselves. In such cases, the narrative may take the form of a comedy, 
in which human optimism is only partially vindicated through the prospect of occasional 
reconciliations of the forces at play in the world.12 Alternatively, it may take the form of a 
tragedy, in which there is no victory of humans over the world; the fate of humans at the 
end of the story is even worse than when the story started.13 Or it may take the form of a 
satire, a story in which the inability of individuals to realise their dreams becomes a sad 
                                                 
8 Like White, Kvernbekk defines a narrative as a “beginning-middle-ending structure that configures all 
elements into a whole” (Tone Kvernbekk, “Truth and Form,” Interchange 38, 4 (2007): 307). Jerome 
Bruner associates a narrative with the telling of the vicissitudes of human intention (Jerome Bruner, Actual 
Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 17). Elsewhere, Bruner contrasts the  
verisimilitude (or the “factlikeness” or “truthlikeness”) that it displays in its story to the story’s verifiability 
as truth (Jerome Bruner, “What is a Narrative Fact?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences 560 (1998): 23). 
9 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 8-9. 
10 To provide another categorisation in history writing, in his Poetics Aristotle juxtaposes narrative and 
history. He associates narrative with fiction, history with facts (Kvernbekk, 305). Aristotle’s “history” is 
thus closer to what White classifies as the annals or chronicle than to narrative. 
11 White, Metahistory, 8. 
12 Ibid., 9. 
13 Ibid. 
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reflection of the human condition.  A satire becomes a story that treats hopes, possibilities 
and truths as illusory and unobtainable by human consciousness.14  
For the purposes of this chapter, the issue, then, is to explain why the telling of 
Muhammadiyah’s history moved from the mode of the chronicle to that of a narrative, 
and what form that narrative takes. However, in order to establish that the history of 
Muhammadiyah as described in The Profile meets the standard of a full narrative in its 
treatment of both human action and an unspoken transcendental law, we need to 
appreciate how Muhammadiyah’s history was represented in two earlier historical 
documents.  
 
2.2 The Previous Chronicles 
The form of the annals was never used as a mode of historical representation in 
Muhammadiyah. The history of Muhammadiyah has always been intended as a story 
with a moral message, even if that lesson lies in the background.  Annals cannot achieve 
this level of story-telling, so the chronicle became the preferred mode. 
The first of these official texts, The History, was intended to cover four periods in 
Muhammadiyah’s history: 1912 to 1923, when Ahmad Dahlan passed away; 1923 to 
1945, when Indonesia achieved its independence; 1945 to 1965, when Soekarno was 
ousted from office; and 1965 to 1985, when Muhammadiyah held its forty-first national 
meeting (Muktamar) in Surakarta. Part 1 was written to cover the first period of The 
History and therefore can be considered as a part of The History.15  
 There are two reasons why both The History and Part 1 are chronicles and do not 
constitute complete narratives. The first is a lack of a storyline. The division of 
Muhammadiyah’s history into these four periods does not follow one specific criterion. 
The first period starts when Muhammadiyah was established and ends with the death of 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 10.  
15 The History does not cover the second period due to “the lack of information and data of 
Muhammadiyah’s history, specifically between the time of K. H. Ahmad Dahlan’s death in 1923 to 1944” 
(Majelis Pustaka, Sejarah, i). The team of writers intended to cover the second period after the publication 
of the book, but I can find no evidence of this. Due to the nature of The History as a chronicle and thus the 
lack of a story uniting the facts it presents, the absence of the second period in this document does not pose 
a problem to the (non-)flow of the facts. 
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its founder. The remaining three periods correspond to different eras within Indonesian 
politics. This division might pose no problem to the achievement of a narrative if both 
books manage to create a storyline out of those periods. But the two documents are more 
concerned with explaining how each of the political periods affects the dynamics within 
Muhammadiyah. In the third period, for example, The History describes how the 
ideological battles during Soekarno’s rule distorted Muhammadiyah, for the organisation 
paid most attention to activities that were actually beyond its control.16  
Instead of recounting Muhammadiyah’s past as a story where everything works in 
favour of the expansion and improvement of the organisation, The History and Part 1 are 
not reluctant to criticise those mistakes perpetrated by members of the organisation. 
Muhammadiyah is depicted here as a movement with its ups and downs, successes and 
mistakes. While the two documents praise the organisation’s success, they do not imagine 
its mistakes as somehow working mysteriously to the common good of the nation. An 
example of this is the treatment in The History of the decision at the second national 
annual meeting of the organisation (Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tanwir) in 1953 to permit 
Muhammadiyah’s members to only vote for Islamic political parties, and thus cancelling 
the decision of the 1950 Majelis Tanwir allowing Muhammadiyah’s members to vote for 
any political party. The History attributes this change to the political interests of 
Muhammadiyah’s elites.17 
The second factor contributing to the failure of The History and Part 1 to form a 
narrative is due to the indication of the source of authority for their writing of 
Muhammadiyah’s history. Different from The Profile, with unstated historical necessity 
as the source of its authority in telling Muhammadiyah’s history, both The History and 
Part 1 specifically cite the 1985 National Meeting as the authority mandating their 
writing. Instead of referring to an implicit authority as their reason to exist, both 
documents opt for an explicit one. In commenting on the rise of Muhammad Yunus Anis 
to the leadership of Muhammadiyah, to cite one example, The History refers to the words 
of Dr. Ali Akbar in acknowledging that “the choice of (Anis) was the fate from Allah the 
                                                 
16 Majelis Pustaka, Sejarah, 27. 
17 Ibid., 34. 
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All Wise”.18 The mentioning of Allah in this sentence to justify the rise of Anis to the 
office of Muhammadiyah’s presidency makes explicit the authority underlying the 
creation of The History. 
Another admission to the role of mystical event in the history of Muhammadiyah 
can be found when Part 1 makes explicit the thought raging in the minds of Dahlan’s 
students when they saw members of Budi Utomo, the first national organisation among 
the indigenous population of the Dutch Indies, enthusiastically delivering their speeches 
on the podium.  
“It will be nice if Islam can be explained by way of speech in Javanese just like this. It will 
certainly be more able to attract the crowd and [Islam] will be better propagated”, they thought 
without any prior agreement.19 (Emphasis added) 
Inspired by this event, Muhammadiyah began to use the podium speech as a 
method for Islamic propagation. By representing the unspoken thought of those men in 
words and by making explicit their unspoken agreement, Part 1 attempts to mark the 
authority underlying its description of Muhammadiyah’s history. This effort, however, 
has the consequence of particularising that authority. Instead of an implicit, but universal, 
authority running through the history that the document tries to portray, the explicitness 
of its authority directs the readers to a specific transcendental actor making its appearance 
in specific events.  
 
2.3 The Narrative of Enlightenment within Muhammadiyah 
The formal construction of Muhammadiyah’s history in its 2010 publication is quite 
different from those published in the 1990s. Unlike its two predecessors, The Profile 
focuses on the story of Muhammadiyah’s founding father and its subsequent leaders; its 
history thus becomes the life stories of its leaders. And the significance of this focus is 
that these life stories become a story of historical transcendence.  
There are three ideas that constitute the narrative of Muhammadiyah’s 
enlightenment. The first is the notion of the exemplary Man and his consciousness, as 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 38. 
19 Majelis Pustaka, Sejarah Muhammadiyah Bagian 1, 52. 
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taken from the story of Ahmad Dahlan. The second is the idea of transcendental 
providence which accompanies this story. The third is the vision of enlightenment which 
here emerges as the convergence between human consciousness and transcendental 
providence. 
 
2.3.1 The Man 
The most notable feature of Muhammadiyah’s official history is that the organisation 
started with a man with a unique consciousness, one which connects the spiritual heart 
and the reasoning mind. Ahmad Dahlan becomes the exemplary Man, an iconic figure 
whose traits are to be emulated by all members of Muhammadiyah. This consciousness 
also brought the understanding that efforts to bring society out of poverty, ignorance, and 
backwardness must be managed within an organisation. The organisation built by the 
Man is thus the vessel in which his character traits are to be emulated by the subsequent 
leaders of Muhammadiyah. 
 The contrast between the pre-Muhammadiyah darkness and the light brought by 
the organisation is established in the first paragraph of The Profile.  
At the end of the nineteenth century Indonesia was a nation in darkness. Following the demise of 
royal authority throughout the archipelago, the country was destroyed by colonialism, a 
collective experience for the nation that caused deep trauma and historical damage. This bitter 
collective experience of a nation repressed by colonialism was felt by the indigenous masses, 
who were drowning in a sea of both structural and cultural poverty, and of ignorance and 
backwardness.20 (Emphasis added) 
This paragraph is concerned neither with the fact that the territory presently called 
“Indonesia” was actually then the “Dutch East Indies”, nor with the question of whether 
people living in that territory could be categorised as a nation. Indonesia in this paragraph 
is an inevitability, a nation historically destined to come into existence.21 These two 
historical inaccuracies do not matter because this paragraph is written with the present as 
its referent and with the present role of Muhammadiyah within the nation of Indonesia as 
                                                 
20 Tim Penyusunan, 2. 
21 Indonesia, in this sense, is what might be called a presupposition within the Muhammadiyah narrative of 
enlightenment. A presupposition is “an implied proposition whose force remains invariant whether the 
explicit proposition in which it is embedded is true or false” (Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible 
Worlds, 27). 
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the object it describes. This historical imprecision is in fact significant, for The Profile 
takes Indonesia and the Indonesian nation for granted, thus focusing on the contribution 
of Muhammadiyah in dispelling the darkness that prevailed in what would later become 
the nation.   
Born to an elite religious family of the Yogyakarta Palace, Dahlan was, however, 
no ordinary member of the elite. Like any other boy he enjoyed playing games; he was 
also skillful in making toys.22 He was educated in a highly religious environment, where 
his father was a senior religious figure in the Palace of Yogyakarta, one of the two 
remaining monarchies in Central Java. As a common practice for youth in this 
environment, Dahlan took his first hajj pilgrimage at a very young age.23 What makes 
him special, however, is his clear-sightedness in comprehending the world around him; 
not in terms of a paradox between reason and spirituality, but in terms of merging the two 
through the act of piety. 
The Profile asserts that there is no contradiction between reason and spirituality:  
[Muhammadiyah] was born when Indonesian Muslims were experiencing systematic decay in 
their daily lives by the loss of Islamic spirituality in handling… rational, worldly matters such as 
poverty, ignorance, backwardness, etcetera. By means of an institutional and systematic Islamic 
movement, Muhammadiyah sought to reinvigorate Islamic spirituality within the everyday lives 
of Indonesian Muslims, who had been marginalised by colonialism for hundreds of years.24 
The use of the words “Islamic spirituality”, “rational”, “institutional” and “systematic” in 
the same sentence in this paragraph might seem curious. Here, it is clearly the intention 
of The Profile to dissolve the contradiction that has so long been identified with the 
practice of Islam: having an Islamic spirituality is not contrary to the rational mind; being 
spiritual does not mean refusing to use one’s reason.  
 In fact, the rational Ahmad Dahlan is a spiritual man, as can be discerned by 
reading a message in his diary: 
You Dahlan, you will certainly come to face great dangers and events, ones that will shock you, 
ones you must endure. You might be able to get through them safely, or you might perish 
because of them. You Dahlan, try to imagine that you are alone with Allah when you are facing 
                                                 
22 Tim Penyusunan, 7. 
23 Ibid., 12. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
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death [and] trials, heaven and hell. And of those that you encounter, remember who is the closest 
to you, and leave the rest behind….25 
Dahlan need not fear because Allah is the one who is closest. This assurance does not 
come from a dream in which some supernatural force comes to Dahlan and tell him his 
fate. Dahlan comes up with those words himself and writes them down as a reminder to 
himself. The Man himself comes to this consciousness (kesadaran), a consciousness of a 
kind that leads him to diligently practice religous rituals (ibadah), to do good deeds (amal 
saleh), to propagate and defend the religion of Allah, and to lead the Islamic community 
(ummat) in the right direction.26 This consciousness takes him beyond the contradiction 
between spirituality and rationality; it is both a result of rational thought and heart-felt 
contemplation.  
This particular consciousness also “makes Dahlan aware of the backwardness of 
Muslims in his homeland”.27 Attaining this level of understanding transforms Dahlan 
from an ordinary man into the exemplary Man. Importantly, the story of the Man 
continues, for it was emulated by Dahlan’s successors.28 The spirit of wisdom 
exemplified by Dahlan lives on in each of these men’s lives. The plots are never the same 
because the character of every man and the situations they find themselves in are always 
different. But each of these men finds his own method to address the requirements of his 
time. For example, the eleventh president of Muhammadiyah Amien Rais is dubbed the 
“Reformist Intellectual”, while the organisation’s twelfth president Syafi’i Maarif is the 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 13. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 The people whose histories are told in The Profile are not only the formal leaders of Muhammadiyah 
after Dahlan passed away. The leaders whose stories are told in The Profile are those men who have 
contributed to the development of Muhammadiyah. During the colonial period, these men whose leadership 
had made Muhammadiyah survive the colonial hardships are Kiai Haji Ibrahim, Haji Muhammad Syudja’, 
Haji Fakhruddin, Kiai Haji Hisyam, Kiyai Raden Haji Hadjid, Kiai Haji Mas Mansur, and Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo. During the time of Soekarno’s erratic leadership, Muhammadiyah was blessed with the 
leadership of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Buya Haji Ahmad Rasyid Sutan Mansur, Professor Dr. Hamka, Kiai 
Haji Muhammad Yunus Anis, and Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi. Ahmad Badawi’s leadership continued 
throughout the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. After Ahmad Badawi, Muhammadiyah was led by Kiai Haji 
Faqih Usman, Kiai Haji Abdur Rozak Fachruddin, Haji Djarnawi Hadikusumo, Haji Soedarsono 
Prodjokusumo, Haji Mohammad Djindar Tamimy, Kiai Haji Ahmad Azhar Basyir, M.A., and Professor Dr. 
Haji Muhammad Amien Rais. After Amien Rais’s participation in national reform efforts, Muhammadiyah 
has been led by Professor Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Professor Dr. Haji Muhammad Sirajuddin 
Syamsuddin, M.A. 
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“Egalitarian Humanist Intellectual”.29 Although all should strive to achieve the same 
general consciousness, the details of where this consciousness leads are determined by 
specific historical circumstances. 
For Muhammadiyah, it is not impossible to emulate the example of a man who 
lived over a century ago. Indeed, the educational activities of Muhammadiyah today are 
intended to accurately reflect the open-minded and religious quality of Ahmad Dahlan’s 
teachings, to educate Indonesian children so that they can gain “broad horizons on 
rational, worldly affairs without finding it necessary to abandon Islamic spirituality and 
values”.30 And Dahlan’s personal attributes are to be emulated by others. The Man should 
be an “independent person who has a direct responsibility to the Creator, but also needs 
other people in order to become a pious human being”.31 The concept of the Man thus 
emerges from –and repeats – the story of Dahlan and his enlightenment. 
 
2.3.2 Muhammadiyah and Transcendental Providence 
The Profile is ostensibly a secular document: it makes no reference to supernatural 
notions to account for Muhammadiyah’s successes in its first century of existence; it uses 
words such as “Allah” and “The Creator” (Sang Pencipta) very sparingly.32 However, to 
say that it has left out any role for transcendental providence in its story and has thus 
completely de-sanctify the history of Muhammadiyah is to miss the point of this 450-
page publication. The Profile is intensely religious, and a spirit of piety can be felt on 
each page. In other words, one can still identify the presence of transcendental 
providence in the story it tells its readers.  
God thus still permeates the book, providing historical guidance to the people of 
Muhammadiyah on how to proceed. Allah’s guidance in this document, however, does 
not take a supernatural form, but acts through the consciousness of Muhammadiyah’s 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 50-54. The Profile gives a predicate to each leader listed in accordance to their personal character, 
the characteristic of the time of their leadership, as well the characteristic of their leadership. 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 The document evidently uses these two words only once each, on pages 13 and 10 respectively. 
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leaders, just as in the story of Ahmad Dahlan and the advice he wrote to himself. The 
Profile strives to manifest the Transcendental in the fullness of history.  
Just as the history of Muhammadiyah is depicted as the story of rationally-aware 
people, the success of Muhammadiyah in its historical travails becomes the story of 
transcendental providence made manifest in the wisdom of its leaders. Again, for 
Muhammadiyah it is meaningless to contrast human reason to spirituality. By using 
reason to assess and control the environment, humanity implores God to give guidance – 
a notion close to the Thomist assertion in Catholicism.33 Muhammadiyah’s  capacity to 
survive and the active role it played in the history of Indonesia as a nation is the result of 
the consciousness of its leaders, as depicted in Ahmad Dahlan’s internal struggles before 
founding Muhammadiyah. 
The idea of Muhammadiyah started from a contemplation, and continued in a struggle of ideas 
that lasted for quite a long time, … to give birth to a movement for  propagation and renewal, 
one that can accommodate the need for an awakening (kebangkitan) during this dark era of 
colonialism.34  
Although the history of Muhammadiyah is the story of its people, their story 
never strays far from the story of Transcendental providence. And as this providence is 
stated indirectly, so is the historical role of Muhammadiyah legitimised by its significant 
contribution to the development of the nation. 
As one of the people’s organisations that has now been able to mark its position as the largest 
modern Islamic organisation in the world, Muhammadiyah has not only been tested by history, 
but also has tested history. [This history proves that] the nation of Indonesia needed the presence 
of an organisation like Muhammadiyah that was intensely and consistently active in [Islamic] 
propagation, in the empowerment of society, and in the eradication of poverty and ignorance.35 
(Emphasis added) 
The importance of Muhammadiyah in the shaping of Indonesian history is established, 
but not by the use of words referring to God. To the contrary, the authority for this 
historical role is made anonymous, yet universal. For The Profile, the fact that 
Muhammadiyah has both been tested by as well as influencing Indonesian history is 
                                                 
33 This is just one of many tenets of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. For a more comprehensive view of 
Thomist philosophy, see Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1957). 
34 Tim Penyusunan, 11. 
35 Ibid. 
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considered sufficient in itself to indicate the presence of a transcendental blessing 
throughout the 100 years of its existence. 
 Throughout this century the leaders of Muhammadiyah faced various challenges. 
Ahmad Dahlan had to face the negative and sometimes violent reaction of traditionalist 
Islamic religious leaders (ulama) who disapproved of his message; Muhammad Syudja’ 
and Hisyam faced the demands of younger members calling for a new generation of 
leaders; Under Ahmad Azhar Basyir’s leadership Muhammadiyah was criticised for 
ignoring the Sufi dimension of Islam; Syafii Maarif had to promote a spirit of renewal 
(tajdid or pembaruan) within an organisation that was seen as stagnant.36 
 Sometimes controversial moves had to be taken to ensure the survival of the 
organisation. Muhammad Yunus Anis, for example, decided to join Soekarno’s 
undemocratic national parliament, the “Mutual Self-help Parliament” (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Gotong Royong), so that Muslims would have some representation in 
parliament.37 In order to ensure Muhammadiyah’s survival during Soeharto’s 
authoritarian rule, Djarnawi Hadikusumo accepted that Pancasila would be the sole 
ideology of Muhammadiyah in the face of widespread demands that Islam remain the 
organisation’s ideological base.38 
 Muhammadiyah is thus seen to have survived because of the bravery and wisdom 
of its leaders. In passing these tests of history, these leaders also offered valuable 
contributions to Indonesian history. Ahmad Dahlan changed the nation’s history with his 
introduction of a modern Islamic organisation; Muhammad Syudja’ made possible large-
scale hajj pilgrimages for Indonesian Muslims; Fakhruddin familiarised Indonesian 
Muslims with modern and improved journalistic methods for Islamic propagation; and 
Amien Rais’s criticism of the rampant authoritarianism and corruption of the Soeharto 
regime facilitated democratic reform in the late twentieth century Indonesia.  
 These achievements, among many others mentioned in the book, are often taken 
as historical proof indicating the presence of transcendental providence in 
Muhammadiyah’s historical role. The fact that this providence was manifest through the 
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37 Ibid., 35. 
38 Ibid., 2 
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efforts of the men of Muhammadiyah’s leadership does not remove the religious spirit 
upon which The Profile is written. It does, however, show that the history that The Profile 
builds of Muhammadiyah is the history of its people.  
 
2.3.3 Muhammadiyah and the Enlightenment of the Nation 
The Profile explains the realisation of this providential role in the various ways it 
overcame the darkness that existed before Muhammadiyah was established; two of these 
are relevant here. The first relates to the colonial policies that left the natives of the Indies 
poor and ignorant. Under colonialism, the indigenous population was marginalised 
economically by the seizure of farmers’ land, a repressive tax system and monetary 
inflation, while access to modern education was limited to the children of Europeans and 
native elites.39 
 The second sense of darkness was found within the minds of the indigenous 
population. According to The Profile the narrow understanding of Islam propagated by 
most Islamic religious leaders was another form of the darkness. “Islam at that time was 
understood as something that stands alone, unrelated in any way to the spirit of politics, 
economics, and other worldly matters.”40 
For The Profile, enlightenment thus means opposing both forms of darkness. 
Accordingly, Muhammadiyah’s activities were aimed at educating native children so that 
they could gain the skills and knowledge necessary to fight ignorance and poverty. In its 
fight against the darkness, Muhammadiyah has promoted democracy, gender equality, 
tolerance, and the growth of the middle class.41 On matters of religion, it eschews the 
practice of those rituals not prescribed in the Qur’an, promotes the use of the vernacular 
in religious sermons, and introduced modern methods for determining the kiblat (the 
direction of Mekkah for prayers) and for calculating the start and end of the fasting 
month.42 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 2-3. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Ibid., 7-9 
42 Ibid., 3. 
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Just as Muhammadiyah in The Profile is itself considered to be the result of 
enlightenment, we can attribute all these social improvements to enlightenment, which 
can be defined as the convergence of human consciousness and divine providence. Such a 
consciousness does not necessarily lead to transcendental providence, for only when the 
transcendent blesses the efforts of conscious men can it bear fruit and transform the 
world. Enlightenment therefore requires both human consciousness and transcendental 
blessing. And as we can only understand history from the point of view of human 
experience, The Profile transforms the history of Muhammadiyah into the history of 
humanity. The presence of transcendental blessings within this history need not be 
explicitly stated because Muhammadiyah has prevailed over history. Muhammadiyah 
itself is therefore both the product and the proof of the convergence of human 
consciousness and transcendental providence.  
 
2.3.4 Muhammadiyah’s History as a Narrative 
Returning to White’s categorisation of historical representation, in “history proper” facts 
are interpreted so as to construct a story, necessitating the selection of events relevant to 
the story.43 It is unavoidable that this will entail the exclusion of certain events so as to 
create a story with a beginning, middle and end, tied together to reach a moralising 
conclusion.44 The Profile thus excludes events that it considers unnecessary to its 
narrative. For example, in 1953 the Majelis Tanwir made an important change to its 
decision of 1950 that had allowed Muhammadiyah’s members to vote for non-Islamic 
political parties, as had been explained in The History. However, this change was 
evidently considered to be irrelevant – and probably disturbing – by the writers of The 
                                                 
43 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), 51. 
44 Scholars of narratives have discussed the truth value in narratives. On the one hand, Mink argues that this 
value is hard to extract from narratives since the claim of truth in a narrative should be assessed on the 
basis of the complex form of the narrative itself, and not from each individual statement about events that 
build the narrative (Louis O. Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” in The Writing of History, 
ed. Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 144). Bruner 
also maintains that it is only the value of verisimilitudes within the narrative that can be assessed, and that 
this value is determined by its effectiveness in creating an illusion of reality (Jerome Bruner, “What is a 
Narrative Fact?” 23). On the other hand, Kvernbekk argues that there has to be a way to assess the value of 
truth in a narrative, even if the way one assesses it must move beyond the correspondence between a 
narrative and something that exists in the world (Kvernbekk, 313-14). 
48 
 
Profile; the event does not make it into its pages. Rather, the events selected to be written 
in are the ones consistent with a plot of a romance, a plot where the man struggles in the 
world and emerges as a winner at the end of the story. The narrative of Ahmad Dahlan is 
indeed what White defines as romance, with Muhammadiyah as the trophy he receives 
for prevailing over the tribulations of the times.45 
 This story of victory and enlightenment is repeated in the life histories of the 
leaders who followed. Indeed, the replication of the story of the Man constitutes the 
whole story of Muhammadiyah, for its evolution is recounted by describing each 
individual leader. The stories which are told surrounding the circumstances of each of 
their births, the adversities they faced in their subsequent struggles to live a pious life, 
and the wise steps they took for advancing the organisation is a story of its evolution 
from a modest beginning to a triumphant ending. This history is thus made up of these 
smaller, yet enlightening, analogies. Muhammadiyah’s progress is built up layer-by-
layer, with each story building on the victorious story of its predecessor.  
 The history of Muhammadiyah is thus the history of its leaders, with the story of 
the first Man as the paragon. The organisation’s history should be understood in terms of 
a history constituted at two levels: that of its leaders and that of the organisation itself. A 
sharp divide between the two is impossible to draw because the enlightenments that these 
leaders experience are what Muhammadiyah stands for. The narrative in The Profile is, 
therefore, always told as a story of human beings. 
Because it is intended as a complete story, a narrative generally permits us to see 
the end in its beginning.46 In The Profile the enlightenment brought by Muhammadiyah 
starts with the first Man, so the end-point of the history that is presented is to be found in 
the idea of enlightenment elaborated at the beginning of the story. And it is not just at the 
                                                 
45 In analysing Muslim reformists’ expressive forms in Yogyakarta, for example, Peacock finds that these 
Muslims tend to prefer written word over dramatic performance. The stories presented in the expressive 
forms of these Muslims usually revolve around both a romance (where the protagonists, with their 
persistence, manage to acquire victory in the form of morally acceptable decision) and a tragedy where 
their misguidedness brings about their suffering. But even in the form of tragedy, the stories of Muslim 
reformists always contain moral lessons to be learned; James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist 
Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 117-28. 
46 White, Content, 24. 
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end-point of the story; the story of enlightenment is present throughout The Profile, 
whichever era of Muhammadiyah’s leadership is examined.47 
 A story is only complete if it has a message to convey, a meaning to discern, some 
moral values to extract.48 And The Profile contains so many moral values that it is 
impossible to list them exhaustively. It is a story of the victory of values such as bravery, 
rationality and spirituality over cowardice, stupidity and ignorance; a story in which right 
always trumps wrong.  
What is significant about The Profile’s notion of morality is the way in which the 
victory of right over wrong is presented. Unlike The History and Part 1, the positive 
outcome that is linked to certain events flows naturally from the story. The Profile’s 
acknowledgement of the wise steps of Muhammadiyah’s men occurs not by an explicit 
reference to God, but by silent allusion to this authority. By choosing to do this, it creates 
a source of authoritative power that is universal and therefore natural; the unspoken God 
that blesses Muhammadiyah‘s history is thus the God of all creatures great and small. 
The transcendent is thus made immanent. As a consequence, although the history of 
Muhammadiyah is a particular history of a particular Islamic organisation in Indonesia, it 
can be read as a story with which all of humanity is familiar.  
The elaboration of events describing the effectiveness of Muhammadiyah’s 
leaders in their worldly activities is not of itself evidence of the presence of a 
transcendental providence. Instead, The Profile creates a spectacle confirming that their 
selfless efforts are the medium through which this transcendental providence confirms its 
presence. Again, this conclusion is implicit in the document. By disciplining 
transcendental authority and transforming it into intelligible human actions, The Profile 
has domesticated what White calls the “sublime” and transformed it into the “beautiful”. 
                                                 
47 This mode of history writing can be said to mark the organisation’s aspiration for modernity as an 
“epoch”. Understood as an epoch, modernity has a definite beginning but no ending (Paul Rabinow, 
Marking Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2). For Muhammadiyah, the beginning of this 
epoch coincides with the enlightenment of the exemplary Man, and its subsequent evolution simply 
involves the emulation of this story of enlightenment. 
48 White, Content, 23. 
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In the story of Muhammadiyah described by The Profile, one can therefore identify the 
tendency towards positioning humanity at the centre of history.49 
 
2.4 Creating a ‘Romance’, Avoiding a ‘Satire’ 
By 2010 Muhammadiyah had thus decided to present its story not as a chronicle of events 
but as a narrative, a story which emphasises a moral tale. Why was this new mode 
selected? As we have seen – and as the two earlier histories recognised – in the past the 
organisation’s political influence has been determined more by the vagaries of political 
life than the capacity of its leaders to shape political outcomes. Muhammadiyah’s history 
therefore could have easily become what I have called a satire, one in which the 
ambitious claims of its protagonists are defeated by political realities. Here, I suggest that 
Muhammadiyah has avoided the possibility of being politically marginalised by 
presenting its narrative in a particular way. 
By the 2000s Muhammadiyah faced challenges on many fronts, but it was the 
growing socio-political influence of fundamentalist religious movements that had 
emerged throughout the 1980s and, especially, into the 1990s that caused most concern.50 
Muhammadiyah grew increasingly uneasy with the expanding influence of such tarbiyah 
movements, especially those related to the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), as is well 
recorded.51 I suggest that it was Muhammadiyah’s reaction to the tarbiyah movement that 
best explains the change of the mode in representing the organisation’s history. 
                                                 
49 White describes how ‘history proper’ generally disciplines the sublime and changes it into “the beautiful” 
(Content, 69), thus making it intelligible to “reason, understanding, or aesthetic sensibility” (Content, 72). 
In turn, such an effort is a step towards positioning humanity at the centre of history. 
50 For an example of the conflict between Muhammadiyah and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, a fundamentalist 
political party, see Syaifudin Zuhri, “From Rituals to Politics: Looking at the Conflict over Al Mutaqqun 
Mosque in Prambanan” (a paper delivered at the International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah, 
Malang, Indonesia, November 29-December 2, 2012).   
51 See for example Abdurrahman Wahid, “Musuh dalam Selimut,” in Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi 
Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 
23-26. The word tarbiyah here refers to any movement that follows the precepts of Sayid Qutb and the 
“Islamic Brotherhood”, Ikhwanul Muslimin. This Arabic word actually means “education” and is used to 
designate Ikhwanul Movement’s model of education through small cell groups, the “usrah” (family). Due 
to this model of educating its cadres, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera can be categorised as a tarbiyah 
movement; Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, “The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia’s 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),” Australian Journal of Asian Law 10, no. 2 (2008): 235. 
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 The first clear indication of this new official position was a decree on the 
“Consolidation of Muhammadiyah’s Institutions and Charities” issued by the National 
Office of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta on 1 December 2006.52 Members were 
instructed to abide directly to the organisation’s ideology. 
All Leaders of the Federation [of Muhammadiyah], Majelis and Institutes, Autonomous 
Organisations, and Muhammadiyah’s Charities, are instructed to uphold the discipline of 
organisation, to tighten its lines [of command], and to strengthen Muhammadiyah’s ideology and 
mission.53 
Muhammadiyah’s institutions and charities were also instructed to synchronise their 
activities with Muhammadiyah’s ideology. However, the explicit cause of the anxiety 
behind this instruction was evidently the encroachment within Muhammadiyah of the 
Justice and Prosperity Party. With regard to political parties in general and The Justice 
and Prosperity Party in particular, the decree instructs 
all members of Muhammadiyah to realise, understand, and take a critical perspective [of the fact] 
that all political parties in this country, including political parties which claim [to be] or expand 
its following propagation activities, such as The Justice and Prosperous Party, are truly political 
parties.54 
The singling out of the Justice and Prosperous Party in this decree informs us of 
Muhammadiyah’s uneasiness towards this party with regard to the latter’s double role as 
both a political party and a social movement.  
 A second document indicative of this new official position is a decree of 
Muhammadiyah’s National Annual Meeting (Majelis Tanwir) released in 2007.55 This 
document titled ‘The Revitalization of Muhammadiyah’s Ideology: Consolidation of 
Faith and Life’s Goals’ is more a statement than a decree. It contains a detailed 
elaboration of the response to two major internal issues: what ideology means for 
Muhammadiyah members, and why it is important to uphold that ideology at present. For 
the first question, the ideology that the document refers to is simply the set of ideological 
                                                 
52 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 
149/KEP/I.0/B/2006. 
53 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 
149/KEP/I.0/B/2006, Keputusan No.9. 
54 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 
149/KEP/I.0/B/2006, Keputusan No.3. 
55 This document can be found in Suara Muhammadiyah dan Majelis Pendidikan Kader PP 
Muhammadiyah, ed., Manhaj Gerakan Muhammadiyah,  253-81. 
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statements formulated during the life of the organisation. More significantly, the answer 
to the second question is that the presence of new Islamic movements has the potential to 
“weaken the internal condition of Muhammadiyah, including the weakening in its 
ideology”.56  The organisation’s answer to this threat – and to ‘revitalise its ideology’ – is 
to emphasise its detachment from political parties. Section D of the document reminds its 
readers of the decision taken by the organisation in the years 1971 and 1978 to avoid 
“organisational attachment with any political party or organisation”. 
 The context for the decision by Muhammadiyah to avoid delineating its 
ideological differences with PKS is that the organisation has long recognised that it has 
similar intellectual sources. Part 1, for example, lauded the works of the religious 
scholars Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Qoyyim, and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab.57 Another 
commentary by scholars linked to Muhammadiyah praises Syaikh Hasan al-Bana, the 
founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) as an important reformer 
within Islamic thought.58 Further evidence of a traditional resistance to new ideas is a 
2003 study of theological discourse within Muhammadiyah, which finds that the 
organisation has no official position on religious pluralism or the teachings of various 
other religions.59 
 This is not to imply that Muhammadiyah has the same ideology as that of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. But the point is that Muhammadiyah, in its construction of its 
narrative history, has sought to divert the discussion away from the nature of its ideology. 
It does this with a publication in which the history of Muhammadiyah is depicted as the 
history of the consciousness of Ahmad Dahlan and his successors. Instead of passing 
judgment on whether its ideology is puritanical or not, it deflects the debate in the 
direction of enlightenment as an event, where many dimensions (of which puritanism 
                                                 
56 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Revitalisasi Ideologi Muhammadiyah: Konsolidasi Bdang Keyakinan 
dan Cita-cita Hidup, Bagian B. 
57 Majelis Pustaka, Sejarah Muhammadiyah Bagian 1, 7-8. These three characters are considered as the 
pioneers of revitalism of puritanism in Islamic thoughts.  
58 Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 52. The two authors are historians from Jogjakarta who are also active 
members of Muhammadiyah. Their works are critical towards more progressive ideas within 
Muhammadiyah.  
59 Zuly Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis-
Hegemonik,” Tanwir 1, 2 (2003): 26. 
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might be one) are involved.60 The Man is a complex creature, but in his complexity he 
manages to attain a consciousness that leads to enlightenment. The history of 
Muhammadiyah is thus a romance, in the sense that it completes a journey and tells a 
story of some moralising conclusion. .  
Nevertheless, if Muhammadiyah’s members are not alert to this threat, the 
encroachment from tarbiyah movements, especially those linked to the Justice and 
Prosperity Party, this history could turn into a story of its failure, a satire.61 To evade this 
bleak possibility and prevent Muhammadiyah’s history turning to irrelevance, its 
members are reminded that Muhammadiyah is a social movement and a child of 
enlightenment, the result of the internal psychological struggles of the Man. It is a 
complex struggle, and one that goes beyond the issue of puritanism. Despite all its 
complexities, this enlightenment has proven victorious over its challenges.  
The publication of The Profile is thus intended to confirm Muhammadiyah’s 
victorious journey. While it is possible that it was indeed written to commemorate the 
hundredth anniversary62 of the organisation, as the document itself states, it is very likely 
that the use of narrative for constructing its history was influenced by the tarbiyah threat. 
If this was not the case, then the old chronicle mode of constructing history could have 
been maintained; a document celebrating the centenary anniversary in the form of 
chronicle could have performed this task. Contrary to the view that sees the anniversary 
                                                 
60 The presence of both tolerant and scripturalistic tendencies within Muhammadiyah have been a common 
topic of scholarly works on Muhammadiyah. Examples of such works are Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent 
Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadijah Movement in a Central Javanese Town 
(Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services: 1997) and, more recently, Pradana Boy, Para Pembela Islam: 
Pertarungan Kelompok Progresif dan Konservatif di Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2009). 
Within the present day Muhammadiyah, much has been written to support either the more puritan stance of 
the organisation (see, for example, Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, “Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup: Kajian 
Teoretis dalam Merespon Perang Pemikiran,” in Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap 
Liberalisasi Islam, ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University 
Press Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2005), 13.) or the more progressive tendency (see, as an 
example, Muhammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: “Matinya Pembaruan” dalam Bingkai 
“Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah”,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan, 
ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), xxix.). The same paradox within 
Protestantism has been discussed in Randall Collins, “The Rise and Fall of Modernism in Politics and 
Religion,” Acta Sociologica 35 (1992): 175 and Alexandra Walsham, “The Reformation and ‘The 
Disenchantment of the World’ Reassessed,” The Historical Journal 51, 2 (2008): 497. 
61 White, Metahistory, 8, 10. 
62 According to the Islamic calendar, Muhammadiyah’s 100th birthday fell on 25 November 2009.  
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as the cause for producing this history, the anniversary has been appropriated by the 
Muhammadiyah leadership as the right occasion to launch its own historical narrative. 
 
2.5 Concluding Comments 
As we have seen in the earlier chronicles, the legend of Ahmad Dahlan was always part 
of the story of how the organisation was established. The Profile now adds to this story, 
providing it with a more fixed plot and tying his life-history more closely to subsequent 
periods in its history, thereby formalising the story that has always become the acquired 
predisposition, or doxa, of Muhammadiyah members. This formalisation of the narrative 
of enlightenment within Muhammadiyah which this documents conveys, along with the 
emphasis on the capacity of human mind to understand the world and act righteously, is 
the basis of what I describe in Chapter Four as the ‘reflective habitus’ within 
Muhammadiyah. 
Besides this narrative, The Profile also describes various autonomous 
organisations and charities within the Muhammadiyah umbrella, as well as listing the 
addresses of every branch of the organisations. This document is thus certainly intended 
as a practical guide to teach members what the organisation is all about. And the history 
that is presented in The Profile is a part of this practical guide, for the stories of the men 
in this document are written to convey to its readers the essence of what it is that 
constitutes Muhammadiyah – and build a sense of common purpose which will enable it 
to tame the threat coming from The Justice and Prosperous Party.  
 This threat is not minor. There was concern in the 2000s within official 
Muhammadiyah circles that the organisation might splinter along ideological lines and 
leave it unable to meet the PKS challenge.63 On the one hand, a number of the 
organisations’ members had encouraged a more progressive approach to social change. 
Avoiding the word “liberal”, these thinkers and activists advocated “pembaruan”, or 
                                                 
63 A good example of a more progressive position within Muhammadiyah is taken by Ahmad Syafii Maarif 
in “Keniscayaan Kebebasan Berfikir dalam Muhammadiyah,” in Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: 
Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy (Jakarta: Grafindo, 
2010), 130-40. The orthodox response is typified by Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, “Islam sebagai Pandangan 
Hidup,” 13-37.  
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“renewal”. On the other hand, those who preferred a more orthodox approach used the 
phrase “gerakan Islam”, or “Islamic movement”, to refer to what they believed 
Muhammadiyah should stand for. The publication of The Profile and other books on the 
organisation’s history as a narrative that focuses on individuals is a reaction to this 
perceived threat and the danger of an internal split.  
As illustrated in The Profile, the organisation diverted the discussion rather than 
allowing the debate to open up discussion on ideological differences. This construction of 
the story aims at creating a new perspective. With its history now focused on individuals, 
it aims to show that Muhammadiyah has now gone beyond the distinction between 
puritanism and renewal: 
Since its inception as a federation, Muhammadiyah has shown itself to be consistent in … 
pioneering the efforts of purification and renewal. This sort of effort has been difficult because 
purification is normally opposed to renewal and vice versa.64  
The final part of The Profile is a reminder to its readers of the challenges it faces. 
To be able to successfully respond to these challenges in its second century, the 
organisation needs to “understand and then reinterpret history, to provide responses to the 
problems facing Muslims in entering the second century of the movement”. The 
optimism that Muhammadiyah will prevail is still alive as one reads the final paragraph 
of The Profile. 
This simple book is an effort to assess ourselves in the process of making that optimism come 
true. At the least this book can turn that optimism into something natural for Muhammadiyah in 
the midst of historical pessimism. A bit exaggerated but it has been widely known that 
Muhammadiyah has become big because of that optimism about our future.65 
As the next chapter shows, however, this optimism might not have been that 
widely shared. Muhammadiyah is still standing in the midst of various competing 
ideologies in post-1998 Indonesia and its members are still grasping for what their 
organisation stands for in the world.  
                                                 
64 Tim Penyusunan, ix. 
65 Ibid., 450. 
56 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE LIMITS TO FREEDOM: 
STATUS QUO AND REFORM IN MUHAMMADIYAH 
 
Having described the reproduction of the narrative of enlightenment in Muhammadiyah 
through the writing of The Profile, this chapter will dwell on the perception of 
Muhammadiyah’s members of this narrative: how the idea of enlightenment is interpreted 
and associated with various theological and social perspectives. As the findings of my 
field research inform me, this idea of enlightenment has been used as the basis of either 
the acceptance or rejection of reform. The issue of reform or change, and its necessity, is 
an important issue that occupies the attention of Muhammadiyah’s members, who gather 
around two opposite views: the supports of status quo and of reform.  
My analysis is mainly based on a Bourdieusian framework, with is emphasis on 
the concepts of “habitus” and “crisis”, to elaborate what I mean by status quo and reform. 
I define the status quo as a situation in a society where its members find it difficult to 
modify and adjust their habitus in the face of a perceived crisis. The supporters of the 
status quo, within this understanding, are social agents who experience a “hysteria of 
habitus”, defined as the “incapacity to think historical crises in categories of perception 
and thought other than those of the past”,1 and insist on keeping their old perceptions and 
thoughts in the face of a crisis. On the opposite of the same framework, the supporters of 
the reform camp are social agents who are able to articulate their habitual predispositions, 
consider the inadequacy of these predispositions, and create “a margin of freedom for 
political action aimed at reopening the space of possibles [sic]”.2  
As this chapter will show, while the reform camp does offer a positive prospect 
for interreligious dialogue, the narrative of the status quo camp tells us an appreciation 
                                                 
1 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 83. 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234. 
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for particular human worldviews. It would be unfair and overly simplistic to say that 
proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah are unwilling to embrace progress. They 
are not against progress, but they believe that as Muslims they have their own definition 
of what constitutes progress. 
This chapter is a description of the debate between these two points of view; a 
debate that is aimed at determining the limits to which the members of Muhammadiyah 
allow religious tradition to lead their lives and, consequently, how their understanding of 
their religion limits their perception of human freedom. The issue of freedom and 
submission and the border between the two is what I will elaborate in this chapter. 
The supporters of the reform camp define a progressive direction for 
Muhammadiyah as a move away from the puritan understanding of Islam. By contrast, 
proponents of the status quo perceive no need to move in this new direction and insist 
that Muhammadiyah, with its present theology and activities, is on the right track to fulfil 
the promises of Islam. There is no chronological order in terms of which camp started 
this debate within the present Muhammadiyah. As my elaboration of previous scholarly 
works on Muhammadiyah has shown, both puritan and liberal tendencies have always 
been present within this organisation. The voices supporting each point of view, 
therefore, have always been there. Taking into consideration the Bourdieusian framework 
that I employ, however, the supporters of the status quo camp within this organisation, 
because of their insistence on keeping what they regard as the traditional and specific 
habitus of Muhammadiyah’s members, have a more reactive attitude, whereas the 
proponents of reform have a more evolutionary perspective with respect to change. I 
therefore start my elaboration with the voices coming from the reform camp and continue 
with those from the status quo camp in their reaction towards those ideas of reform. 
I do not see one camp as better than the other. As my elaboration progresses, I 
will show that the status quo camp’s insistence on the particularity of what they perceive 
to be the Muslims’ habitus expresses the limits to what is generally defined as freedom. 
The opinions of the camp’s supporters inform us of the bounded nature of social agents 
within their environment, or “field”. The two camps tell us two different stories of social 
agents’ responses to crisis and both stories are equally valuable. Therefore, rather than 
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viewing the categorisation between status quo and reforms camps in quantitative terms, I 
look at these two camps as qualitatively different. 
 
3.1 The Reform Projects 
I divide the reform efforts into five different projects. What I mean by a “project” is a 
vision of members of Muhammadiyah about how their organisation can better tend to the 
calling of Islam. I created this categorisation in order to make it easier to understand 
various aspects of their reform efforts. In the next part of this chapter I also refer to the 
status quo’s supporters as having their own set of projects. Their version of projects, 
however, has a different meaning. Instead of associating their projects with reform, they 
relate their projects to maintaining what they understand to be the established way of 
observing Islam in Muhammadiyah. 
It is impossible to be exhaustive with respect to this sort of listing, but these five 
issues are the ones that have received enormous attention from Muhammadiyah’s 
members urging the organisation’s reform. I call these efforts the theological, pluralism, 
socio-economic, cultural, and gender projects. While there is some overlapping of 
different projects, it is important to look at each of those projects in its specificity. 
 
3.1.1 The Theological Project 
This project can be considered the basis for the other reform projects because of its basic 
insistence on the need for a continuous interpretation of religious texts in the face of a 
changing world. The ex-chairman of Muhammadiyah, Syafii Ma’arif, in one of his 
articles describes the exact mood of this whole project when he quotes the Indian Muslim 
poet and thinker, Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938): 
The unmoved beach says: “I have been here for a long time, but I have yet to understand who I 
am”. The wave, restlessly rolling, promptly replies, “for me, to roll is to become, to stop means 
that I have not yet become”.3 
                                                 
3 Muhammad Iqbal, A Message from the East, trans. M. Hadi Hussain (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977), 92-
93, as cited in A. Syafi’i. Ma’arif, Islam: Kekuatan Doktrin dan Kegamangan Umat (Yogyakarta: Pustaka 
Pelajar, 1997), 16. 
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In Ma’arif’s point of view, Iqbal is a symbol of a true Muslim in his harsh reaction 
towards weakness, laziness, helplessness and passivity in the heart of Muslims. In 
Ma’arif’s interpretation of Iqbal, the monotheism of Islam cannot tolerate any idleness, 
ignorance, slavery, and formalism in religion.4 
 Yet this unfortunate situation is where Muhammadiyah finds itself at the moment, 
according to proponents of the theological project. Dawam Rahardjo, who used to be 
among the thirteen national leaders of Muhammadiyah, for example, associates 
Muhammadiyah with the extreme ideology of Wahabism, as practiced in Saudi Arabia, in 
its intolerance of other faiths.5 Rahardjo blames the current president of Muhammadiyah, 
Dien Syamsuddin, for this development by making possible the transformation of 
Muhammadiyah’s potential for puritanism into a real fundamentalism.6 When 
interviewed, Rahardjo mentioned three ideas that are inherent in Muhammadiyah’s 
worldview: social responsibility, a modern Western education system, and puritanism. 
The last idea, however, developed at a much faster pace than the first two. At present, 
Rahardjo asserts, the puritan side of Muhammadiyah has become the dominant element 
within the organisation.7  
 The theological project is aimed at reducing the dominance of this puritan 
tendency. According to Amin Abdullah, there are two methods to do this. The first is 
improvement in the way Muhammadiyah orients its purification efforts. Muhammadiyah, 
for the sake of sustaining its relevance among Indonesian Muslims, must widen its 
purification efforts to also cover social behaviour. Besides the traditional understanding 
of purification as the cleansing of local cultures from un-Islamic elements, more attention 
should be given by Muhammadiyah to efforts aimed at reforming people’s attitudes so 
that they will shy away from committing unethical acts, such as corruption.8  
                                                 
4 Ma’arif, Islam, 20. 
5 M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Mengkaji Ulang Muhammadiyah sebagai Organisasi Islam Berorientasi 
Pembaruan,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan, ed. Taufik Hidayat and 
Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), 3. 
6 Ibid., 10. 
7 M. Dawam Rahardjo, interview by author, Jakarta, June 28, 2011. 
8 Amin Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam,” in Pengembangan Pemikiran 
Keislaman Muhammadiyah: Purifikasi & Dinamisasi, ed. Muhammad Azhar and Hamim Ilyas 
(Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2000), 12. 
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 The second method is the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Islamic teachings. 
By reconstruction, Abdullah means the use of new methods to build up Muhammadiyah’s 
religious interpretation: 
The logic of the middle ages and its way of thinking need to be clarified by the method and the 
way of thinking of the sciences which came after them. The emergence of a new scientific 
approach is usually precipitated by experience of anomalies attached to the old system …. If 
Islamic ideas do not wish to lose their relevance, the present thinkers in the field do not need to 
feel worried when facing new developments within contemporary Islamic studies.9 
What Abdullah means by the old system is the traditional method of interpreting Islam; 
for him, this old science is based on the good vs. evil dichotomy of Greek philosophy, 
one that does not allow an overlapping configuration in which two elements can be 
present simultaneously.10 This way of thinking has created antagonism between Muslims 
and non-Muslims by eliminating the possibility of the presence of non-Islamic elements 
in Muslims’ identity and vice versa. When interviewed, Abdullah again mentioned this 
need to understand the possibility of a grey area in Islamic spirituality: 
But spirituality – the new spirituality – no longer uses the word “religion” because spirituality 
(spiritualitas) … has a more inclusive approach, which covers … both the internal and the 
external within us. We do not feel agitated even when the external penetrates [our identity]. The 
external is an inseparable part of our internal self…. [When] that is understood, I think we can 
live a healthy life.11 
 The importance of the use of contemporary method to understand religion is very 
often repeated in the theological project. Mohammad Shofan is an ex-lecturer at the 
Universitas Muhammadiyah Gresik fired by the university rector because of his allegedly 
un-Islamic attitude of extending a Christmas greeting to Christian readers in a local 
newspaper.12 He states that “to study Islam, al-Qur’an is not sufficient without the use of 
a set of proper methods for interpreting it”.13 One of the methods that are worthy of 
consideration is hermeneutics, defined by Shofan as an approach that performs a 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
12 Mohammad Shofan, “Natal dan Pluralisme Agama,” in Menegakkan Pluralisme: Esai-Esai Pemikiran 
Moh. Shofan dan Refleksi Kritis Kaum Pluralis, ed. Ali Usman (Yogyakarta: LSAF, 2008), 55-59. 
13 Mohammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: “Matinya Pembaruan” dalam Bingkai “Kembali ke al-
Qur’an dan al-Sunnah”,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah, xxvii. 
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“scientific operation” (“operasi ilmiah”) on the meaning of texts inherent in the Qur’an.14 
This operation includes psychological, sociological, political, and cultural analysis of the 
text.  
 Moeslim Abdurrahman compares the act of approaching present issues through 
various perspectives to looking through the perspective of many windows and drinking 
from various wells: 
Too many windows that need to be looked through and many wells [whose water] needs to be 
drunk …. If there is too much “self-blocking”…, shutting oneself [from the world], it is as if 
there were ghosts everywhere.15 
The willingness on the part of Muslims to be open-minded is not only necessary in terms 
of adjusting to scientific development, but also for living in an ever-changing world. The 
use of various scientific methods to study religion will produce new interpretations that 
are more in tune with the needs of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. One reason for 
the justification of reinterpretation efforts is pragmatic. Abdullah cites a concrete 
example where a reinterpretation is needed for Muslims to survive: Muslims in Bali are 
reluctant to join the hotel business in the tourists-filled island due to the stigma attached 
to this business. The fear of allowing the practice of impiety by opening up hotels needs 
to be addressed by Muhammadiyah. A reinterpretation is needed to allow these Muslims 
to survive economically.16  
 Another reason for the need for reinterpretation is related to changes in people’s 
mind-sets. Muhammadiyah as a harbinger of modern Islamic organisations needs to 
adjust itself to changing situations on national and global levels. On the national level, 
Abdullah mentions the education of women in Indonesia that requires a more women-
friendly reinterpretation of the Qur’an.17 Syafii Ma’arif asserts the need for 
Muhammadiyah to adjust to the spread of information technology: the increasing demand 
of our time, thanks to the development in information technology, makes it impossible 
                                                 
14 Ibid., xxv-xxvi. 
15 Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. The English phrase ‘self-blocking’ 
was used by Abdurrahman during the interview. 
16 Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih,” 15. 
17 Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
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for Muhammadiyah to lock itself up in its own puritan world.18 Global values are to be 
embraced, not rejected. Muhammadiyah needs to stop its disengagement with 
developments on the global level19 and also to try to address global problems.20 
 Therefore this project rejects the old way of interpreting the Qur’an that treats the 
book as if the Holy Book, and the interpretation of it, came out of a vacuum. In his 
criticism of Islamic puritanism, Zakiyuddin Baidhawy associates this attitude with a sort 
of foundationalism, namely 
a point of view that asserts that knowledge can begin or start from nothingness by accumulating 
elements of knowledge, which are certain and infallible. Foundationalism in the history of the 
philosophy of knowledge started with Rene Descartes (1596-1650). He was certain that men can 
understand everything clearly and vividly…. That certainty is called rationalism. This project has 
entrapped itself with its subjective claim over certainty.21 
A subjective reading of the Qur’an makes it difficult for this divine revelation to offer 
solutions to human problems due to the fact that, in this reading, subjectivity is forced to 
abandon the textual meaning. The text, in the subjectivist approach, is arbitrarily 
interpreted according to the taste of the readers. This mode of reading is likened by 
Shofan to the rape of the text.22  
 The theological project aspires to the recognition on the part of the text’s 
interpreters of the “limits” to their interpretation.23 Absolute certainty over the meaning 
of the text is wishful thinking. One can only understand texts in relations to the method 
one uses and the values one wishes to take on board. In the words of Abdullah, 
in general, the challenge is how to blend faith, methods, and values. In the centre of these three 
elements is rationality. If we can blend these three elements, then it will be safe for us to live our 
religious life in the present era. Otherwise, it will be unbalanced. You can move to either the 
extreme right or the extreme left … because faith can be dragged to either extreme right or 
                                                 
18 A. Syafii Maarif,  “Keniscayaan Kebebasan Berpikir dalam Muhammadiyah,” in Menggugat Modernitas 
Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy 
(Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 134. 
19 R. Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan “Aku Serahkan Muhammadiyah Padamu”,” in Satu 
Abad Muhammadiyah, 42-43; and Ahmad Juanda, “Muhammadiyah dan Kepedulian Sosial-Ekonomi,” in 
Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah, 115. 
20 Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah,” xviii. 
21 Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, “Puritanisme dan Etos Keilmuan: Anomali Sebuah Gerakan Tajdid,” in 
Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah, 161. 
22 Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah,” xxiii. 
23 Baidhawy, “Puritanisme,” 162. 
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extreme left if understood without methodology. This will be even more so if we are blind to 
new values, right? New values [which include] the rise of education, interfaith dialogue. These 
are the new values, aren’t they?24 
 Figure 3.1 is my visual interpretation of the scheme offered by Abdullah. Let us 
call this the “triangle of rationality”. In his understanding, rationality is not a fixed 
notion, a notion as understood by the foundational philosophy explained by Baidhawy 
above. For Abdullah, rationality is the balance between faith (the text itself), methods, 
and values. By defining rationality in this specific way, he tries to bind rationality 
simultaneously to human intellectual properties, perceptions, and the context in which 
they live. He eschews the authoritarian, univocal definition of this term. Rationality 
bounded to the three elements of faith, methods and values, promises, in Abdullah’s 
understanding, a more productive interpretation of Islam. 
Figure 3.1 Amin Abdullah’s Triangle of Rationality 
 
 On the one hand, this new comprehension of rationality helps the theological 
project in justifying the understanding of the Qur’an as a secular (sekuler) revelation. 
This critical attitude of human interpretation of the Qur’an is also shared by other 
proponents of theological project. Mohammad Shofan, states that “the Qur’an must be 
seen and interpreted as a living text, and it needs to be continuously re-interpreted and 
tested by history”.25 Various interpretations of the Qur’an must be allowed to flourish, 
thus allowing no differentiation between the high culture of the pure interpretation and 
other interpretations of the low culture.26 On the other hand, this new scheme does not 
prioritise Descartian rationality in the interpretation of the text: the newly understood 
                                                 
24 Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
25 Shofan, “Satu Abad,” xxiv. 
26 Baidhawy, “Puritanisme,” 163. 
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rationality is now more than just the intellectual property of human beings. It is an 
activity of balancing this property with both the text and the context that will determine 
the relevance of Islam for men and women living their daily lives. Both text and 
rationality are thus made to relate to the profane and contextual to the human 
environment.  
 
3.1.2 The Pluralism Project 
In the context of the present debate within political theory, the term “pluralism” has often 
been discussed in terms of, and often in contrast to, liberal multiculturalism. Liberal 
multiculturalism is often regarded as a response to the inadequacy of pluralism as a 
political project in addressing the demand of minority groups in a multinational state. For 
Will Kymlicka, a staunch supporter of multiculturalism from Queen’s University of 
Canada, pluralism still enforces allegedly common values of liberal justice and a national 
identity, however thin they are, as accepted by various groups within a society.27 
Pluralism, in other words, respects cultures of different groups within a society, but still 
upholds individual civil rights – even when individuals decide to renounce their 
attachment to their primordial group.28 The main beneficiary in a pluralist society, 
therefore, is still the individual. 
 Liberal multiculturalism, by contrast, perceives what are considered as common 
values and identity within a pluralistic society to be the values and identity of a particular 
group, most often the dominant one, which has been disguised as a national one. Liberal 
multiculturalism strives for more than just the protection of basic political and civic rights 
of individuals and is suspicious of the homogenising tendency of the nation-state and the 
marginalisation of minority groups.29 It questions the narrative of national values and 
identity, and exposes this narrative as a particular component of a majority culture that 
                                                 
27 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 271. 
28 Ibid., 234. 
29 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 16, 61, 65. 
65 
 
has been prioritised over those that belong to minority groups.30 The goal of a liberal 
multicultural state is a citizenship in that state that is inclusive of various cultural 
groups31 and therefore allows those different cultures to form the identities of their 
individual members without having to be opposed to national identity; a citizenship that 
is multinational in nature.32 
 Within this understanding, multiculturalism trumps pluralism in its respect for 
various cultures within a society. Pluralism, in its appreciation of these cultures, still 
prescribes the existence of a unifying identity for members of that society. Reading 
through the works of the proponents of what I call the pluralism project in 
Muhammadiyah, however, I find that pluralism, as contrasted to Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism, is what the proponents of this project aim for in Indonesia. Appreciation 
for the various religions and cultures within Indonesia, according to supporters of this 
project, should be accompanied by a common platform for citizenship. These supporters 
see that pluralism, not multiculturalism, is what Indonesia needs in order to protect the 
rights of its minority groups. They still see the need for Indonesian society to have a 
common national identity that takes precedence over the appreciation of various cultures 
existing within the society. As this dissertation progresses, I will show how we can 
understand this particular stance in terms of the reform projects’ goal of adjusting Islam 
to modern values of justice and equality and therefore providing an alternative approach 
to the tendency of the opposite camp to insulate this religion from those modern values. 
 The pluralism project is aimed at a formulation of Muhammadiyah’s theology 
supportive of tolerance and pluralism.33 For the proponents of this project, pluralism is 
more than just an act of recognising plurality. It is an active involvement within a plural 
world. In the article that cost him his academic position, Shofan states that the ultimate 
                                                 
30 Bashir Bashir and Will Kymlicka, “Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and Reconciliation in Modern 
Democracies,” in The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Bashir 
Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5. 
31 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, 
Concepts,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Willy Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 9. 
32 Will Kymlicka, “Multicultural Citizenship within Multinational States,” Ethnicities 11, no. 3 (2011): 
295; and Will Kymlicka, Multinational Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 17-18. 
33 Zuly Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis,” Tanwir 1, 
no. 2 (2003): 42. 
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goal of the pluralism effort, which he has been actively propagating, is the creation of 
homo multikulturalis on a more global level, a model of human beings with their 
conviction that, within a plural environment, there is a need to build a common platform 
based on the recognition of egalitarianism, equality, and justice.34 Shofan’s association of 
the term multikulturalis with a common platform is therefore closer to pluralism than to 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism. 
 This project starts from the reality that Muhammadiyah, at present, has no official 
theology that encourages pluralism. On the one hand, there is a perception of a gap 
between the present sectarian attitude of Muhammadiyah and the inclusivist legacy of 
Ahmad Dahlan.35 The Muhammadiyah that we know today, according to this perception, 
has not been faithful to the ideals exemplified by its founder. On the other hand, the 
absence of a theology on pluralism in Muhammadiyah is considered natural as this 
organisation has been occupied, since its inception, with concrete programs aimed at 
educating and creating welfare for Indonesian Muslims.36 Muhammadiyah’s pragmatic 
occupation with these activities has consumed most of the organisation’s energy and 
resources, therefore resulting in the stagnation of the discourse on theological issues, such 
as the relation between Islam and other faiths. 
 An effort was made to codify Muhammadiyah’s pluralist theology in Tafsir 
Tematik Al-Qur’an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama (“Thematic 
Interpretation of the Qur’an on Social Relations between Religious Communities”), a 
book published by Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah in 2000. It discusses four issues: the 
principles regulating the relations between religious communities, the ways to maintain 
good relations and cooperation among those communities, the Qur’anic description of the 
‘people of the book’ (ahli kitab), and inter-religious marriage.37 This first effort at 
formalising pluralism in Muhammadiyah was halted after rampant protests from sections 
of Muhammadiyah on the book’s allegedly liberal interpretation of the Qur’an.38 The 
                                                 
34 Shofan, “Natal,” 59. 
35 Mohammad Shofan, “Menakar Obyetifikasi Pluralisme,” in Menegakkan Pluralisme, 66. 
36 Qodir, “Wajah Islam,” 36. 
37 Abdul Rohim Ghazali, “Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah,” Tanwir 1, no. 2 
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document never made it into a formal theology of Muhammadiyah, thus leaving the 
organisation still silent on the issue of pluralism.39 
 However, for the proponents of the pluralism project, the potential to construct 
such a theology has always existed. The legacy of Ahmad Dahlan was never lost; it just 
needs to be resurrected. In addition, the pragmatic approach of Muhammadiyah in its 
social activities is based on the spirit of humanism and tolerance, and is built upon the 
importance of human reasoning in understanding religion. This spirit contains a potential 
for the construction of a pluralistic theology.40 The pluralism project is, therefore, not a 
far-fetched aspiration; it is feasible. 
 As its first step, the proponents of the pluralism project need to clarify the 
apparent paradox between Muhammadiyah’s intense adoption of Western methods and 
the seemingly anti-Christian attitude of its founding fathers. With respect to Shihab’s 
thesis on the anti-Christian spirit as the main motivation for the establishment of 
Muhammadiyah, a supporter of this project argued that this antagonistic attitude was 
caused by the intertwined efforts of Christian missions with Dutch colonialism.41 If this 
were true, the anti-Christian motivation was therefore actually caused by the colonial 
Dutch Indies government and its support for Christian missions. Muhammadiyah’s 
objection towards Christian missions should be perceived not as an anti-Christian attitude 
but as an anti-colonial one. The social activities of Muhammadiyah during the colonial 
era should not be seen as hatred towards Christianity but instead as Muhammadiyah’s 
participation in a sort of competition in which the contestants compete with each other in 
the performance of good deeds for fellow human beings.42 In the view of the proponents 
of this project, the goal of this competition is the betterment of humanity. 
 The pluralism project relies heavily on the reconstruction and reinterpretation of 
the theological project.43 In referring to Abdullah’s triangle of rationality, I see that the 
proponents of this project recognise the value of inclusiveness within Muhammadiyah’s 
                                                 
39 Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, 24 June 2011. Since this book, there was no serious 
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reading of the holy text. Islamic morality needs to be measured, to use Abdullah’s term, 
“with a higher yardstick”.44 The assessment of Islamic morality cannot be conducted only 
in terms of the standard it uses to treat fellow Muslims. This new yardstick needs to 
encompass the way that morality views and treats non-Muslims. In Abdullah’s words, “if 
… morality only applies to your [Muhammadiyah’s members’] own community, it means 
that you have failed because you will face another community. The modern world means 
that the elements of other communities are present within [our own community]”.45  
 For this project, interpreting Islam entails the inclusion of people of other 
convictions. For Shofan, Islam means peace, so Muslims are expected to live a peaceful 
life with everyone, regardless of their religion. With regard to various religions’ claims to 
truth, Shofan believes that the Qur’an teaches Muslims not to place the stigma of 
“infidels” on anyone else, Muslims and non-Muslim alike,46 and instead to appreciate 
individual freedom to choose a religion, to accept the existence of other religions, and to 
admit to the unity of messages among various prophets across religions.47 
 The pluralism project thus urges Muslims to be inclusive. This inclusiveness 
means that one needs to not only be tolerant of the beliefs of other people, but also learn 
from those beliefs and use them as resources to be critical of one’s own religion.48 In this 
regard, the discussion of pluralism is related to globalisation.49 For Moeslim 
Abdurrahman, one of the consequences of globalisation is that one cannot assess the truth 
of what one says and does according to one’s own standard: “our truth is now related to 
the truth of other people; [it is] a global truth”.50 On the influence of tradition in affecting 
one’s religious behaviour, he states, “there is no singular Muslim, there is no singular 
                                                 
44 Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
45 Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
46 Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011. 
47 Mohammad Shofan, “Menuju Pluralisme Global,” in Menegakkan Pluralisme, 74-75. 
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Christian because, in life, we borrow from each other”.51 This project, understandably, is 
highly critical of the repressive practice of Islam in some countries, especially in Saudi 
Arabia. As Shofan asks rhetorically when responding to a question of human rights, “Can 
[the Saudis] be allowed to live with their own rules without being involved in 
international norms?”52 
 An appreciation of Islam for the pluralism project needs to be conducted through 
the process of subjecting this religion to various tests. It is no longer sufficient to 
appreciate Islam on the ideological level; it needs to be put under the scrutiny of modern 
interpretive methods.53 In other words, the relevance of Islam needs to be justified not 
only by the Muslim community but also by people of other convictions. By subjecting it 
to more global values, Muslims make Islam significant on the global level.54 This sense 
of confidence is obvious in this project; it is optimistic about the future of Islam. This 
project is sanguine about the prospect of Islam’s embracing the “Other”. In welcoming 
the “Other”, this project believes that Islam will shine brightly, as the religion for all 
humanity. 
 In summary, the pluralism project aims at neither the subjecting of religions to 
relativism55 nor mere tolerance. “Pluralism is beyond tolerance; instead, it can be 
perceived as a militant tolerance.”56 It does not only mean being considerate towards 
other religions, but also involves having a constructive dialogue with them. It means to 
move from “harmonious coexistence” to “meaningful cooperation”.57 
 
3.1.3 The Socio-Economic Project 
What I mean by the socio-economic project is the project concerned with the 
underprivileged section of the society. Poverty and marginalisation are two recurring 
themes in discussions within this project. In one of his articles on the politics of 
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empowerment in Indonesia, Moeslim Abdurrahman starts his discussion on these two 
issues by stating his disappointment with the present political system in Indonesia, which 
is democratic but with minimal participation of the people from the lower socio-
economic level. With regard to a public discussion in an election campaign, he states that 
the debates within the programs in public media are designed and controlled by the 
programmers, or the advertiser for the [political] candidates. They discussed the “grand” political 
issues, such as issues of national economy and macro level policies on education, which are 
abstract for the people of the lower socio-economic level. People themselves, in this sort of 
debate, act more as spectators, even though sometime they are given room to participate, such as 
by text messages –as if they were taking part in Indonesian Idol.58 
Neither do non-governmental organisations play any significant part in overcoming it 
within this unfortunate arrangement. Instead, they discuss the issue of poverty under the 
rubric of civil society.59 Elsewhere, Abdurrahman has written that 
nowadays, non-governmental organisations seem to be more interested in fighting for the rights 
of people as citizens and consumers rather than advancing the rights of people suffering as 
workers or as lower-class citizens.60 
 Abdurrahman calls this situation “hyper-modernity”, where life no longer centres 
on state and politics but, instead, on the issue of money, consumption, pleasure, 
technology and war; a life where community has lost its meaning. The issue of poverty is 
no longer making headlines in a society where everybody is only out for himself.  
 For the socio-economic project, poverty is a form of violence. The violence is 
perpetrated by blocking people’s access to the fulfilment of their various needs. These 
needs include not only physical ones but also access to education and the right to live a 
secure life. Juanda calls this sort of violence “economic abuse”.61 Added to this abuse is a 
globalisation that, according to Tuhuleley, entails privatisation of the provision of basic 
services for citizens as the government sits unmoved by the plight of people.62 The result 
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of this globalization, for Tuhuleley, is rampant poverty and a rapidly growing income gap 
between the poor majority and the elite.63 
 Where does Muhammadiyah stand in this wretched situation? The Profile 
mentions that one of the missions of this organisation is to build and develop Indonesia’s 
middle class.64 But some doubt its effectiveness in eradicating poverty and in advancing 
the interests of Indonesia’s underprivileged citizens to become members of the nation’s 
middle class. Alka argues that even though Muhammadiyah has been active in 
administering a variety of social charities, these charities have yet to benefit the urban 
poor.65  
 Juanda asserts that despite its origin as a social movement for helping the poor, 
Muhammadiyah in its centenarian anniversary has seen the thriving of its charities to 
benefit only the upper-middle class section of society.66 Said Tuhuleley, the head of 
Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat (The Council for Social 
Development), one of the councils within Muhammadiyah’s national structure, admits 
that there has long been a gap between social activism in the time of Ahmad Dahlan and 
today’s activism. With regard to the charitable work in Muhammadiyah’s early years, 
it had been a long time since Muhammadiyah left that activity. It has since been only performed 
through routine works of its institutions, especially its educational institutions, and not 
coordinated by [the central leadership of] Muhammadiyah. Because it had been abandoned for 
too long, [many] branches in Muhammadiyah do not understand that it is one of the duties of this 
organisation.67 
The effort to revive this spirit of activism began in 2000 with the establishment of a 
national institute (lembaga) in Muhammadiyah’s national structure that deals with issues 
affecting peasants and fishermen. This institute was upgraded into Majelis 
Pengembangan Masyarakat (The Council for Social Development) in 2005. Tuhuleley 
has been the head of both the section and the council since 2000. 
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 The resurrection of the socio-economic project in Muhammadiyah, for Tuhuleley, 
began soon after. He acknowledges some limits in the work of this council (majelis), 
especially with regard to the lack of awareness from the members of Muhammadiyah of 
the necessity to do this charity work as part of their duties. The socio-economic project in 
Muhammadiyah, therefore, is a project to revive the spirit of charity among its members. 
To do this, Tuhuleley argues, requires that Muhammadiyah’s members return to the one-
hundred-and-seventh chapter (sura) of the Qur’an, titled “al-Maun” (“Charity”), one of 
the chapters within the Holy Book given much attention by Ahmad Dahlan when he 
taught his students.  
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate 
Has thou seen him who cries lies to the Doom? 
That is he who repulses the orphan 
and urges not the feeding of the needy. 
So woe to those that pray 
and are heedless of their prayers, 
to those who make display 
and refuse charity.68 
 Based on this sura, and the teaching of Ahmad Dahlan and Sayyid Qutb, 
Tuhuleley argues for an addition to the definition of “infidels” in order to sensitise 
Muhammadiyah’s members to the issue of poverty: those claiming themselves to be 
Muslims but pay no heed to the plight of the orphans and the poor should also be 
considered infidels.69 Amin Abdullah’s advice on the need for Muhammadiyah to widen 
its target of purification efforts to the domain of social ethics can be understood as a step 
towards inculcating this spirit of social responsibility among its members. 
 In the same spirit, Moeslim Abdurrahman sees the need to perceive repressive and 
unequal social structure as a form of idolatry that Muslims should resist, and to see 
poverty (kefakiran) as a form of sin (kekufuran) and therefore to be eradicated.70 By 
contrast, he looks at social justice as the highest form of piety.71 These analogies are 
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created to turn the problem of poverty and social marginalisation into a topic worthy of 
religious discussions. Islam is made relevant in addressing the plight of the people; 
religions are transformed into a set of values to counter the marginalising tendency of 
capitalism. Abdurrahman, however, does not opt for the sectarian solution to the problem, 
as imagined by those with a more fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an. Instead, he 
chooses to emphasise the humanistic potential of Islam. This potential comes in the form 
of values that can be used as a part of a counter-hegemonic attack on capitalism. Islam, in 
this regard, can bring out the best aspects of Muslim society in its response to 
globalisation. Those aspects of Islam are freedom, justice, and a sense of community.72 
 
3.1.4 The Cultural Project 
The inclination among some Muhammadiyah’s members to look at the world through a 
framework of binary oppositions is the main concern for the cultural project of the reform 
camp. The opposition of the modern to the traditional Islam, of the truly devout to the 
syncretic Muslims, the religious to the secular, and of the scriptural Islam to its liberal 
counterpart is considered by this project to be counterproductive to the organisation’s 
propagation activities.73 These sets of binary oppositions have narrowed the meaning of 
the organisation’s Islamic propagation directed only towards the spread of scriptural 
Islam. Therefore, Muhammadiyah has been seen as unappreciative of local culture, for 
local cultures are perceived to be marred by pre-Islamic religious elements. For the 
proponents of the pluralism project, this black-and-white way of thinking has taken its 
toll in the form of puritanical attitudes towards local culture.  
 The spirit of religious purification in this organisation has set it aside from the 
majority in society by creating for itself a high culture that is elitist in nature.74 This “high 
culture” (“budaya besar”) is then again made to exist opposite the “low culture” 
(“budaya kecil”) that belongs to the peasants, the traditional Muslims (as opposed to 
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modern Muslims), the syncretic, and the secular.75 There are two victims of 
Muhammadiyah’s alleged puritanism: the local culture and, to use the term used by the 
proponents of the socio-economic project, “lower-class citizens”. 
 Muhammadiyah’s fear of the polluting effects of un-Islamic elements in local 
culture is in line with its traditional method of thinking. Kuntowijoyo refers to this 
method as the “substantive” as opposed to the “symbolic”. Emotional Islam, which 
provides spirituality and sense of community, is limited in Muhammadiyah. “The culture 
of spiritualism is consciously eliminated, whose result is a religion that is felt ‘dry’ by 
society that [in fact] wishes for a sense of being part of a community.”76 For 
Kuntowijoyo, members of Muhammadiyah have fallen victim to the organisation’s 
unfriendliness towards local culture. This way of practising Islam is unacceptable for 
proponents of the cultural project. 
 There are two visions in this cultural project; both are based on the notion of the 
need for Muhammadiyah to embrace local cultures. They differ, however, on how to treat 
its object after that embrace. The first is what I call the interventionist vision. This vision 
sees no need to fear local culture with its rich, and allegedly un-Islamic, symbols. The 
argument for this vision is that these symbols often have uses that are synchronous with 
Islamic teachings. The practitioners of local cultures, however, often do not understand 
the Islamic meaning of those symbols. This vision imagines the presence of two layers 
within a culture: the outer, physical, appearance, and the hidden meaning. The task for 
Muhammadiyah is to awaken people to the hidden meaning of their culture, so that they 
are not bound to its mythical symbols but grasp its true and rational meaning. The two-
layered assumption of this vision requires this organisation to intervene in the way people 
attach meaning to the symbols present in their local culture. Demythologisation is the 
first step of this intervention: 
We do not need to regard those symbols as taboo as long as we are able to Islamize the values 
lying behind them. It is often the case that there must be demythologisation, desacralisation, and 
demythification of those symbols in order for them to be assimilated into the lap of Islamic 
culture.77   
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 This vision is different from the second one, which I call the laissez-faire vision. 
The main proponent of this vision is Kuntowijoyo and he advocates a non-interventionist 
attitude towards local culture. A case he uses as an example to explain his position is the 
performance of a shadow puppet play during the forty-second Muktamar of 
Muhammadiyah in 1990. The story told in this performance is the “Wayang Sadat”, a 
story of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine holy saints who brought Islam to Java in his 
struggle to seek knowledge. In the original story, Sunan Kalijaga, in his search for 
knowledge, meditated intensely on a river bank until his skin was covered in moss. In the 
original story, he is also depicted as mastering a supernatural power that he uses when he 
had to fight his enemies. In order to purify the story for the national meeting (muktamar), 
instead of portraying Sunan Kalijaga as meditating, the puppeteer showed a scene in 
which Sunan Kalijaga was actually studying Islamic scriptures. Instead of the myth of 
Kalijaga’s supernatural power, the puppeteer instead represents the saint as well-trained 
in religiously-sanctioned martial arts.78 
 To the Islamisation of the above story, Kuntowijoyo responds by saying that “if 
myths need to be made into history, and spectacles into lessons learned, wayang will be 
dried out. As a spectacle, it will be uninteresting; as a history, it will not be based on 
facts”.79 To the tendency of the rationalization of local culture, he exclaims, “it will be 
odd if we want everything to make sense!”80 For Kuntowijoyo, arts are the expression of 
the whole of human properties; they are not only the expression of human reasoning. In 
his words, “to look at everything as a product of human reasoning is like reducing 
humanity, like having no faith in the all-embracing power of God”.81 
 Islam is liberating and therefore Islamic purification need not cover all things 
under the sun. For Kuntowijoyo, there are things that need to be kept as they are, things 
which do not require reinterpretation. Culture and arts are examples of these things. For 
him, this is the only way to maintain Islam as a liberating element for humanity: 
                                                 
78 Kuntowijoyo, “Islam dan Budaya Lokal,” 292. 
79 Ibid., 293. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 
76 
 
I think what we really need is a new substance to [add to] the efforts of purification … so that we 
will be spared from the need to make things up. Religion should be protected in order that it does 
not become a burden for humanity. Do not let Islam stop being a liberator!82 
 Muhammadiyah has responded to this call from the cultural project. This response 
took the form of the document Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah’s 
Method of Islamic Propagation through Culture), a product of the 2002 Tanwir Meeting 
in Denpasar. This document has been celebrated as a sign of cultural reform within 
Muhammadiyah. The culturally sensitive method of Islamic propagation elaborated in the 
document is perceived to 
take the side of a universal humanist values, accept local wisdom and intelligence … by heeding 
the uniqueness of humans both individually and socially. The way of Islamic propagation, with 
this method, is made “easy” and “enjoyable” for the upholding of Islamic values in life with its 
various social, economic, political, and cultural aspects.83 
The assumption in this document is that Islamic propagation need not be antagonistic 
towards local culture. Within the arts,  
aesthetics is enchanting because it also contains the truth as long as this aesthetics is attached to 
the All Righteous. Therefore, arts in Islam creates the synergy between the dimensions of 
aesthetics – ethics – truth  For that reason, aesthetics cannot be separated from ethics (venerable 
morality) and are always joined to the effort to bring truth to life.84 
 On the need for intervening in local culture in the interest of Islamic propagation , 
the document is understandably closer to the interventionist vision of the cultural project. 
In appreciating local culture, the document states that 
it does not mean that culturally sensitive Islamic propagation maintains or justifies the elements 
that are syirik [the quality of worshipping any being other than God], bidah [the quality of 
adding unnecessary elements to the prescribed rituals], tahayul [the quality of superstition], and 
khurafat [the quality of attributing Islamic nature to non-Islamic practices]. On the contrary, this 
mode of propagation understands and responds to these elements by subjecting them to the 
activities of Islamic propagation.85 
To do this, the new method of propagation needs to differentiate, within culture, those 
elements that are Islamic in nature and therefore universal, absolute, and everlasting; and 
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those elements which are of human making, and are therefore particular, relative, and 
temporal.86 Here again we find the tendency to dissect cultures into smaller, more 
comprehensible, sections. In this act of partitioning, culture is demythologised; it is made 
acceptable to rationality by being stripped to its most basic elements. Culture is turned 
into a human construct, or rather, it is made to realize its nature as human conventions; it 
is disenchanted by being cleansed of the magical aura that used to surround it. Within the 
seeming act of appreciation, this document domesticates culture. 
 The domestication does not stop here. After differentiating between the Islamic 
and the conventional – human-made – elements of culture, the second element of this 
domestication is to be further dissected into those that are ma’ruf (in accordance with 
what the Qur’an refers to as “good”) and those that are not yet ma’ruf.87 With regard to 
those that belong to the first category, Muhammadiyah needs to develop them for the 
interest of Islamic propagation. With regard to the second category, it is the task of 
Muhammadiyah to ‘intervene’ (‘melakukan intervensi’) by transforming the content of 
those elements and develop them further until they manage to reach the category of 
ma’ruf, and can be used for the interest of Islamic propagation.88  
 In this sense, “the local culture [is] both the method … and the target of Islamic 
propagation”.89 Local culture, again, is the target of purification. This is certainly not the 
cultural project that the laissez faire vision imagines. Amin Abdullah argues that it is 
important to put human reasoning aside when one talks about local cultures and rely on 
“the feeling of the people” in appreciating them: 
Human reasoning can cause problems because, to some extent, human beings cannot rely only 
on their reason; the feeling of the people is also important…. We cannot just abandon the feeling 
of the people. In looking at local culture, the feeling of the people must be involved. That is what 
a considerate person would do. In wisdom, various aspects need to be taken on board.90 
 While the interventionist vision regards the cultural project as a struggle to spread 
a rational approach to local culture among Muhammadiyah’s members,91 the cultural 
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project envisioned by the proponents of laissez-faire vision rejects this tendency to 
rationalise culture. Their project is to give room for local culture to at least maintain its 
presence in society. In Kuntowijoyo’s words, 
what Muhammadiyah needs to do is create a forum to uphold social solidarity (silaturahim) for 
… communities. Arts … are one of the possible [tools to bring back] the spiritual culture [in 
Muhammadiyah] that due to a [puritan] concern have been abolished.92 
Kuntowijoyo reckons that it is natural for human beings to require both the substantive 
and symbolic aspects of religions.93 The breathing room for local culture is what the 
laissez-faire vision hopes for, while religious purification is what the interventionist 
vision is aimed at. 
 
3.1.5 The Gender Project 
In my previous description of the theological project, Amin Abdullah mentions the need 
to adapt to the fact that these days women have experienced higher levels of education. 
This fact requires Muslims to understand Islam in a way that is friendlier towards 
women. The gender project aims exactly at this: Muhammadiyah, and also Islam, needs 
to understand that women have the same potential to contribute to the advancement of 
society as do men.  
 This project does not, in any case, stipulate that Islam is opposed to the 
empowerment of women. For the proponents of this project, as for proponents of the 
previous four projects, the Islam that we know is always Islam as a product of human 
interpretation. Any case of repression against women in the name of Islam, therefore, is 
based on a puritanical reading of this religion. For the gender project, Islam in itself 
contains a high appreciation for women. Siti Chamamah Soeratno, for example, believes 
that the coming of Islam had brought with it a civilising mission. Islam teaches human 
beings to embrace morality. “Humans,” says Soeratno, “are fortunate with the coming of 
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Islam,” and that “the most fortunate of human beings with the coming of Islam are 
women”.94 
 Islam, for this project, has many reasons to be proud of its achievement in 
uplifting the status and role of women. If pre-Islamic Arabia was marked by the 
subjugation of women by men, the Prophet Muhammad introduced various teaching that 
places women in a much better position. For example, Islam introduced the limitation of 
how many wives a man can take. The conditions that entitle a man to take more than one 
wife, however, are so difficult for any man to fulfil that the truly prescribed form of 
marriage in Islam is monogamy. In terms of the chance for women to fulfil their 
potential, Islam has not set any limitation. The prime examples of this are the wives of 
the Prophet who were given all the opportunity to develop themselves, including being a 
leader.95 
 Within Muhammadiyah specifically, this spirit of gender equality has been 
present since its inception. Retelling the story of Ahmad Dahlan, Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin 
explains Dahlan’s view on the empowerment of women: 
Just imagine that in his time Kiai Dahlan was threatened just because he was supporting Muslim 
girls to ride bicycles. He told them to change their clothing, to don a wide dress [so that they will 
be able to ride bicycles], just like Dutch girls.96 
 Dahlan’s attention to the empowerment of Muslim girls is also obvious in his 
insistence on their education. He pioneered general education for girls in his 
neighbourhood in the Kauman, where most of Yogyakarta’s santri live; he even sent 
some of his female students to study at Dutch public schools.97 Another formal 
publication of Muhammadiyah, The Heroines (Srikandi-Srikandi) tells the story of how 
Ahmad Dahlan  
did not only establish Muhammadiyah. He also paid great attention to the life of women. In Kyai 
Dahlan’s view, women have equal rights to men to participate to advance their society and 
religion. Besides doing their jobs as household mothers, women can also be active in the 
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development of the society. This brilliant idea of Kyai Dahlan was born a century ago when the 
society of Kauman still looked at women just as konco wingking (“a companion at the back”, 
which only takes care of the household).98 
 The above statement sounds as if Dahlan had supported a double role for women: 
those of both public and domestic worlds; and as if Dahlan’s insistence on the necessity 
for women to be involved in social activism on top of their domestic chores99 had 
testified to his support for this double role. The gender project, however, understands this 
insistence in terms of Dahlan’s social environment where women had not been given the 
opportunities that they have now. The fact of Dahlan’s progressive vision for the role of 
women is an achievement to be measured in the context of his time. 
 The gender project, therefore, is a project to contextualise gender discourse in 
Muhammadiyah. It is not meant to judge the level of gender sensitivity of past leaders of 
Muhammadiyah. It is more interested in making Islam, as understood in Muhammadiyah, 
relevant and significant in addressing various issues affecting women. The main concern 
for this project is the gap between the official discourse on gender in Muhammadiyah and 
the reality of the present lives of Muhammadiyah’s female members. As Dzuhayatin 
notes, in reality, the jobs held by the organisation’s female members are no less 
demanding than those of their male counterparts. It is even often the case that the wives 
in Muhammadiyah-affiliated households play a more financially significant role in 
sustaining the family’s livelihood than the husbands.100 The official documents in 
Muhammadiyah elaborating the proper role of women, however, are still focused on their 
role as good wives and mothers, regardless of the fact that they are dynamic, active, and 
independent women in the work place. 
 For the proponents of the gender project, the evolving values with regard to 
women and the reality of the lives that they endure are two reasons why Muhammadiyah 
needs to build its official gender conception, a conception that is expected to be more 
accommodating towards women’s needs. A religious reinterpretation of the proper roles 
of women in the present time has become necessary and for the first time 
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Muhammadiyah has facilitated a discussion on this theme, its result published in the 2005 
book Wacana Fiqh Perempuan dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah (“Muhammadiyah’s 
Perspective on the Discourse in the Islamic Jusrisprudence on Women”).101 This book is 
the first effort at bringing the debates on the issue of gender to public realm. Even though 
it is not an official document, as this is a compilation of opinions on this issue among 
Muhammadiyah’s members, both male and female, it is still considered an important step 
in forwarding the gender project in the organisation. 
 The opinions contained in the book have various views with regard to the issue of 
women in Islam. There are opinions that advocate the need for the reinterpretation of the 
Qur’an in order to adjust Islam to the present world.102 But there are also those who are 
content with the present treatment of women by Islam in its puritan interpretation.103 
Moreover, the papers in the book do not only concern themselves with the development 
of the discourse on gender in Muhammadiyah but are also critical towards the status and 
role of women within various national legislations, especially with regard to the issue of 
marriage. 
 The gender project endeavours to include the progressive gender perspective in 
Muhammadiyah and to make this organisation more sensitive towards the evolving 
global discourse on this issue.104 With respect to various perspectives on feminism, 
especially those developing in the West, the proponents of this project seem to see no 
contradiction with what they themselves are doing in Muhammadiyah. Siti Aisyah 
regards feminism as a response to the marginalization of women: 
[Feminism] is really a struggle to increase the value [of women]. So it is actually [responding to] 
social problems. I think there is no problem in that. Besides, there were developments in the 
form of Islamic feminism. Now, if feminism is defined as [the efforts] to put women in an equal 
status with men, it is exactly what Islam does.105 
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The same tone came from the President of Aisyiyah at the time this research was 
conducted, Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, who sees the values inherent in feminism as 
parallel to those in Islam. Both feminism and Islam strive to disentangle social and 
cultural constructions to achieve justice for both men and women. Differences in 
strategies of various movements employed to achieve this goal are natural as each faces 
different situations.106 
 The gender project, just as the other reform projects, is thus not a unitary 
program. It is constituted by various opinions of members of Muhammadiyah in search of 
the relevance of Islam with respect to women. The proponents of this project are not 
interested in establishing a fixed formula to address gender issues in both 
Muhammadiyah and Indonesia. They realise that the discourse needs to be revitalised 
time and again to meet the evolving problems of women. It is natural, therefore, to expect 
them to champion the cause of the continuous reinterpretation of the text.107 
 
*     *     * 
 
As a summary of what I have elaborated so far about the efforts of the reformists in 
Muhammadiyah, there are two things that underlie all the five projects. The first is that 
reform projects rely heavily on the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Islam. Islam, 
understood by the reform camp, is always Islam perceived. The way Muslims understand 
Islam will determine the way they behave. In order to keep Islam significant as a mind-
set today, therefore, it is of utmost importance for Muslims to embrace modern methods 
of interpreting Islam’s holy texts. The second underlying theme in the five reform 
projects is the necessity for Muslims to take into account the context in which Muslims 
live their lives. Islam exists to guide Muslims in their daily lives. The interpretation of 
Islam, therefore, should not be blind to the present environment in which Muslims live. 
Contextualisation is what Islam needs in order to be relevant to the lives of Muslims. 
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3.2 The Status Quo Projects 
Contrary to the proponents of the various reform projects, the proponents of the status 
quo wish Muhammadiyah to stay on its present, familiar, course. What Muhammadiyah 
has accomplished, for the proponents of the status quo, has been in accordance with the 
requirements of Islam. Reconstruction and reinterpretation, therefore, are unnecessary 
because the danger of straying off the path of Islam as the result of reconstruction and 
reinterpretation is real. The status quo is puritan when it comes to the defence of the 
present interpretation of Islam within Muhammadiyah. But there is much more to the 
story of the status quo. Its insistence on the adequacy of the traditional interpretation of 
Islam is a story of how human beings are bound to their familiar cultural milieu. 
 The status quo camp has projects with which they urge Muhammadiyah to 
engage. Contrary to the reformist projects, these projects are aimed at keeping 
Muhammadiyah on the organisation’s traditional path of what they perceive to be the true 
calling of the organisation. These projects, however, are not blind to the development of 
new global values, as I will suggest in the last part of this section. 
 
3.2.1 The Project of Islamic Defence 
This project is a response to the projects by the proponents of the reform camp. 
Perceiving an attack from the reformist camp, this project wishes to bring 
Muhammadiyah’s members back to the true path of Islam. The project’s first argument 
against its more progressive adversary is that Islam is not just a set of values. Islam, for 
this project, means the act of self-surrender to a concrete, well-defined, set of rules.108 In 
Islam, the outer and physical – exoteric – dimension is no less important than the esoteric 
dimension.   
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Within Islam, the syariat (exoteric) aspect is very important. The forms of rituals are the very 
basis of Islam. Islam does not separate exoteric from esoteric aspects. Islam strongly rejects any 
forms of rituals other than those used as examples by the Prophet Muhammad.109 
 The same person who writes the above, moreover, argues that those Muslims who 
plan to create an Islam without its shariah aspect should just leave Islam instead.110 In 
Husaini’s opinion, stripping Islam of its exoteric aspect will ruin the basic meaning of the 
religion itself. Islam will not be Islam without its exoteric aspect.111 
 The project’s second argument is related to the fact that the concreteness of Islam 
is well maintained by the purity of the Qur’an in which “there has been no intervention 
whatsoever by humans in terms of its choice of words, the construction of its sentences, 
let alone the interpretation of its meanings and messages”.112 With the revelation of Islam 
completed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the perfect nature of Islam 
consequently requires no further development or growth.113 The revelation of the Qur’an 
is thus permanent; what Muslims need is only elaboration of the Holy Book.  
 With respect to the interpretation of the Qur’an, this project strongly opposes 
hermeneutical methods. With the originality of the Holy Book maintained, its proponents 
believe, there is no need for an interpretation that takes into account factors surrounding 
the process of the writing of the Qur’an. Contrary to the theological project of the 
reformist camp, this project asserts that in order to acquire the true meaning of their Holy 
Book, Muslims need only to redirect any interpretation of the Book back onto the Book 
itself.114 Instead of adopting the method of hermeneutics in interpreting the Qur’an, this 
project urges Muslims to be proud in this Islamic method of interpretation, the 
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interpretation based on the monotheistic nature of Islam.115 Any interpretation of the 
Qur’an risks becoming insidious (bathil) unless it is based on this method. If an 
interpretation is performed without using this method, the interpreters risk becoming 
infidels (kafir) who act as if they were studying the Qur’an while in reality they doubt its 
authenticity and, furthermore, defile it.116 Since the Qur’an has an eternal message for 
human beings, any interpretation of the Qur’an can only be considered as reviving and 
not renewing its meaning.117 
 The project’s third argument is Islam’s status as a worldview, as an ideology that 
“has key concepts that originate from its own tradition and are diametrically different 
from the concepts of other worldviews”.118 Some of those key concepts are: its view of 
reality and truth as the result of human beings’ perception of both the visible and the 
invisible world; Islam’s reliance on both transcendental revelation and the support of 
human’s reasoning; and its central concept of God. The project’s belief in the 
distinctiveness of the Islamic worldview puts Islam in a different place from other 
religions, civilisations, and cultures. 
 This first project for defending the status quo is clearly aimed at defending Islam 
from other ideologies, values, and methods of interpretation, especially those coming 
from the Western world. This emphasis on the distinctiveness of Islam is to keep 
Muslims from being attracted by Western ideologies, values and methods by creating a 
sense of pride among Muslims and a sense of the adequacy of Islam in addressing their 
present needs.  
 
3.2.2 The Rescue Project 
This second project urges that a further religious purification become Muhammadiyah’s 
main concern: 
As an organisation for Islamic propagation, it is only proper that Muhammadiyah takes as its 
main concern the issues of keimanan [faith] and akidah [morality] more than the issues of 
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politics, economy, education, and other social issues. It is because Islamic morality is the 
foundation to uphold other good deeds. There can be no good deeds without the right foundation 
of faith.119 
The main concern for this project is that under the guise of Muhammadiyah’s slogan of 
reform or renewal (tajdid), some members try to “uproot this organisation from its 
foundation, and even to move it away from its vision and mission as a movement for 
Islamic propagation and amar maruf nahi munkar (a movement that calls people to do 
good deeds and avoid dishonour)”.120  
 For the proponents of the rescue project, it is only natural for Muhammadiyah to 
be consistent (istiqomah) in fighting superstitious belief and syncretism among 
Indonesian Muslims, as coined in the term “the illness of TBC”121 by the proponents of 
this project. To create a true Islamic society is the only aspiration deemed to be in 
accordance with the legacy of Ahmad Dahlan. For the proponents of this project, the 
main method to reach this aspiration is through the eradication of un-Islamic elements, 
which mainly refer to the influence of “pre-Islamic” local cultures, from the life of 
Muhammadiyah’s members. 
 What does the figure of Ahmad Dahlan stand for in the eyes of the proponents of 
this project? The first image of Ahmad Dahlan for them denies any inclination, on the 
part of Dahlan, to either pluralism or liberalism. According to Adian Husaini, the 
proponents of reform in Muhammadiyah have unfairly misinterpreted his legacy: 
Since its inception in 1912 the founder and the leaders of Muhammadiyah might have never 
thought that one day there would emerge from within this organisation a wide range of thoughts 
that [would] ruin the construction of Islam. Truth be told, this is now no longer the case. There 
are so many ideas disseminated by institutions and members of Muhammadiyah that are odd and 
considered unreasonable by Muslims. It is not unusual that those ideas are claimed as part of 
Muhammadiyah’s teaching with the misuse of the name of the organisation’s founder, K.H. 
Ahmad Dahlan – as if the founder of Muhammadiyah had been a figure supporting pluralism.122 
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Husaini is equally critical of the efforts of the reform project to depict Dahlan as a 
supporter of liberalism.123 
 For the supporters of this rescue project, Ahmad Dahlan stands for the intelligent 
selection of what the West has to offer. “The people of Muhammadiyah”, argues a 
proponent of this project, 
should be able to follow the organisation’s founder … [in his selective attitude of] taking what is 
good from the West … and combatting [the West’s] Christian culture, Christian thoughts, and 
Christian lifestyle. KHA Dahlan had been consistent towards Islam even though he took a lot of 
Western methods in propagating Islam and developing the value of human beings.124 
This project argues that in Muhammadiyah, this selective attitude towards non-Islamic 
elements in the society has to be maintained. They argue that any effort of reform must 
follow Islamic ideology,125 the Qur’an and the Hadith,126 and the Islamic morality 
(akidah).127 
 For this project, two rules apply. First, with regard to pure rituals (ibadah 
mahdlah), there will be no contextualisation. This means that neither addition nor 
subtraction can be applied to the prescribed rituals. Second, with regard to those things 
outside the pure rituals, contextualisation is allowed as long as it is based on the ideal of 
morality in Islam.128 Saleh Daulay, the president of the youth wing of Muhammadiyah, 
Pemuda Muhamadiyah (“The Youth of Muhammadiyah”), refers to these two elements in 
Islam as ideology and social life, respectively, for which the same rules apply.129 
 With regard to these two rules, on the one hand, the logic of Islamic puritanism 
applies to matters of ideology. The proponents of this rescue project admit that 
Muhammadiyah adopts a Salafist approach in its ideological framework. The works of 
Ibnu Taimiyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, and Rasyid Ridla influence 
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Muhammadiyah’s understanding of Islamic morality and rituals.130 On the other hand, 
with regard to social life, Muhammadiyah is allowed to adopt Western modernism.131 For 
proponents of the status quo, there was never an unconditional adoption of Western 
modernism, neither was there an all-out puritanism in Muhammadiyah. 
 The proponents of the status quo do not intend to isolate Muhammadiyah from 
global problems facing humanity. Muhammadiyah needs to be active in discussing 
various issues facing human’s civilisation. The ex-chairman of Muhamadiyah, the man 
who was also the speaker of Indonesia’s national parliament in 1999 to 2004, Amien 
Rais, for example, urges Muhammadiyah to bring together its members to discuss the 
issue of Islam, as well as those issues of global warming, globalisation, and the future of 
human civilisation. The discussion hopefully can help Muhammadiyah understand its 
position amidst global changes. According to Rais, however, Muhammadiyah’s 
involvement with regard to these issues should always be based on the puritan 
understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.132  
 The rescue project is therefore aimed at bringing back Muhammadiyah and its 
members to what they perceive to be the original understanding of the Qur’an. 
Muhammadiyah needs to wake up to the fact that at the moment the gravest danger 
facing this organisation, and the most perilous act of disbelief likely to be committed by 
its members, is the propagation of Western ideologies of secularism, pluralism, and 
liberalism.133 The project usually refers to this set of ideology as “the disease of 
sipilis”.134 
 This project sees many members of Muhammadiyah as suffering from a feeling of 
uncertainty when they are facing the West: 
This nervousness and confusion are marked by an inferiority complex that has stricken some of 
Muhammadiyah’s members and leaders, especially when they are facing Western civilisation 
and modernisation. They then feel confident if they adopt the secular Western approaches and 
                                                 
130 Dien Syamsuddin, “Kata Pengantar: Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman,” in 
Pemikiran Muhammadiyah, viii-ix. 
131 Ibid., xi. 
132 Rais, “Pluralisme Kebablasan,” 99. 
133 Zaini Munir, “Liberalisasi Syari’at Islam,” in 1 Abad Muhammadiyah, 75. 
134 The word “sipilis” is an Indonesian term to refer to the disease of syphilis. The word is used by 
proponents of the rescue project to explain the destructiveness of the ideologies of secularism, pluralism 
and liberalism. 
89 
 
methods because those approaches and methods are considered advanced, progressive, 
transformative, liberating. They therefore adopt these things unconditionally. At the same time, 
they feel phobic [and] unconfident in upholding organic Islamic thinking, the thinking that began 
and developed from a Muslim worldview, with its source in Al-Qur’an and Sunnah and in the 
richness of Muslim intellectuality.135  
The proponents of this project urge the Western-influenced members of Muhammadiyah 
to “repent and admit to their mistakes, study Islam better, and to think more clearly and 
more modestly”.136 As we have seen, they liken this Western-influenced attitude of the 
proponents of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah to a disease137 and urge a more 
selective attitude towards the West if this organisation is to cure itself.138 
 
3.2.3 The Status Quo’s Rejection of Global Values 
For the proponents of the status quo, the struggle to bring Muhammadiyah back to the 
right path is an ideological war between Islam and the globalising values of the West. 
Responding to the globalising mission of the West, there are three arguments. First of all, 
they see Muslims as people who are supposed to be ruled by an Islamic worldview. This 
worldview is specific and different from other worldviews, including from the Western 
one. In this regard, Muslims should be given the freedom to live according to their 
religious precepts, even when these precepts are contradictory to a Western worldview.139 
 This contradiction, however, does not mean that it is impossible for Muslim 
worldviews to have some overlap with a Western worldview in terms of the values they 
cherish. With regard to plurality, for example, this project believes that Islam is basically 
a religion that respects plurality. Even though Islam has its own claim as the only true 
religion of God, and has at time seemed lenient and at other times assertive towards 
minorities,140  
                                                 
135 Syamsul Hidayat, “Prolog: Respon Muhammadiyah terhadap “Liberalisme Islam”,” in Pemikiran 
Muhammadiyah, xiv. 
136 Husaini, Islam Liberal, 132. 
137 Ibid., 125. 
138 Syukriyanto, “Istiqamah,” 4. 
139 Husaini, “Muhammadiyah,” 84. 
140 Husaini, Islam Liberal, 112. 
90 
 
it does not mean that the followers of Islam are allowed to be exclusive, to isolate themselves, to 
be rigid and intolerant …. Tolerance towards the beliefs of others is an obligation in the teaching 
of Islam.141 
In Husaini’s words, 
the belief in the truth and the distinctiveness of Islam does not make it right for Muslims to be 
intolerant towards believers of other faiths. Muslims are also expected to honour other faiths, 
even though their faith claims that the only truth lies within their own religion.142 
 It is important to explain the meanings this project attaches to the words 
“plurality” and “pluralism”. While “plurality” (pluralitas)  for its proponents refers to the 
recognition of the reality of the existence of a variety of religions in a society without the 
need to consider the truth claims of all religions relative, “pluralism” (pluralisme) is 
defined as the ideology that considers the validity of all religions to be relative.143 For the 
supporters of the status quo, while Islam acknowledges plurality, it utterly rejects 
pluralism.144  
 The project’s second argument is that the Western worldview is also a particular 
one, just like Islam. The ideology of secularism, for example, was born out of the 
historical trauma of Western society of the violence perpetrated by its organised 
religions.145 Secularism is a product of a specific history of the West that required it to 
eventually separate religions from public life. Pluralism and gender equality are other 
examples of specifically Western conceptions.146  
 The proponents of reform in Muhammadiyah, despite their jargon of free 
thinking, are considered to be the slaves of Western texts. When they criticise the puritan 
reading of the Qur’an by the proponents of the status quo, argue the project’s supporters, 
they are actually upholding, among others, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the American Declaration of Independence.147 In so doing, they treat those 
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documents as their Holy Scripture148 and position the standard of the implementation of 
human rights and gender equality above that of the Holy Book.149 
 The third argument of this project is that despite the particularity of the origin of 
its concepts, the West and its supporters among Muslims are forcing these concepts onto 
the Muslim community. “The jargon of plurality and pluralism upheld [by those Muslims 
bent on supporting liberalism in Islam] are nothing but lip service because … these 
people are constructing an hegemony over [those with] different views.”150 For the 
supporter of the status quo, it is hypocritical of the West to refuse the specific nature of 
its ideology, while it forces its ideas of pluralism, human rights and gender onto 
Muhammadiyah in particular and onto Islam in general.151  For the proponents of the 
status quo, their fight is a cultural war against the hegemony of Western values. 
 
3.3 Concluding Comments: On the Limits to Freedom 
The supporters of the status quo camp are not against progress, but they believe that, as 
Muslims, they have their own definition of what constitutes progress. Their project 
recognises the particularity of any human worldview. Their criticism of the hegemony of 
the worldview coming from the West originates from their recognition of the particularity 
of any human worldview. The project for the status quo also admits to the particularity of 
the Islamic worldview and it is aimed at maintaining the purity of this worldview against 
the penetration of Western ways of thinking. 
 The idea of freedom accompanying the penetration of the Western worldview into 
Islam, for the project, is nonsensical. Firstly, the freedom that the West has been busily 
campaigning for is an empty concept because even the supposedly modern West has 
never been consistent in applying this concept in its own society. 
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At the moment, modern humans also discriminate against each other with respect to place of 
birth and blood connection. Just because someone was born in America, for example, he is given 
different rights from those who happened not to be born there.152 
This perceived hypocrisy of the West points to the impossibility of humans reaching the 
sort of freedom that the West imagines.  
 Secondly, this project’s rejection of any possibility of humans implementing 
ultimate freedom is based on the fact that humans are creatures who are constantly bound 
by their worldview, either Islamic or otherwise. It is the nature of human beings to follow 
a certain worldview. In this regard, for supporters of the status quo camp, to be free 
means subjecting oneself to a certain text, a certain worldview. To aim for freedom in 
accordance with the Western standard, therefore, is no more liberating than to submit to 
Islam. 
 The project’s criticism of the proponents of various reform projects in 
Muhammadiyah is directed towards their perceived blindness to the bounded nature of 
human beings. For the status quo, their adversary’s utopian idea of human beings 
reaching freedom is a sign of their naivety and ignorance of the true human nature. For 
this project, Islam is one worldview among various worldviews, but this fact does not 
make it less meaningful for Muslims to rely on their religion’s claim of truth – as the 
Americans are supposed to find the ultimate truth of humanity in their worship of the idea 
of freedom. In arguing their case, the proponents of the status quo have showcased the 
limits to human freedom. 
 Their assumption of the naivety of the reform projects, however, may be 
somewhat misdirected. The proponents of Muhammadiyah’s reform projects never aim 
for the liberation of the Islamic worldview from the particularity of its origin and 
development. It is the view of the reform projects that every interpretation of Islam is 
bound to certain contexts, and therefore it is obligatory for interpreters of Islam to 
understand the limits of their interpretation.153 In the minds of the supporters of the 
reform camp, Islam should be subjected to more rigorous standards by inviting other 
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scientific methods in the discourse. They do not see their call for the need to reconstruct 
Islam as an effort to liberate this religion from its particularity.  
 On the contrary, it is their view that by reconstructing itself, Islam will be subject 
to more particularities. Shofan, for example, asserts the need to interpret Islam through 
the basis of adequate knowledge. This knowledge is the factor that should bind Islam to a 
particularity. His association of the puritan reading of the Qur’an to the acts of religious 
authoritarianism and rape154 should be understood as the inclination to subject Islam to a 
reliable and scientifically accountable interpretation. It is indeed the ambition of the 
theological project to make Islam responsive to the changes in scientific methods of 
religious interpretation. The relevance of Islam as the target of this project is achieved 
through subjecting Islam to more than one particular method. 
 The need to employ various methods and thus to subject Islam to various 
particular interpretations should be understood in terms of the reform project’s emphasis 
on the need to reinterpret Islam by considering the challenges faced by Muslims. The 
changing world has brought in a need to incorporate new values when one interprets 
Islam. Once again, the proponents of the reform camp subject Islam to a higher standard. 
While in the reconstruction effort Islam is subjected to various methods, in the 
reinterpretation of Islam the evolving needs of human beings in an ever changing world 
are its binding factors. Amin Abdullah’s triangle of rationality is the scheme for reform 
projects in their endeavours to subject Islam to a more rigorous interpretation. 
 Instead of aiming at the uprooting of Islam from its particular history and 
environment, we have seen that the five reform projects as equally committed to the 
bounded, and therefore limited, reading of Islam. Despite the parochial nature of every 
possible interpretation of Islam, the reform projects do not suggest that Muslims should 
be content with the traditional interpretations of the Qur’an. Being bound does not mean 
being willingly entrapped in an old interpretation. The limits to freedom in the 
interpretation of the Qur’an should not stop Islam from being sensitive and responsive to 
changing times and context, eventhough the new interpretation will still be bound.  
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 For the reform camp, because the West is a particular entity in the history of 
humanity, this does not mean Islam cannot learn and benefit from that particularity. 
Because Islam is particular, this does mean that it can isolate itself from other 
particularities. The particular nature of each human worldview for the reform projects, 
therefore, should not be an excuse to keep from interacting with other worldviews. It is 
not the aim of the reform projects to construct an interpretation of Islam that will be valid 
across the whole of human history and human society. But since every interpretation is 
particular, so goes the argument in this camp, why should Muslims shy away from other 
particularities when dealing with their particular space and time? 
 
***** 
 
Their differences notwithstanding, I will argue in the next chapter that they own the same 
set of predispositions, or habitus. I call this predisposition reflective, as summarised in 
Chapter One. Like any predisposition, the reflective predisposition is also productive of 
varied actions. In the case of Muhammadiyah, the same reflective predisposition has 
generated both the status quo and reformist tendencies among its members. Chapter Four 
will elaborate this generative capacity of habitus amongst Muhammadiyah’s members. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
HABITUS AND REFLEXIVITY IN MUHAMMADIYAH 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen the current schism among Muhammadiyah’s 
members with regard to whether Muhammadiyah needs reform, and, if one responds 
affirmatively to this question, where reform should be directed. As explained in Chapter 
One, I have used the categories of “status quo” and “reform” to refer to the two camps 
within the organisation and avoided the commonly used labels of “puritan” and “liberal” 
to describe the characters of the two opposing groups within this organisation. I avoided 
the second categorisation because it is not directly related to the issue of transformation 
in Muhammadiyah, which is the subject of my dissertation.  
 From the elaboration in the previous chapter, both the status quo and reform 
camps show their awareness of other worldviews outside Islam. Within the status quo 
camp, there is an appreciation of the distinctiveness of divergent worldviews. This 
appreciation of the particularity of each human worldview is also obvious in the reform 
camp. Its insistence on the needs to understand Islam beyond the familiar method of 
interpretation should be read as an endeavour to strengthen the particularity of Islam. The 
differences between the two camps lie, therefore, not in their acknowledgement of the 
distinctiveness of Islam but on whether that particularity should be left alone or reformed. 
These two camps have put forward the particularity of Islam as currently the main topic 
of debate in Muhammadiyah and, in so doing, they put their understanding of Islam to the 
test. 
 This attitude from both camps is similar to Rabinow’s understanding of the 
process of thinking. For Rabinow, ‘thinking’ is the process of detaching oneself from 
what one does and of transforming one’s understanding into an object of one’s question.1 
On the same topic, Lash talks about ‘reflexivity’ as the activity of reflecting on everyday 
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experiences, of making one’s everyday experience the object of one’s thoughts.2 In other 
words, reflexivity involves the process of questioning the familiar. In Adkins’s words, 
“reflexivity must therefore be understood to involve reflection on the unthought and 
unconscious categories of thought”.3  
This chapter is aimed at further elaborating the positions of the status quo and 
reform with respect to their reflexivity. In this chapter, the reflexivity of both camps will 
be put under scrutiny; the purpose of this scrutiny is to establish the notion that 
reflexivity can be used to explain either transformative practices or a conservative 
stance.4 These two contradictory possibilities in the course of reflexivity can be 
comprehended if one understands reflexivity not as a purely cognitive activity but as a 
process that is bound to the everyday practices of individuals. 
Just to remind us about the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, for Bourdieu, 
habitus is a set of predispositions that facilitate social agents’ behaviours in their 
environment, or the field. These predispositions are treated by Bourdieu as containing 
possibilities of various actions and not rigid rules that social agents are obliged to obey. 
With respect to reflexivity, I define it as the capacity of social agents to put these 
predispositions in practice reflexively.5 I have started the discussion on reflexivity and 
reflectivity in the first chapter of this dissertation. This chapter will elaborate these 
concepts further before going to the topic of Muslims’ habitus in Muhammadiyah. 
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4.1 Reflexivity and Reflectivivity Revisited 
In Chapter One I define reflexivity as the capacity of social agents to immediately view 
their position within their field and to react almost instinctively to certain things or 
actions according to their predisposition. I define reflectivity as a particular sort of 
predisposition that inclines social agents to treat the world as divided between their selves 
as the subjects of action and their environment as the object of their analyses and actions. 
By making these two definitions, I employ Scott Lash’s later understanding of these two 
terms.6 This understanding of the concept of reflexivity is different from his earlier one 
and also that of Adkins.7 In Lash’s earlier definition and also Adkin’s, reflexivity is social 
agents’ reflection and evaluation of their (previously unspoken) predispositions. This 
definition could be traced back to Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology8 that associates 
reflexivity with social agents’ critical attitude towards their predispositions. In this 
regard, Lash’s earlier definition, as well as Adkins’ and Bourdieu’s, tilts more towards 
the cataphatic form of reflexivity. 
Bourdieu’s seemingly cataphatic perception of reflexivity is related to his 
treatment of the concept of strategy. Bourdieu had a tendency to contrast the concept of 
“strategy” to that of “rule”.9 While rules are what social scientists extract from the 
behaviours of social agents, strategies are how social agents behave in real lives. Rules 
are analytical concepts while strategies are the tools of social agents. These tools, 
however, are perceived by social agents not as tools consciously employed but as 
predispositions naturally practiced.  
Is there a place for strategy in habitus? Bourdieu answered this question with an 
affirmative. Considering the definition of habitus that incorporates the important role of 
both the social structure and the agency of individuals, however, a strategy must be 
understood as the way social agents approach the game based on a bounded perception 
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towards the game. In Saba Mahmood’s work mentioned earlier in Chapter One,10 those 
women who belong to a Mosque movement in Cairo do not see any possibility of a life 
outside what they understand to be orthodox Islam. The practice of veiling is therefore a 
physical predisposition. This predisposition is so embodied in their being to the extent 
that these women would feel uncomfortable leaving home without donning their veils. 
Moreover, the practice of veiling is also a strategy that is aimed at creating a moral 
predisposition, which inculcates a certain moral and religious inclination in these women. 
To attribute the label of determinism to Bourdieu’s sociology11 is therefore 
incorrect if strategising is defined as a bounded practice. In Bourdieu’s understanding, 
there are never any interest-based strategies that are not bound to agents’ habitus because, 
for example, even disinterestedness shown towards the act of chivalry in some 
communities or in the search for unbiased knowledge among intellectuals is an “interest 
in disinterestedness”:12 interest that is so specific to some games that it needs to take the 
form of disinterestedness. It is, in other words, a strategy with regard to specific games or 
fields. With this in mind, strategies are always bound to the game; they are always bound 
to the feeling for the game. 
 Bourdieu’s tendency to prioritise the concept of strategy in his analysis cannot be 
detached from his critique of structuralism in anthropology with its penchant for creating 
a cultural map as a representation of the mentality of social agents. In constructing a set 
of rules for gift exchange among some communities, for example, some anthropologists 
abolish the time dimension in the process. This jettisoning of the time factor has the 
consequence of discounting the strategy that the social agents in question have with 
respect to the gift exchange.13 Bourdieu’s sociology is aimed at bringing the agents’ 
strategy back into the analysis of the social world. Whether an agent reciprocates the gift 
soon after he receives it, or whether he delays in replying the gift, is a strategy either to 
maintain or increase his position in the whole economy of pride, an economy that 
assumes the feeling for the game on his part.  
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It is the same strategy that is criticised by Michel deCerteu when he contradicts it 
with the concept of tactic. In deCerteu’s view, Bourdieu’s sociology puts too much 
emphasis on social agents’ ability to reflect on their environment. For deCerteu, strategy 
means “the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will 
and power…can be isolated from an ‘environment’”, while tactic is defined as “a calculus 
which cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus a 
borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality”.14 Furthermore, he likens a 
strategy as “taking a trick” in a card game on the assumption that there is some defined 
playing space and “the rules that accord the value to the deal and certain options to the 
players”.15 DeCerteu’s practice of everyday life assumes tactic, not strategy, as the 
calculus in the life of social agents and therefore puts Bourdieu’s habitus, contrary to the 
mainstream critique of Bourdieu, on the side of the rationalist wing in sociology. Not all 
deCerteu’s assumption of Bourdieu’s strategy is founded in the latter’s works. Bourdieu’s 
conditional understanding of strategy, for example, does not accord “will and power”16 to 
social agents understood as factors “isolated”17 from agents’ environment. DeCerteu’s 
critique towards Bourdieu’s works, however, shows us Bourdieu’s intention to provide 
agency with a role in his analysis, even if this role is a conditional one. 
The conditionality of strategy along with the practice of strategising in Bourdieu’s 
sociology has often been criticised as deterministic and dismissive of the chance of 
meaningful freedom for social agents. Karakayali, for example, considers Bourdieu’s 
works as so occupied with setting the right epistemological mood for sociologists in 
doing their sociological work that it does not give enough room for the role of 
imagination and imagination’s contribution to the discussion on the possibility for any 
social transformation.18 Another criticism of Bourdieu’s work comes from Myles. He 
sees Bourdieu’s tendency to avoid the subjectivism of social agents as causing him the 
inevitable new dualism in his works: common sense, as embedded in the feeling for the 
                                                 
14 Michel deCerteu, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), xix. 
15 Ibid., 53. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Nedim Karakayali, “Reading Bourdieu with Adorno: The Limits of Critical Theory and Reflexive 
Sociology,” Sociology 38, no. 2 (2004): 358. 
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game, versus reflexivity.19 This issue of Bourdieu’s tendency towards structuralism, and 
thus its limitation in explaining social transformation, has also been brought by Gorringe 
and Rafanell in their discussion on the issue of the protests by the dalit (“the 
untouchables”) communities in India.20 
To do justice to these critics, Bourdieu never really gives meaningful attention to 
the topic of reflexivity in his sociology except when he turns his attention to the 
sociology of sociologists, or intellectuals in general. The only time a hint of reflexivity 
arises is when he describes the situation of crisis in society. Bourdieu likens this crisis to 
a hysteria, “when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant 
from that to which they are objectively fitted”,21 when there is “a structural lag between 
opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them which is the cause of missed 
opportunities and, in particular, of the frequently observed incapacity to think historical 
crises in categories of perception and thought other than those of the past”.22 Yet even 
during this gap between habitus and the field, Bourdieu only attributes “a margin of 
freedom” for social agents to make explicit their unquestioned predispositions, or to 
transform doxa into rules, to reflect on them, and eventually to open “political action 
aimed at reopening the space of possibles [sic]”.23 
It is a mood entirely different from when he discusses the importance of 
reflexivity in doing sociology. In An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Bourdieu warns 
sociologists of their tendency toward “epistemocentrism” associated with scholarly 
viewpoints. Sociologists, in the eyes of Bourdieu, need to be aware of the situatedness of 
sociology in a wider academic field, along with the implicated forces working in this 
field. Furthermore, they need to be conscious to the claim of universality that their works 
strive to achieve, while in reality the practices of social agents they try to explain are not 
their own practices.24 Reflexive sociology means a sociology that is aware of 
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20 Gorringe and Rafanell, “The Embodiment of Caste,” 112. 
21 Bourdieu, Outline, 78. 
22 Ibid., 83. 
23 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 234. 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Practice of Reflexive Sociology (The Paris Workshop),” in An Invitation to 
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unconscious predispositions operating within its field, such as the predispositions to 
claim the monopoly of the universal.25 
The works that are appreciative of reflexivity in Bourdieu’s writings are therefore 
focused on reflexivity as specifically targeted at the academic milieu. Schubert, for 
example, has this to say about Bourdieu: 
Bourdieu is inviting us to join him in a rigorous scientific method in which our own positions as 
social scientists are foregrounded. Bourdieu shows the academic how much of the self is social. 
He shows us just how much of what we see and feel is a consequence of where we stand in 
relations to others in the social space.26 
Bourdieu’s intention is not to take the science out of sociology; his project is not a 
deconstructive one.27 By contrast, he envisions reflexivity in sociology as the tool to 
strengthen its epistemological stance. Reflexivity urges sociologists to be critical towards 
their implicit assumptions in doing sociology. The final, expected, outcome of reflexive 
sociology is the recognition that “ours [sociologists’ work] is not the ultimate or the final 
word, it is rather just a social scientific word”.28 In a similar vein, Frangie sees in 
Bourdieu’s reflexivity “the principle that links the epistemological security of the social 
scientific endeavour to the practices of socio-analysis of the researcher as a cultural 
producer and to the analyses of the conditions of possibility of sociology as a 
discipline”29 that should be appreciated as a way to transform one’s gaze as a person of 
science. Crossley, however, despite his appreciation of Bourdieu’s works as a “persuasive 
and highly sophisticated approach to social analysis”, criticised him as unclear in his 
explanation about how habitus “shapes and indeed constitutes human subjectivity”.30 
Crossley’s critique notwithstanding, these works are generally appreciative of Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on the importance of reflexivity in practising social sciences. 
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 Some works have been dedicated to the effort to insert reflexivity into Bourdieu’s 
understanding of habitus. Sweetman, for example, argues for the possibility of the 
creation of “habitual reflexivity” or “reflexive habitus” where “a reflexive orientation 
towards the contemporary environment may itself be regarded as a form of habitus”.31 
Social agents in this sort of habitus are depicted as constantly monitoring themselves. 
The possibility of the construction of this habitus, however, is especially related to the 
emergence of what Ulrich Beck calls the epoch of second, late, reflexive modernisation,32 
with its trait of individualization of risk as welfare states retreat from the lives of their 
citizens.33 Taking Bourdieu’s analysis, however, Binkley asserts that the reflexivity in 
reflexive modernisation cannot be understood as the total freedom of social agents in 
living their lives. Instead, he argues for an analysis on the dynamism between reflexive 
self-awareness and pre-reflexive dispositions of conducts to better understand 
reflexivity.34 For both Sweetman and Binkley, however, reflexivity in Bourdieu’s 
sociology is still problematical in two ways. First, reflexivity does not belong to all 
societies across time and space. It only arises when there is a crisis, such as the retreat of 
the welfare state. Second, even if it arises in a time of crisis, reflexivity is not 
incorporated in habitus as a general concept, and thus the diametrical opposition between 
habitus and reflexivity. Any effort at combining the two notions together, therefore, can 
be achieved only through hybridisation.35 
 In this section I would argue, based on my reading on Bourdieu’s works, that 
reflexivity is a part of habitus and that therefore it can be found in any society. To do 
that, I will firstly need to borrow Lash’s conceptualization of reflectivity and reflexivity. 
On the one hand, “to reflect”, he tells us, “is to somehow subsume the object under the 
subject of knowledge. Reflection presumes apodictic knowledge and certainty. It 
presumes a dualism, a scientific attitude in which the subject is in one realm, the object of 
                                                 
31 Paul Sweetman, “Twenty-first Century Dis-Ease? Habitual Reflexivity or the Reflexive Habitus,” The 
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knowledge in another”. On the other hand, reflexivity, he suggests while modifying 
Beck’s definition of reflexivity, “has more to do with reflex than reflection. Reflexes are 
indeterminate. They are immediate. They do not in any sense subsume”.36 If reflectivity 
entails the division between subject and object, for Lash, reflexivity is about the demise 
of this distinction.  
 Comparing Lash’s reflexivity with Bourdieu’s habitus, we come up with a sense 
of strategy that is based neither on perfect knowledge of the situation and of the game, 
nor on the situatedness of social agents outside their environment. Our environment, 
reflexively understood, is not the object over which we exert our power. On the contrary, 
we live in the world while the world lives in us. Following this line of thinking, the 
resource that we have in order to participate in the game, therefore, is not knowledge but 
feeling for the game. Discussion on reflexivity, therefore, needs to be situated “in-the-
world”37 as well as heeding the deeply embedded aspects of habitus within social 
agents.38 
From my elaboration above of Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and reflexivity, and 
Lash’s differentiation between reflexivity and reflectivity, it clear that what is meant by 
strategy contained within the concept of habitus is parallel to reflexivity; and that 
reflexivity is a bounded act of strategising. In this regard, reflexivity belongs to habitus in 
general. In contrast, reflectivity can be defined as strategising as if social agents have the 
perfect capability to delimit themselves from their environment as their object of gaze 
and, upon the separation of themselves from their object, as if they have perfect 
knowledge to act upon their environment. An illusio, understood by Bourdieu as “a 
fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of the stake which is inherent 
in that membership”,39 although coming in the forms of different suppositions in specific 
habitus, is a common characteristic of all habitus. The notion of human capacity that 
belongs to reflectivity is not special when compared to other illusio belonging to other 
habitus. It is neither more nor less mythical than the perception of the natural differences 
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between sexes among the Kabyles Berber of Algeria and therefore their prescription for 
sexual division of labour.40 
 
4.2 Muslim Habitus in Muhammadiyah 
One of my elaborations in Chapter One shows that reflexivity is the general property of 
habitus and that reflectivity, with its assumption of the perfect capacity of social agents, 
is only one possible sort of predisposition in a habitus. Reflectivity is just a doxa, or 
acquired predisposition, with which social agents see and take care of their positions 
within the field. 
This section of the chapter will establish reflectivity as the predisposition that is 
shared by Muhammadiyah’s members. In other words, the Muslim habitus of 
Muhammadiyah is marked by the penchant to think of oneself as a rational actor capable 
of comprehending the laws of nature. It should be understood that by employing the 
concept of habitus in explaining the practices of Muhammadiyah’s members, I do not 
intend to establish a mentality of those members, one which constitutes a common rule of 
behaviour and results in the similarity of those behaviours among them. Rather, my goal 
is to find a shared predisposition among them and, since habitus is also a generative 
structure, I aim to show that this shared predisposition is a potential that facilitates 
various sorts of practices, even those that conflict with each other, as demonstrated by 
different viewpoints from the proponents of reform and those of the status quo.  
 
4.2.1 The Sources of Muhammadiyah’s Reflective Predisposition 
Before dwelling on the reflective predisposition within both camps in Muhammadiyah, 
let me explain the sources of this predisposition. The first source of reflective 
predisposition among Muhammadiyah’s members is the myth of enlightenment 
elaborated in Chapter Two. The axiom in this myth is the power of reason to help human 
beings attain enlightenment, as exemplified in the life story of the exemplary Man. 
Human reason is a reliable tool to find truth contained in the universe; it enables human 
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beings to reflect on their environment and to take action on it as a sign of Muslims’ 
obligation to Allah. The contradiction between human reason and human spiritual quest 
is disputed by this myth because it teaches Muhammadiyah’s members that the use of 
human reason can lead them to achieve Islamic spirituality. Consequently, the quality of 
reflectivity is a highly valued trait in Muhammadiyah because this organisation, as 
perceived by its members, is built and maintained by the consciousness of Dahlan and his 
successors. 
 The second source of the reflective predisposition of Muhammadiyah’s members 
is the teaching of Ahmad Dahlan himself. This teaching is recorded in the document The 
Seven Philosophical Teachings of Ahmad Dahlan41 by one of his students, Hadjid. It is 
possible to categorise these teachings into three tenets that I think are symptomatic of 
reflectivity. Firstly, there is the need to perpetually reflect on one’s own intention in life. 
The good life is the life well planned; humans need to use their reason to think about the 
ultimate goal of one’s life. For Muslims, it is of utmost importance to recognise one’s 
intention in life and whether that intention has been guided to attain happiness in the 
afterlife. This self-directed questioning has as its target the correct behaviours of 
Muslims, the behaviours that are constantly and consciously projected towards the 
interest of life after death.  
 Secondly, there is reliance on the capacity of human beings to attain the ultimate 
truth of life. This second tenet is based on the notion of the capability of human beings to 
“empty their hearts” of their old habits and of their perception of self-claimed truth.42 The 
ultimate truth is achievable only if individuals use their rationality and overcome their 
misguidedness. This effort, though, should be conducted in steps according to each 
individual’s clarity of thought. 
 Finally, there is confidence in the capacity of human beings to choose to follow 
the truth. As a continuation of the second tenet, this tenet warns Muslims of the fragile 
condition of human beings in the face of their own vicious desires and the consequent 
tendency to embrace the evil and reject the good. Awareness of this fragility should be 
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followed up with the change of one’s heart to follow the truth, which is Islam. As Dahlan 
emphasized in one of his teachings by quoting the thirtieth verse of the Ar-Rum Chapter 
of the Qur’an: 
So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the fitrah [true nature] of 
Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of Allah 
. That is the correct religion, but most people do not know.43 
For Dahlan, the only religion that hones the potential for good within human beings is 
Islam. Human beings are born holy. Unfortunately, they turn unholy in later life by 
vicious desires. The only way to regain their holiness is Islam. 
 Within Muhammadiyah, reason and religion in this set of predispositions are 
compatible with each other. The right reflection will eventually lead a person to the true 
path of Islam. As in the case of any illusio, however, it is built upon a certain set of 
assumptions. One might want to criticise the idea of human reason and refer to it as a 
myth but, for Muhammadiyah’s members, the idea of human reason is self-evident. In 
this light, consciousness and enlightenment, as I have elaborated in the first chapter with 
regard to the concept of the exemplary Man, are historical facts. 
 The third source of reflective predispositions within Muhammadiyah is the 
method employed in this organisation to socialise the members of its missions. According 
to Asep Purnama Bachtiar, the head of Majelis Pendidikan Kader (Council for Cadre 
Education) within Muhammadiyah’s national leadership, various programs of this 
committee are aimed at developing a critical attitude in Muhammadiyah’s members 
through the employment of the method of dialogues and discussions.44 The inculcation of 
a critical attitude through the committee’s programs is expected to equip the 
organisation’s members with the capacity for independent reasoning and therefore enable 
them to solve the problems faced by Muhammadiyah’s branches in which they work. The 
myth of the power of human reason to reflect and to take appropriate actions on their 
environment – reflectivity – is perpetuated through the programs of the committee in 
charge of educating the organisation’s cadres.  
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4.2.2 Reflectivity in the Status Quo and Reform Camps 
There is a general appreciation of the myth of enlightenment among Muhammadiyah’s 
members. For example, both Muhammad Shofan and Masyitoh Chosnan, whose 
arguments I place in the reform and status quo camps respectively, spoke highly of the 
film “Sang Pencerah”45 in which the myth of enlightenment is brought to life. Shofan 
admired the modernising efforts of Dahlan depicted in this film, while Chosnan focused 
her appreciation on Dahlan’s adoption of a modern Western school system.46 Both, 
however, were equally appreciative of the idea of Muhammadiyah as a product of 
enlightenment. 
This section of this chapter will elaborate the reflective predisposition of 
Muhammadiyah’s members, as based on the myth of Dahlan’s enlightenment, across the 
two camps. As points of reference, the five reform projects will be used to see how the 
supporters of both the status quo and reform camps are reflectively predisposed. 
With respect to the interpretation of the Qur’an, the proponents of the theological 
project of the reform camp see the text as an object which can help Muslims understand 
the truth, even if this truth is bound to a certain time and place. The proponents of the 
status quo do use a distinctive method in understanding religion but their treatment of the 
text as an object to be analysed is no different from that of the proponents of the 
theological project. The use of human reasoning in the practice of Qur’anic interpretation 
can be found within both positions. The divergence lies only in the method each side 
employs. While the proponents of the status quo see the need for any analysis of the 
Qur’an to be brought back to the text itself, those of the reform camp urge any analysis to 
take into account other factors surrounding the process of the writing of the text. For the 
status quo camp, reason must be bound to the Qur’an. For the reform camp, reason 
should be bound to extra-textual factors.  
With regard to issue of pluralism, it is clear that the proponents of the status quo 
see this issue in terms of the opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims. The status 
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quo is satisfied with the status accorded to non-Muslims in a Muslim-majority society as 
understood through their interpretation of Islam. There is no repression towards non-
Muslims in this society, just a qualitative difference in terms of the roles accorded to the 
minority. The differentiation of the insiders versus the outsiders is obvious within this 
position. The pluralism project, however, does not see the need for relativism, either. This 
project is not aimed at dissolving differences between existing religions; instead, it 
targets cooperation among different religious groups. 
 On the issue of poverty that is the focus of the socio-economic project, the status 
quo’s stance is that Muhammadiyah “cannot stop on the al-Ma’un theology of the 1900s 
but needs to build the al-Ma’un theology, with its emphasis on the need for Muslims to 
care for the poor and the marginalised, in the twenty-first century when the number of the 
poor in Indonesia has reached more than 32 million souls”.47 The role of human 
reasoning to build a formula of social empowerment that is attuned to the change of time 
is appreciated. The distinction of this position with that of the socio-economic project lies 
in its insistence that Muhammadiyah should stay consistent with the purity of the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah in building the new understanding of al-Ma’un verse on charity. 
 With regard to the cultural project, especially the issue of local culture, naturally 
the proponents of the status quo are extremely cautious. They are relentless in their 
differentiation between the pure Islamic and the syncretic rituals. The proponents of the 
reform, on the contrary, take a more liberal stance. Their more relaxed response, 
however, should be understood in light of the meaning they attach to it. Amin Abdullah, 
for example, understands the rituals before the start of the fasting month by the villagers 
in Java as a symbol of their welcoming the fasting month and a reminder to prepare 
oneself for the holy month.48 Instead of being troubled by the possible un-Islamic nature 
of the ritual, Abdullah argues for the need to find the meaning of the ritual, which he 
deems as no doubt Islamic. The use of reason and the critical analysis of local culture as 
one’s object, for the proponents of the reform camp, can help in understanding the 
Islamic meaning embedded in it. 
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 Various modernist polarisations – between the past and the present, between 
meaning and symbol, and between religion and custom49 – are still extant even within the 
cultural project of the reform camp. The supporters of this particular project never 
abandon these modernist categorisations. Unlike their status quo counterpart, however, 
they take a friendlier approach toward the differences these categorisations produce. 
Instead of being critical or even confrontational, they are appreciative of what supporters 
of the status quo camp consider un-Islamic. Regardless of what nominal Muslims 
actually think when they perform what they consider to be an Islamic ritual, the 
supporters of the cultural project insist on going beneath the layers of the rituals to find 
the true meaning of those rituals. Even within the cultural project, the line between 
symbol and meaning must be established. 
 Another aspect of the cultural project is its critical stance towards Sufism. With its 
modernist outlook, Muhammadiyah has been often seen as an Islamic organisation that 
rejects a more spiritual practice of Islam, or what is often referred to as Sufism. The 
organisation’s modernist character, argues Howell, often puts its members in opposition 
to nominal, or abangan, Muslims with their more spiritual and less scriptural practices of 
Islam.50 I also found this tendency when I interviewed Muhammadiyah’s members during 
my field research. As an example, with respect to the revival of Sufism in the urban 
setting, such as Ary Ginanjar’s Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) program, Dawam 
Rahardjo, whose opinions tend to fall within the reform camp, mentioned that he is not 
too fond of the method used in this program. He argues that being conditioned to cry in 
order to repent might be useful for some Muslims who are yet to acquire the proper 
religious knowledge.51 Masyitoh Chosnan, whose opinions generally support the status 
quo camp, would prefer the method of providing a rational understanding in religious 
education compared to the emotionally-charged method of the ESQ program.52 
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 Having said this, Chosnan wrote her doctoral dissertation on Sufism in 
Muhammadiyah, especially related to the life of the organisation’s longest serving leader, 
Abdurrazaq Fakhruddin. In her dissertation, which she then rewrote into a book, she 
argues that Muhammadiyah has never opposed Sufism. This organisation, however, is 
critical of the un-Islamic elements added to Sufism.53 For Chosnan, Sufism should be 
understood mainly in terms of noble morality (akhlak mulia). In Muhammadiyah, this 
morality-related Sufism (tasawuf akhlaqi) has always been emphasised and supported.54 
 This emphasis on the ethical aspect of Sufism and how it requires “careful, 
reasoned judgement and honest assessment” can also be found in Hamka’s elaboration of 
Sufism, as argued by Howell.55 Considered to be one of the leaders of Muhammadiyah 
and a prolific writer, Hamka was always appreciative of Sufism. Hamka’s understanding 
of Sufistic practices, however, is related heavily to “a subtle examination of personal 
motivation.56. What Howell refers to as Salafist Sufism, with Hamka as one among its 
supporters, tries to bring back the spiritual element of Islam into what Kuntowijoyo refers 
to as dry practices of scripturalist Islam. Especially related to Muhammadiyah as the 
largest modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, the supporters of this stream of 
Sufism within it have a cautious approach towards what can be considered as the proper 
Sufistic practices. This careful approach, along with the emphasis of Salafist Sufis within 
Muhammadiyah on the role of reason in morality-based Sufism, informs us of the 
enduring presence of reflective predisposition among Muhammadiyah’s members. 
 Moving from the issue of Sufism to the gender project, we can still find the 
symptoms of reflectivity. Generally, the women in Muhammadiyah tend to accept veiling 
as an obligation for Muslim women that is prescribed in the Qur’an. The form of the veil, 
however, is not prescribed in the text. Women, therefore, are allowed to be fashionable in 
their wearing of the veil. In the words of Abidah Muflihati, the chairwoman of Nasyiatul 
Aisyiyah, the female youth wing of Muhammadiyah, 
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with regard to the fashion, it is related to culture. Therefore, it is not a problem whether a female 
Muslim wants to wear a long veil, the veil that covers the whole body, the veil only for the upper 
part of her body, the veil along with a pair of pants, as long as the injunction that her aurat be 
covered is fulfilled. I think that this is the dress code for every female Muslim.57 
This view on veiling is also shared by Djohantini, who is critical of the 
association of Islamic dress with that which belongs to Middle Eastern cultures.58 Siti 
Aisyah adds that as long as the clothes are not too tight, they are acceptable to the 
standard of Islam.59 Dzuhayatin has a slightly different view on this issue. She asserts that 
nobody can force a woman to veil her head. For Dzuhayatin, veiling is a matter of choice 
for each of the women involved. She herself admits that sometime she wears a very loose 
veil in public. For her, veiling has become a habit and she would feel uncomfortable in 
going outside her house without veiling. Nevertheless, she recognises that this is her habit 
and not necessarily that of other women.60 Regardless of this difference among them, 
however, Muhammadiyah’s women of the reform projects have a relaxed stance towards 
the forms of veil appropriate for female Muslims. As proponents of the cultural project 
highlight the search for a deeper and Islamic meaning of local culture, these women of 
the gender project emphasise the inner meaning of the practice of veiling more than the 
outer form and styles of veils. 
 This emphasis on the meaning and the purpose of Islamic rituals and dress code is 
also shared by Masyitoh Chosnan, the current rector of Muhammadiyah University of 
Jakarta and the first female rector in the history of Muhammadiyah universities. Despite 
her status-quo perspective which I elaborated in the previous chapter, she emphasises 
rational understanding rather than emotionally-charged rituals whenever she is asked to 
deliver religious sermons.61 Abidah Muflihati, whose opinion I categorise as pro-reform, 
understood that rituals do not necessarily translate into good morality. What is required to 
obtain good morality, she asserts, is a religious understanding on top of the practices of 
                                                 
57 Abidah Muflihati, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 26, 2011. 
58 Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011. 
59 Siti Aisyah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 30, 2011. 
60 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. 
61 Masyitoh Chosnan, interview by author, Jakarta, July 7, 2011.  
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Islamic rituals: “Good morality comes first. If a Muslim has good morality…, rituals will 
have effect. Without good morality, rituals will not have any influence”.62 
 The attitudes of Muhammadiyah’s members on Islamic rituals are good example 
of how reflectively predisposed they are in their worldview. To put it differently, we can 
say that the basic predisposition of Muhammadiyah’s members is based on reflectivity. 
The mental predisposition that emphasises the capacity of human beings as subjects who 
are constantly aware of their environment is the foundation of Muhammadiyah’s habitus. 
In summary, I see reflectivity as the marker of the habitus of Muhammadiyah’s members. 
The way they view their position amidst their field, their reflexitivity, takes the form of 
reflective predispositions. 
 
4.3 Reflexivity in Muhammadiyah 
In this section, I portray the relations between habitus and reflexivity in a form of an 
Euler diagram containing reflexivity as a subset of habitus. Reflexivity, understood as the 
overview that a social agent has of his position with regard to the game he is in, is a part 
of habitus. Figure 4.1 shows this relation between reflexivity and habitus and how 
Muhammadiyah’s members stand in relation to progressive reading of the texts (as 
represented by the horizontal axis) and political activity (represented by the vertical axis).  
As shown in this figure, Muhammadiyah’s members vary in their level of 
progressive interpretation of the texts and political activity despite sharing the same 
habitus. For example, some members of Muhammadiyah consider the further 
empowerment of women as an urgent task of Muhammadiyah, while others see the issue 
of women’s empowerment is already settled and that the more urgent issue for 
Muhammadiyah to address is the youth’s increasing access to pornography. With respect 
to the level of political activity, some members of Muhammadiyah see the need for 
Muhammadiyah’s members in their personal capacity to join political parties in order to 
forward the organisation’s ideals while others see the efficacy of Muhammadiyah’s work 
as stemming its organisation’s neutrality in the face of political parties. From my 
                                                 
62 Abidah Muflihati, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 26, 2011. 
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elaboration of Chapter Three, the proponents of the status quo sit closer to the puritanism 
extreme compared to their counterparts, the supporters of reform projects. 
Figure 4.1 Habitus and Reflexivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to this relation between the habitus and reflexivity of 
Muhammadiyah’s members, the same figure also displays the relation between the field 
of Muhammadiyah’s members and the fields of other Muslims with respect to the same 
two categories of levels of progressivism and political activity. From my descriptions of 
various reform and status quo projects within Muhammadiyah in the previous chapter and 
of the reflective predisposition of its members earlier in this chapter, I would put 
Muhammadiyah’s members roughly in between of these two categories. Muslims other 
than Muhammadiyah’s members have their own habitus, as well as their way of assessing 
their positions in social world (reflexivity). There are Muslims who are more progressive 
than Muhammadiyah’s members, as there are Muslims who are more puritan. Similarly, 
in terms of political activity, some other Muslims are more politically active and others 
are less so.  
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On the level of progressive interpretation of texts, the supporters of the status quo 
within Muhammadiyah stand closer to the more puritan extreme and thus have an 
overlapping field with more puritan Muslims, such as those in Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (The Council for Indonesia’s Islamic Propagation). The supporters of the 
reform camp, on the contrary, are closer to the more progressive side and share the field 
with more progressive Muslims, such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network of Liberal 
Islam) championed by figures such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla. In terms of the interpretation 
of the Qur’an, for example, the proponents of the reform camp support a more 
progressive reading of the holy text while their counterparts insist on the maintaining of a 
puritanical reading of the text. 
 
4.3.1 Crisis and Intensified Reflexivity 
In the face of criticism from the proponents of reform, however, the supporters of the 
status quo cannot ignore the presence of other fields outside their own, especially of those 
Muslims of more progressive leanings. They need to include the expansion of the field in 
which Muhammadiyah lives when they explain their position. The refusal to engage in 
the debates with the critics would result in a perception of anathema of the status quo’s 
stance to the dynamics of the world. The status quo’s involvement in the debate is the 
camp’s response to what Bourdieu refers to as a crisis – a situation which requires an 
intensification of their reflexivity.  
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will deal with the expansion of the 
perceived field that that may instigate a sense of crisis within Muhammadiyah. As 
proceeding chapters will show, while the proponents of reform urge this organisation to 
embrace the crisis and therefore accept the need for reform, the supporters of the status 
quo aim at avoiding the crisis.  
For the remainder of this chapter I will formulate the positions of both the status 
quo and the reform projects within the framework of habitus and reflexivity. As I 
conclude in the previous chapter, the proponents of the status quo justify their reading of 
Islam not only in terms of their traditional interpretation of Islam but also with regard to 
various issues brought forward by the supporters of reform. The supporters of the status 
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quo are forced to speak in terms of issues such as the reinterpretation of the Qur’an, 
pluralism, marginalisation, culture, and gender: the sort of issues that were not part of the 
status quo’s vocabulary two decades ago. Moreover, the supporters of the status quo have 
been compelled to justify their position in these terms. The result of this process of 
subjection becomes an apologia for the status quo. They do not concur with the precepts 
of the reform projects, but in no way is their apologia insignificant. 
Eventually, the proponents of the status quo have to talk, for example, about the 
status and role of women in Islam. The commonly accepted assumptions they have about 
this issue are made explicit through their apologia. This articulation is not limited only to 
the issue of status and role of women but it illustrates a more general perspective on 
change. For each issue brought forward by the reform projects, they are measuring their 
position in terms of the standard set by these projects. With respect to the issue of 
women’s right to legal ownership of property, for example, Isnawati Rais asserts that 
Europe was a late comer since Islam has acknowledged this right ever since its inception 
in the seventh century, compared to Europe’s acknowledgement of the same rights only a 
century ago.63 With regard to the idea of tolerance, the supporters of the status quo regard 
it as an intrinsic characteristic of Islam.64 In the status quo’s apologia, we can see that 
there is a measuring of one’s self against the standard that belongs to the “Other”. 
At first glance, the position of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah seems to be 
the opposite of the status quo. As the previous chapter has shown, however, the 
proponents of reform projects in Muhammadiyah are aware of the particularity of Islam 
and also that of other cultures; their idea of subjecting Islam to more than one perspective 
cannot be seen as a disregard for Islam’s distinctiveness. Their projects are the extension 
of the field but with recognition of their own habitus. Moreover, the proponents of reform 
still rely on the common vocabulary in Islam and especially Muhammadiyah. For 
example, Moeslim Abdurrahman’s redefinition of evil (kekhufuran) as the attitude of 
remaining idle towards poverty and his redefinition of idolatry as one’s submission to an 
                                                 
63Isnawati Rais, “Perempuan dalam Fiqh Munahakat: Perspektif Muhammadiyah,” in Wacana Fiqh 
Perempuan, ed. Wawan Gunawan and Evie Shofia Inayati (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan 
Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, 2005), 142. 
64 Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 199. 
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unjust social structure65 mirror the common categorisation in Muhammadiyah between 
good and evil. By making this claim, Abdurrahman keeps his attachment to the familiar 
environment of Muhammadiyah while forwarding his agenda of making poverty an issue 
of religious significance. 
 It has to be admitted that the proponents of reform projects sometime criticise the 
traditional reflectivity within Muhammadiyah showcased in the narrative of the 
enlightenment in Muhammadiyah’s history, as I have elaborated in the second chapter. 
Baidhawy, for example, disapproves of rationalism understood as the certainty that “men 
can understand anything clearly and vividly, and take it as real and build knowledge upon 
that understanding”.66 The response from the supporters of the reform projects, 
nevertheless, is not an abandonment of rationality. As Amin Abdullah’s triangle of 
rationality shows, the reinterpretation project of Islam still sees the need for Muslims to 
use their rationality. However, the use of this capacity should aim to cover a wider frame. 
Other methods should complement the use of Muslims’ rationality, including the 
development of new social values. In other words, reform projects do not aim at the 
dissolution of rationality. Instead, they strive for a bounded rationality. 
 In this understanding, the reform project of Muhammadiyah can be discerned as 
an intensified reflexivity in the face of a crisis. This intensification of reflexivity entails 
the articulation of reflectivity as a predisposition in Muhammadiyah, namely the making 
explicit of one’s habitus. Upon this articulation, however, the proponents of the reform 
projects’ proposed reflexivity continues to assume the rationality of social agents. This 
new reflexivity is not a rupture with the old; they do not even see it as a new reflexivity. 
The proponents of the reform projects claim to hold to the legacy of Ahmad Dahlan in 
forwarding their arguments. Shofan, for example, sees Dahlan as a religious teacher who 
practiced hermeneutical methods in his understanding of Islam during his time, albeit this 
method had not yet been intellectually identified in Dahlan’s time. Shofan argues that the 
                                                 
65 Moeslim Abdurahman, “Politik Umat, Politik Pemberdayaan,” in Menggugat Modernitas 
Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy 
(Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 68, 75. 
66 Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, “Puritanisme dan Etos Keilmuan: Anomali Sebuah Gerakan Tajdid,” in 
Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah, 161. 
 117
reform camp within Muhammadiyah only continues this practice.67 The proponents of the 
status quo, he asserts, have caused stagnation within the organisation because they have 
lost the “élan vital” of Dahlan’s teaching, one based on the need for perpetual adjustment 
to the changing world.68 For Shofan, reflexivity within Muhammadiyah is always in tune 
with change and progress.  
The propagation of this seemingly new reflexivity by the proponents of the reform 
camp is actually an act of resurrecting the old reflexivity that had been lost during the 
course of the organisation’s history. This newly exhumed reflexivity is based not only on 
the articulation of reflectivity, along with the idea of rational social agents assumed by 
reflectivity, but also on the need to bind it further and to hold it accountable to a higher 
standard and make it relevant to new situations. The reform project’s proposed reflexivity 
does not jettison the old reflectivity. On the contrary, it extends it further.  
 
4.4 Concluding Comments 
Based on my elaboration of the habitus of Muhammadiyah’s members discussed above, 
we have seen that reflexivity is the everyday practice of social agents and that a crisis has 
intensified this reflexivity. Within this intensification, social agents articulate their 
previously unstated predispositions and question their compatibility with the changing 
field as the result of the crisis. This intensified reflexivity should be understood as an 
extension, and not a rupture, of the previous one.69  
Reflexivity is always tied to habitus. In Muhammadiyah, the predisposition of its 
members is that of reflectivity, which is based on the notion of human consciousness and 
the ability of that consciousness to help them reach the truth in life. This reflectivity is 
narrated through the story of enlightenment and the exemplary Man. The telling of this 
story socialises Muhammadiyah’s members to a shared predisposition of reflectivity, just 
                                                 
67 Muhammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: “Matinya Pembaruan” dalam Bingkai “Kembali ke al-
Qur’an dan al-Sunnah”,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan, ed. Taufik 
Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), xxvii. 
68 Ibid., xii. 
69 This argument is contrary to other analyses of the notion of habitus, such as Adkins who suggests that 
reflexivity entails the questioning of the familiar. (“Reflexivity,” 25.) 
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as proverbs and sayings in the Kabyle Berber society in North Africa help share a 
predisposition towards temporal distribution of activities.70 
Using the example of the habitus and reflexivity among Muhammadiyah’s 
members, I have shown that Bourdieu do not ignore the issue of reflexivity in his 
elaboration of the habitus of those social agents who do not belong to the academic field. 
Bourdieu was always aware of the inherence of reflexivity in habitus but he refused to 
refer the meaning of reflexivity to a form of rationality. Freedom, for Bourdieu, is always 
regulated. 
 The remaining chapters of this dissertation will elaborate further the issue of 
reflexivity with regard to the change, or extension, of the field that Muhammadiyah’s 
members find themselves in. These changes are related to the presence of the “Other” in 
Muhammadiyah, changes that might attract different responses in the form of support for, 
or rejection of, reform within it. Their attitudes towards the presence of the “Other”, 
nonetheless, following Wacquant’s elaboration of Bourdieu’s sociology, cannot be 
simply categorised within the dichotomous framework of resistance and submission.71 
With regard to the dichotomy of domination-resistance, we have McNay, on the one 
hand, who argues that Bourdieu’s concept of bounded freedom provides a way to 
understand how the practice of emulating the dominant structure (the practice of 
“mimicry” and “hybridity”) can contain the potential for resistance.72 On the other hand, 
we also have Adkins who asserts that the potential for ambivalence in the practice of 
mimicry and hybridity is unfounded in Bourdieu’s works.73 Regardless of their different 
readings of Bourdieu, both works nevertheless offer an outline for direction that can 
benefit scholarship on habitus and reflexivity. 
Summarising the debate on the direction of Bourdieusian perspective above, what 
we need to forward the study of habitus and reflexivity is the coupling of Bourdieusian 
perspective with a post-colonial one. The following chapters will take this direction. 
Chapter Five will discuss the case for mimicry and hybridity in the Indonesian context 
                                                 
70 Pierre Bourdieu, Logic, 200. 
71 Loic J. D. Wacquant, “Towards a Social Praxeology,” 24. 
72 McNay, “Gender,” 104-5. 
73 Adkins, “Reflexivity,” 37. 
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within the story of the Buru Quartet by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. This discussion of 
Pramoedya’s works will then become the basis for an examination of the extension of the 
field as experienced by Muhammadiyah’s members. The combination of Pramoedya’s 
post-colonial perspective and Bourdieu’s sociology will then provide a better 
understanding of the issue of domination and resistance in Muhammadiyah. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE APPROPRIATION OF THE WEST: 
PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER’S BURU TETRALOGY 
AND ANTI-COLONIAL RESISTANCE 
 
I concluded the previous chapter with a suggestion that the Bourdieusian perspective 
could be enriched with a post-colonial perspective. The coupling of this perspective with 
a post-colonial perspective might offer a more comprehensive viewpoint for the 
understanding of two ideas. The first is on the emergence of the sense of crisis by relating 
it to the presence of another ideology, another way of life, another perspective – or what I 
generally refer to in this dissertation as the “Other”. For both the protagonist of 
Pramoedya’s tetralogy and Muhammadiyah’s members, what they consider to be 
Western culture has always been a source of both admiration and fear, something which 
they both desire and avoid. For them, the West is the strong “Other” that requires their 
attention due to its influence on their old, familiar, environment. This chapter will dwell 
on the perception of the West that belongs to the main character in the tetralogy. It will 
also elaborate how this perception creates, contributes, and presents a solution to the 
crisis of the field that he faces when old Javanese tradition into which he was born meets 
modern Dutch culture. In the following two chapters, I will turn to the present-day 
Muhammadiyah and describe how its members relate the presence of the West to their 
perceived crisis. 
The second idea is on how the emulation of the “Other” cannot be simply 
categorised as a submission to the “Other”. How the tetralogy’s main character uses what 
he considers to be a modern European perspective for an anti-colonial cause is an 
example of how the imitation of the “Other” can be used to both criticise and resist it. My 
analysis of the story in the tetralogy will become the basic framework to analyse the 
present-day Muhammadiyah with regard to its members’ stance on the usage of Western 
influence and their judgement about whether this usage is appropriate to forward the 
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organisation’s goals. These two ideas based on the coupling of the Bourdieusian 
perspective with a post-colonial one will benefit the first perspective through the 
elaboration of a crisis situation in relation to the presence of the “Other”. On the other 
hand, the post-colonial perspective might be enriched through the linkage between the 
identification of self, as opposed to the “Other”, in terms of the emergence of a crisis 
within which the “Other” seems to encroach upon one’s familiar field. 
This chapter might be seen as a theoretical digression in the course of my 
dissertation, although a useful one due to its theoretical significance. It will serve as a 
background in answering the second question of my research, namely why 
Muhammadiyah’s members can have two opposing views with regard to change within 
the organisation. The answer to this question will be provided in the next two chapters of 
this dissertation. However, the elaboration of a post-colonial perspective discussed in this 
chapter will provide the theoretical basis for these two chapters.  
Pramoedya did not mention Muhammadiyah in any of his works. In the third book 
of the Tetralogy, Jejak Langkah, he did mention Syarikat Islam as the first indigenous 
organisation in the Dutch Indies pioneered by the main protagonist of the story but not 
Muhammadiyah. I choose the Tetralogy as a theoretical foreground in assessing how 
Muhammadiyah engages with the “Other” not because of Pramoedya’s view on 
Muhammadiyah but for the similarity of its story line with what is occurring in 
Muhammadiyah. As a further theoretical elaboration of Muhammadiyah’s habitus, this 
chapter should be seen as a facilitating mechanism. In this chapter I will fashion the story 
of Minke, the main protagonist in the Buru Quartet, into an example of how the presence 
of the colonial Dutch as a strong “Other” creates doubts about the relevance of the culture 
of his forefathers; a sense of crisis facilitated through the presence of a strong “Other”. 
Also in this chapter I will show how Minke emulates the Dutch way of life in order to 
fight the repressive aspect of Dutch colonial rule. In doing so, I will provide a theoretical 
basis for my analysis of the perception of crisis among Muhammadiyah’s members in the 
proceeding chapters. 
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I use the term “East” and “West” in this chapter to represent the colonised and the 
colonial elements in the story of Buru Quartet. The first term is used to refer to non-
Western societies that are generally colonised by Western countries. 
 
5.1 On the Fascination with Dutch Shoes 
Let me start my elaboration of Pramoedya’s work by quoting the dramatic scene when 
the protagonist of his Buru Tetralogy, like a prodigal son, is brought by force by a police 
officer to pay homage to his father, who has recently been promoted to be a regent 
(bupati), a Javanese aristocrat appointed to govern a district:  
The officer starts to treat me improperly, gesturing that I take off my shoes and socks. A start of 
a great torture.… 
“Yes, walk on your knees, Your Highness”, he says as if he were pulling a buffalo out of a mud 
pool…. 
And I start to walk the almost ten-meter distance while swearing in more than three languages. 
… 
From where I am prostrating, I can see a pair of slippers moving slowly. Inside those slippers is a 
pair of clean feet. The feet of a male. Over those feet, a batik fabric folded in wide strips. (BM, 
180-81)1  
This is the story of a conflict between Javanese slippers (selop) and Dutch shoes. Raden 
Mas Minke, our protagonist, is the son of a Javanese noble. Considered as the smartest 
among his siblings, he is sent to a Dutch school established mainly for the children of 
European descent in Surabaya. Being in love with the West and its achievements, he 
admires both Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch shoes, and learns to loathe the feudal 
Javanese tradition.  
 And yet, faced with his father’s slippers, he is enervated. His European education 
suddenly becomes useless as this father figure sitting on a rocking chair in front of him 
touches his uncovered head with a whip made for horse-riding. He despises this 
                                                 
1 I use the first edition of Buru Tetralogy published by Lentera Dipantara. I am aware of the translation of 
Pamoedya Ananta Toer’s works by Max Lane but in this chapter I choose to refer to the original Indonesian 
version translated into English by myself. For the purpose of referencing, I use the abbreviations BM for 
Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), ASB for Anak Semua Bangsa (Child of All Nations), JL for Jejak 
Langkah (Footsteps), and RK for Rumah Kaca (House of Glass). Bumi Manusia was published in 2005 
while the remaining three were published in 2006. 
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repressive Javanese tradition but does not have the power to fight back. The only possible 
way to retaliate is to become more Western than he already is, at least after he leaves his 
father’s place. 
 However, as he comes to enrol at STOVIA, the Dutch Indies medical college in 
Batavia, he experiences a shock when he is told that he has to abandon his European 
clothing for a traditional head cover, a Javanese shirt, and a batik fabric to cover the 
lower part of his body. And he is allowed no shoes. Each student is obliged to wear his 
traditional clothing (there are no women in the college). Differences must be established 
in a colonial environment one way or another. It makes him realise his status in the 
colonial world. 
Good bye, European attire! First I take off my shoes, trousers, socks. To replace my hat, I am 
using a destar [head cover made of fabric folded into a triangular shape] now, which I have not 
worn for a few years. These noble feet, usually covered in socks and shoes, are now naked like 
chicken feet. And the floor feels cold; it sucks out my warm blood. (JL, 14) 
 The impertinent colonial reality forces Minke to what Fanon called 
“lactification”,2 a desire to become White and possess whiteness. His brown skin has 
failed him in becoming a true White, but he can at least dress as a White man. He can go 
even further in trying to possess whiteness. If not a pure White, one half is sufficient. 
Annelis Mellema, a Eurasian girl, is what he needs to add an extra tinge of whiteness to 
his self. Yet in the first book of the tetralogy, even this goddess-like wife is taken away 
by court order, leaving him with nothing but his shoes to flaunt. 
 In the next quote from the tetralogy, one can see how shoes and other attire were 
being turned into a symbol of hybridity when worn by the indigenous people. The shoes 
are, for the indigenous population, both masks and swords. They function not only as a 
tool to deny their brownness, but also as a “strategic reversal of the process of 
domination”.3 As masks, shoes give the impression of being modern for the users. As 
swords, they are annoyance to both the indigenous and colonial elites. 
There is an indegenous master who was jealous of the behaviour of an indigenous man, whom he 
considered as imitating European people in the way he dresses and acts. Abdoel Moeis, who was 
too naïve to realise that people could carry any malignant intent in their hearts. … 
                                                 
2 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 29. 
3 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 159. 
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As he could no longer hold his anger, the indigenous master ordered his men to teach the 
impertinent Moeis a lesson. 
And with that the bashing started. The conclusion of the story: With clothes torn, his bicycle 
wrecked, lying down on the side of the street with shoes gone, the man crawled to a police 
station in the early evening. The police did not do anything about it. The man then left the station 
crawling, and was later taken to a hospital by bypassers. (JL, 532-33) 
A hybrid not by race but by clothing preference, Abdoel Moeis and his shoes have raised 
a colonial sentiment, a sentiment not necessarily based on a white/brown duality but 
definitely on a slave/master distinction. His behaviour represents chaos in the delineation 
within colonial society: because while the Europeans were forever higher than the 
indigenous population, there were still indigenous masters for the rest of the indigenous 
people: a pecking order with common indigenous people always on the bottom rung. The 
contention about the practice of hybridity occurred not between different colours, but 
between the oppressed and their oppressor.  
 For Abdoel Moeis’s story tells another tale of the shoes; this piece of clothing no 
longer stands only as an objection towards the repressive, feudal, Javanese tradition. It is 
now symbolically a locus of the fight against both Brown and White repressions. The 
shoes beneath the feet of the indigenous people have created ambivalence for oppressors 
of all colours.   
With that news Dutch Indies indigenous people started to realise: shoes are no noble things, no 
longer a sign of a god or a priest as in the stories of wayang, not a sacred thing to be worshipped. 
They are no more than foot protectors [protecting them] from worms and shattered glasses, 
crooked thorns, sharp pebbles, dog excrement. Everybody can and may buy shoes without any 
Dutch Indies law able to forbid it, as long as one has the money. Shoes are not signs of 
Europeaness or of Christianity. They are not a sign of how close one is to the Dutch authority, so 
the masters do not need to be jealous of the common people with their shoes, or issue an order to 
bash [those common people who wear shoes]. 
A miniscule event! Really small! And it transformed everything. Look, as if being encouraged, 
even when the court case on Abdoel Moeis’s bashing has not been settled, shoe stores are 
already being flooded by buyers and young people start to stroll bravely around the street 
wearing their new shoes… (JL, 537) 
The “Dutch shoes” then become everybody’s shoes. For the indigenous rulers, this means 
the undermining of the traditional authority of the gods and the priests. For the colonial 
rulers, the popular usage of shoes by the indigenous people is not only for the sake of 
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imitating the West but also for their comfort and functions; both are utilitarian. 
Demystification brings forth significant questioning of feudal authority and makes 
Western culture affordable for the indigenous people. 
 However, this fascination with the Dutch shoes must be brought to a halt. After 
his government-imposed exile in the Moluccas, when he is about to leave his ship which 
just landed in Surabaya,  
Raden Mas Minke sits with his batik dress while smoking slowly. His head cover looks old, as 
well as his white Javanese shirt and batik dress. His right foot leans on his left one. And he is 
wearing a new pair of selop. His moustache is still thick, dark, and combed upwards. He looks 
much older than when he left [for exile]. (RK, 529) (Emphasis added) 
This chapter analyses the significance of the transformation of Dutch shoes into 
plain shoes, and their relation to the Javanese selop. It aims at analysing the act of 
appropriation of the West by the East when the East decides to steal the West and make it 
its own; when bare feet don those shoes. 
The next section tries to put the purpose of this chapter into the wider context of 
postcolonial studies. It is aimed not at surveying the literature on postcolonial studies, but 
at describing one form of everyday resistance in a colonial environment. The third part 
dwells further on how the appropriation takes place by taking the example of the Buru 
Tetralogy. This act of appropriation creates hybridity and thus poses a threat to the elite 
establishment. This will be described in the fourth part. The last part summarises the 
discussion in previous parts.  
Some important notes before I continue with my reading of the tetralogy: First, 
my purpose in writing this chapter is to create a framework for the next chapters in my 
dissertation with regard to the emergence of a crisis within Muhammadiyah that 
prompted a response from the organisation’s members, as we have seen in the previous 
two chapters.  
Second, I will create this framework by treating the four novels as a purely 
fictional work, even though they resemble the life of Raden Mas Tirto Adhi Soerjo, the 
pioneer of journalism in the Dutch Indies. As a consequence, I am not concerned about 
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the historical accuracy of the events in the novels, as was done by Shiraishi with regard to 
Toer’s biography of Soerjo in Sang Pemula.4  
Third, I will treat the tetralogy as a world in itself. The focus on the story of the 
tetralogy means that I will not treat the tetralogy as a text that should be reflected back to 
the real world as perceived by Pramoedya. The anti-colonial resistance that I will 
elaborate in the remainder of this chapter is what Minke and the other characters do in the 
story and not what Pramoedya intended to do by writing it. In this regard, this chapter is 
different to works, such as Tong’s and Bahari’s, which emphasise the literary dimension 
of the resistance inherent in the tetralogy.5 This chapter is, furthermore, not concerned 
with the assertions made by both Maier and Day, in contrast to Tong and Bahari, that the 
tetralogy has become a part of mainstream Indonesian literature by putting forward the 
message of universal humanism and the victory of dull political necessity over the 
language of creative intimacy.6 
Finally, my chapter should be regarded as an effort to “clear (another) space for a 
new critical reading” of a “well known work”.7 Its contemporary value lies not in finding 
an aspect that has been overlooked by previous works, but in further indulging in 
Pramoedya’s ambivalence when he talked about Western civilisations. In “My Apologies, 
in the Name of Experience”, for example, he showed both admiration and contempt for 
the West.8 Seen in this light, it is natural that, on the one hand, writers such as Tong and 
Bahari perceive the mood of resistance against the dominant order in the tetralogy. On 
the other hand, reading the same work, Maier and Day come up with a totally different 
                                                 
4 Takashi Shiraishi, “Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s “Sang Pemula” (The Pioneer),” Indonesia 44 
(1987): 129-40. 
5 See Sebastian Tong, “Unexpected Convergences: Bakhtin’s Novelistic Discourse and Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer’s ‘Epic’ Novels,” World Literature Today 73, no. 3 (1999): 481-84; Razif Bahari, “Remembering 
History, W/Righting History: Piecing the Past in Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Buru Tetralogy,” Indonesia 75 
(2003): 61-90; Razif Bahari, “Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Buru Tetralogy: The Genre of the Novel, 
Language and the Colonial Subject,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 40, no. 1 (2006): 57-83; 
and Razif Bahari, Pramoedya Postcolonially: (Re-)Viewing History, Gender and Identity in the Buru 
Tetralogy (Denpasar: Pustaka Larasan, 2007). 
6 See Henk Maier, “Stammer and the Creaking Door: the Malay Writings of Pramoedya Ananta Toer,” in 
Clearing a Space: Postcolonial Readings of Modern Indonesian Literature, ed. Keith Foulcher and Tony 
Day (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 81; and Tony Day, “Between Eating and Shitting: Figures of Intimacy, 
Storytelling and Isolation in Some Early Tales by Pramoedya Ananta Toer,” in Clearing a Space, 234. 
7 Tony Day and Keith Foulcher, “Postcolonial Readings of Modern Indonesian Literature: Introductory 
Remarks,” in Clearing a Space, 2. 
8 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, “My Apologies, in the Name of Experience,” Indonesia 61 (1996): 3-5, 11. 
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conclusion: that this work is Pramoedya’s yielding to the overwhelming state project of 
Indonesian nation-building. This ambivalence in the work of Pramoedya between 
admiration and contempt for the West, between emulation as a form of adulation and of 
resistance, is what this chapter is concerned with. In other words, it is aimed at 
elaborating the presence in Dutch shoes of both resistance and submission. 
 
5.2 Anti-colonial Resistance when Theft is the Only Alternative 
If I am to create a context of postcolonial studies for this chapter, starting from the work 
of Jack Goody may not seem to be an auspicious step to take. This is because of his 
criticism of how postcolonialism and postmodernism “frequently fall into” a trap of “a 
hidden ethnocentric risk”.9 According to Goody’s work, it is a tendency for all human 
societies, not only the West, to display ethnocentric attitudes in order to define their 
culture. The pride of a society lies in creating an image of achievements uniquely its own. 
Consequently, the fact that these achievements may happen after the importation of 
foreign factors must be concealed.  
 Goody refers to this concealment as an act of theft; in the case of the West, the 
theft occurs in two ways: the underplaying of the history of the rest of the world, and the 
imposition of its own historical concepts and periodisation over the rest of the world. The 
West’s exclusive claim of its institutions, towns, universities, humanism, democracy, 
individualism, and even love is debunked in Goody’s The Theft of History. What the 
West takes as its unique achievements is in fact learned through contacts with the non-
West.  
 It is the idea of the theft that makes Goody’s work fit into the general context of 
postcolonial studies. Colonialism steals; the impoverishment of the East comes after the 
plundering of its land and natural resources. Furthermore, through the working of what 
Said described as “Orientalist social sciences”, post-Independence non-Western societies 
are attuned towards progress defined by the West as modernity.10  
                                                 
9 Jack Goody, The Theft of History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5. 
10 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 107. 
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 This Foucaldian hegemony that Orientalism exercises does not allow an 
independent East’s depiction of the West, free of the West/Other dualism. The East, 
considered as ignorant and thus incapable of grasping the way the material world works, 
hates the West for its licentious, dull, mechanistic, and atheistic attitudes. The West’s 
cities, merchants, minds, and emotions have become the targets of the East’s jealousy.11 
Even when the East looks at the West, it does this in its irrational, myth-bound way. This 
is the first meaning of Occidentalism: the progressive West in the eyes of the envious 
East. 
The second meaning is concerned with the implicit assumption the West has of 
itself when it is practising Orientalism.12 The Occident in this second definition becomes 
what the Orient does not have. In other words, the West tries to define its rational, 
progressive self through the denial of these same traits to the East. To figure out what the 
West stands for is to find what is absent in the East, namely rationality. The West 
becomes what the East is not. While our first understanding of Occidentalism supposedly 
comes from the East, the second definition originates from the assumptions the West has 
of itself that is perpetuated through the negation of the same traits for the East. This 
second definition of Occidentalism is thus intertwined with the practice of Orientalism. 
 The theft does not stop here. Through its rationalism, the West likes to consider 
itself to have achieved the highest possible form of social and political system. The 
faculty of human minds is now consciously directed to values and ideologies. Antiquity, 
claimed by the West as uniquely its own, left a repository of polis, democracy, freedom 
and the rule of law13 that was exhumed during the Enlightenment. “When conceptualized 
as a project”, argues Venn, “the Enlightenment invariably calls up, and merges into, the 
concept of modernity as a project”.14 Since modernity as a project is considered to be a 
                                                 
11 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (London: Penguin 
Books, 2004). 
12 See Boaventura De Sousa Santos, “A Non-Occidentalist West?: Learned Ignorance and Ecology of 
Knowledge,” Theory Culture Society 26 (2009): 105; James G. Carrier, “Occidentalism: The World Turned 
Upside-down,” American Ethnologist 19, no. 2 (1992): 197; and James G. Carrier, “Introduction,” in 
Occidentalism: Images of the West, ed. James G. Carrier (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 23. 
13 Goody, The Theft of History, 26. 
14 Couze Venn, “The Enlightenment,” Theory Culture Society 23 (2006): 478. 
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universal one, by now a definition of good society with all its ideals15 has also been 
stolen by the West. The pain does not lie only in the act of theft itself, but also in the 
monopoly of the use of the stolen goods. 
 And so the East is left only with two options: renting the stolen goods or finding a 
substitute for them. They both come with risks. On the one hand, you can rent the stolen 
goods but they will never be yours. As Fanon argued, no matter how hard one tries to 
emulate the Western way of life, the non-White will always be identified as a person with 
colour and it is the colour that defines who you are more than the amount of the West you 
have assimilated into your self.16 For the people of the East, the West always sees them as 
people of colour. One will always be a never-complete self; almost complete, but not 
quite.17 
 On the other hand, by trying to find the substitute for the stolen goods, the non-
West refuses any contact with it. So instead of becoming an “exceptional nigger”, he opts 
to become a “filthy nigger”,18 and thus confirming the duality of East/West once more.19 
Lapses towards irrationality and fundamentalism20 in the envious reaction of non-
Western people towards the West are considered normal and logical consequences of 
dissatisfaction with the West, the sorts of lapses the West “cannot fully comprehend”.21 
These reactions are considered normal by the West since they come from the myth-bound 
East. With its rational self, the West never completely understands these irrational 
behaviours. The only explanation the West can think of for these behaviours is that they 
are inherent in the Eastern self: the East is irrational because it is non-Western. 
Using a different categorisation but with the same conclusion, Coronil lists three 
possible modalities of Occidentalist representation. The first of the three is the dissolution 
                                                 
15 Akeel Bilgrami, “Occidentalism, the Very Idea: An Essay on Enlightenment and Enchantment,” Critical 
Enquiry 32 (2006): 411. 
16 Fanon, Black Skin, 97.  
17 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 122. 
18 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 158. 
19 On the post-colonial literature that encourages this Euro-centric dualism, see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth 
Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures 
(London: Routledge, 1989), 21. 
20 Couze Venn, “World Dis/Order: On Some Fundamental Questions,” Theory Culture Society 19 (2002): 
129. 
21 Mervyn F. Bendle, “Trajectories of Anti-globalism,” Journal of Sociology 38 (2002): 220. 
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of the “Other” by the Self where the opposition between the East and the West is resolved 
“by absorbing non-Western peoples into an expanding and victorious West”.22 The East, 
after the process of absorption, is reduced to a mirror image of the West. I refer this 
process as assimilation. The second modality is where the “Other” is incorporated into 
the Self. In this modality, the East is allowed to keep itself as an entity but it is only 
allowed to operate within a system created and introduced by the West, such as the global 
liberal economy. In this system the exotic “Other” is kept alive, yet domesticated, 
contributing its exotic goods and services to the service of a global economy. 
The last modality, where the Self allows itself to be disturbed by the presence of 
the “Other”, seems to be a benign one since the East and its characteristics is praised as 
something that the West lacks. In this modality, rationality is highly valued but myth-
bound and spiritual life is also needed to balance the rational, Western, self. I see the 
second and third modality as part of “nativisim”. But both assimilation and nativism are 
problematic, as also argued by Courville.23 Assimilation and nativism’s refusal of the 
liquidation of the East/West distinction encourages the practice of taking for granted the 
distinction between the two categories. Rejecting “a Self-centered standpoint from which 
difference is turned into Otherness either through Self-confirming objectification or Self-
questioning exoticization”, Coronil argues that 
just as Orientalist accounts are partial not because of their inherent incompleteness, 
representations of the non-Western culture have colonising effects not because they depict 
diversity. What makes a difference is not the inscription of difference but the kind of difference 
it makes.24 
The “black and white” difference, where the Self is totally opposite to the 
“Other”, and where there is no possibility of overlapping characteristics in-between, is 
what Coronil is concerned about in his discussion on Western representations of non-
Western culture. To make the situation more alarming, while the difference might have 
been created by the West, it is not the only one that sustains it. In their modernisation 
efforts, for example, both Japan and Turkey have maintained this differentiation by 
                                                 
22 Fernando Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories,” Cultural 
Anthropology 11, no. 1 (1996): 58. 
23 Mathieu E. Courville, “Genealogies of Postcolonialism: A Slight Return from Said and Foucault back to 
Fanon and Sartre,” Studies in Religion 36 (2007): 228. 
24 Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism,” 73. 
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claiming themselves as not being part of Asia, and instead heading towards the West and 
acting as role models for other Asian countries.25 
 Considering the negative effects of this dualism in the essentialisation of 
identities, it is important to look for an alternative mode of engagement. This bipolar 
situation containing only two nodes of engagement with the West (either assimilation or 
rejection) must give way to a tripolar situation where on top of the two previous nodes is 
a third one representing another possibility: one where the old dualism is purposefully 
eroded. There might be many possibilities of the mode of engaging the West in this 
manner but this chapter focuses on what I call the appropriation of the West, where the 
East grabs the West and dons its shoes. 
Why appropriation? Why theft? There are two reasons. The first is because, with 
reference to Goody, societies steal from each other all the time. Culture, civilisation, 
values, even technology are imitable and modifiable. Problems arise when in an 
environment of unbalanced power relations, one society denies access to these items to 
another society. The second reason, still keeping in mind the imbalanced power relations 
between the East and the West, is that theft is often the only available alternative.  
To illustrate this point further, we can consider James C. Scott’s arguments in 
Weapons of the Weak.26 One important argument in Scott’s work is his broad definition 
of resistance. What counts as resistance, in his definition, lies in the intention and not the 
consequences. In his research in Sedaka village in the state of Kedah, Malaysia, the 
village poor resisted the repressive economic system, not with violence, but with 
activities such as petty stealing from rich people. Scott mentions five reasons for the poor 
peasants to avoid open confrontation.27 
The first reason is that exploitation is exercised indirectly. The poor are not totally 
impoverished. They are left out of the production process, but old customs such as 
regular donations to paupers during various Islamic holidays are still maintained. The 
second reason is that there is an overlapping class structure that prevents hatred towards 
                                                 
25 Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), 69-71. 
26 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985). 
27 Ibid., 295, 242-48. 
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only certain people. The villagers are still related one to another, one way or another. 
This condition disperses resentment. The third reason is that the poor can still vote with 
their feet; in the face of unbearable exploitation, they can leave the village in order to 
look for a better livelihood. The fourth reason is the fear of repression. The wealthy have 
money at their disposal to do this. The last reason is related to the fact that the poor 
always manage to physically survive in the village, no matter how meagerly. Open 
confrontation is, thus, often avoidable in this situation. 
I argue that Scott’s explanation for non-violent resistance in Sedaka can be used 
to explain the story of resistence by the protagonist of the Tetralogy, namely Minke, 
through what I call the appropriation of the West. This mode of anti-colonial resistance 
then will be used to reflect on what is occurring in Muhammadiyah at the moment. I will 
start this elaboration from the beginning of the story in the Tetralogy. 
 
5.3 Appropriation of the West 
Following the story of Minke in the Tetralogy, one can discern three stages in his search 
for humanity among the indigenous population of the Dutch Indies. The first stage is 
when he despises this population and sees the West as everything the East is not. In this 
stage Minke is mesmerised by the progress made in the West and sees no possibility of 
the East achieving the same progress. After experiencing how the indigenous people of 
the Dutch Indies in particular, and non-Western people in general, strive for their 
independence, in the second stage Minke understands that freedom is everywhere longed 
for. At this stage, Minke starts to be critical of the West and optimistic at the same time 
of the potential of the East in achieving the same progress. 
 In the final stage of the Tetralogy, Minke takes an active role in employing 
Western methods and tools to empower the indigenous population of the East Indies. 
Through the use of journalism, modern organisation, and boycott, he finds out that 
methods and tools emerging in the West can be used and manipulated to benefit the 
colonial subject. It is at this stage that appropriation of the West takes its form. 
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5.3.1 The First Stage: When the West is the Teacher 
On the cover of the first edition of the tetralogy published by Lentera Dipantara, I notice 
that something is out of place. The picture shows a four-wheeled cart pulled by two 
horses. On the cart are two women and two men. The women are Annelis, Minke’s first 
wife, and Nyai Ontosoroh, her mother, while the two men are Darsam (the plantation’s 
head of the security) and Minke. In this picture Minke is depicted as wearing a set of 
Javanese clothes, complete with a pair of selop. While it may have not been the intention 
of the artist who drew that picture to depict in detail the clothing of the characters of the 
book, I think a European style of clothing would suit Minke’s character better in Bumi 
Manusia, the first book of the Tetralogy. 
 Bumi Manusia begins by describing Minke’s admiration for the Netherland’s 
Queen Wilhelmina and the West she represents. The West, with its science and 
technology, has bewitched this brown-skinned man and made him believe that he is 
different from the rest of the indigenous people of Java. This book describes this West-
enchanted stage of Minke’s life:  
Science and knowledge, which I received from the school and whose manifestation in life I see 
with my own eyes, has made me a little different from most of my people. I am not even sure 
that I may have violated my physical form as a Javanese. And it is the life that I have 
experienced as a Javanese who has European knowledge that has encouraged me to write. (BM, 
12) 
About the tradition of walking on one’s knees to show one’s respect for nobility, he says, 
truly, my school friends will laugh at me if they see this drama of how a human being, used to 
walking upright on his own two legs, now has to walk on half of his legs, with the help of his 
two hands. Oh, God, my ancestors, why did you create such a tradition, one that insults the 
dignity of your own offspring? Did this never occur to you, you outrageous ancestors! … How 
could you pass down such a tradition? (BM, 181) 
When asked by his mother if he wants to become a regent in the future, Minke answers, 
“No, Mother, I do not want to.” 
“No? That’s strange. Well, you do whatever you like. [But] what do you want to be in the future? 
After you graduate, surely you could be anything you want.” 
“I only want to be a free man, neither taking nor giving orders, Mother.” 
“Huh? Will there ever be such a time, my son? This is the first I have heard of it.” 
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Just like when I was a kid, I enthusiastically explain to her what the teachers told me in school. 
About Miss Magda Peters with her enchanting story: the story of the French Revolution, its 
meanings, its principles. 
Mother just laughs and does not criticise me. Just like when I was a kid. (BM, 190) 
 Freedom is what the French Revolution means to Minke. For him, there is no 
other reference to freedom other than that found in European history. In the feudalistic 
Javanese society freedom is a luxury not to be found in the indigenous vocabulary. It has 
to be understood by wearing a pair of spectacles borrowed from some foreign land. 
Progress happens in Europe, and it brings freedom. Freedom is European. And to write 
about freedom is to write in a European language, even when the European court system 
ridicules him as a witness in the trial of the murder of his Dutch father-in-law. 
How I have disappointed you, Mother, for I do not have the skills to write in Javanese verses. 
My life has seen so much trouble, it is overwhelmed, Mother, and it cannot be captured through 
my ancestors’ verses. (BM, 441) 
Of his self-claimed inability to write in Javanese, his mother retorts, 
“Now, if you were still a Javanese, you would always be able to write in Javanese. You write in 
Dutch, my son, because you no longer want to be a Javanese. You write for the Dutch. Why do 
you care about them so much? They also drink and eat from the land of Java. You do not eat or 
drink from the Dutch land. So, why do you care about them so much?” (BM, 460) 
 Approaching the end of the first book, Minke’s school-mate Jan Daperste decides 
to become a Javanese instead of following his adopted Dutch parents back to the 
Netherlands. He changes his name to Panji Darman. And as decided by the Dutch Indies 
court for Europeans, Annelis Mellema is to be taken to the Netherlands and placed under 
the care of her pure Dutch stepbrother until she is legally an adult. Upon leaving Java, 
Annelis chooses to use the same suitcase that had been brought by her mother Nyai 
Ontosoroh when she was about to enter the Mellema residence as a concubine. Choices 
are made: both Jan and Annelis refuse to be considered Europeans.  
 The Europe that he worships has brought his world down. Even when he has not 
been aware of any alternative to Europe, he feels that a disturbance was growing in the 
colonial system. 
I no longer understand anything. I suddenly hear my own cry, Mother, your son has lost the 
fight. Your beloved son did not run away, Mother; he is not a criminal, even when he could not 
defend the rights of his own wife, your daughter-in-law. Are we indigenous people this weak in 
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the face of Europe? Europe! You, my teacher, is this what you do? You have made my wife, who 
does not know much about you, lose her faith in her own small world – a world without security 
and a future for herself. (BM, 534) 
Annelis dies in the Netherlands under the care of strangers employed by the Mellemas.  
 
5.3.2 The Second Stage: When One Finds the West in the East 
Europe remains a teacher to Minke because it was from Europe that he first learned the 
idea of humanity. As the story progresses, however, he manages to find the East fighting 
for its humanity. He learns that while Europe introduced the concept of humanity, 
humanity is everywhere longed for. There are two main ideas in the second book of the 
tetralogy: colonialism recognises no colour; nor does humanity. 
 The first non-Western society that captures Minke’s attention is Japan. In Bumi 
Manusia Japan enters the story as an entity that did not fit the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century global situation, where Whites dominated non-Whites. Intellectually, 
however, Minke is still unsure of how to understand Japan. (BM, 169-70) In Anak Semua 
Bangsa, this nation raises a sense of Asian pride in Minke’s heart (ASB, 65) for its role in 
disrupting the colonial situation in the Dutch Indies. As Minke explains, 
Japan is becoming more interesting. This magnificent nation becomes more and more inspiring. 
In my old notes I wrote: the Netherlands and Japan signed an amity agreement about fifty years 
ago. One-by-one the Europeans started to look at this Asian nation as an exception. And about 
five years ago I read in an article: Japan has entered the colonial competition. Not wanting to be 
left behind by the White nations, it has itself joined in the partitioning of the world. It started 
attacking Manchuria, China, Chinese territory. And the Netherlands, and so then the Dutch 
Indies, declared its neutrality in the on-going war. Neutral! Neutral towards an aggressive friend! 
A sort of neutrality that has really helped the Japanese. And no one came to the aid of the 
victims. I can imagine a small kid, smart and strong, stealing the belongings of an old nation 
infested by all kinds of diseases – an old giant lying helplessly on his bed. (ASB, 56) 
… If I may conclude: there is a sense of restlessness among the Dutch. It is as if they have lost 
faith in their own strength. How can it be that a nation of big and tall people can be so scared of a 
nation that it dislikes and despises? I do not understand. I can only sense that there is something 
troubling the Europeans…. (ASB, 64) 
 
 136
 For the Japanese, humanity means being on a par with, if not at a higher level 
than, the West. For the Chinese, it is how to survive Europe by providing a modern 
education for its youth and creating a republic out of a crumbling empire. In several 
conversations with Khouw Ah Soe, a member of China’s youth group sent to Java to 
recruit support among the overseas Chinese for a new Chinese republic, Minke learns 
about the aspirations of the Chinese. Says Khouw Ah Soe, 
It will all be in vain if we have to be governed by a stupid and corrupt but powerful Old Group 
and follow them to become stupid and corrupt to maintain power. Useless, Sir. No matter how 
smart a person is, if he is inside a stupid kind of power, he will become stupid as well, Sir. (ASB, 
88) 
Therefore, overseas Chinese youth must be prepared to receive a modern education. A large, 
very large, amount of money must be collected.… Modern schools must be built, now and in the 
future. Otherwise, the nation of our own ancestors will be ravaged by the Japanese, as Africa has 
been swallowed up by the British. (ASB, 119) 
 And from Khouw Ah Soe, Minke also learns about the Philippines and their fights 
against Spanish colonialism.  
The Philippines Revolution broke out. It aimed at getting rid of the Spaniards from the 
Philippines. In my mind I can see educated Filipinos leading their uneducated fellow men…in 
attacks on Spanish barracks…. Even my imagination cannot do justice to the scene. They were 
not led by individuals. But by…a collective plan.… And they fought. The whole country, in my 
imagination, was rising. Marching, leaving their homes to fight. To live or die. The Spanish in 
the Philippines were getting cornered. And the Filipino indigenous people chose their first 
president: Emilio Aguinaldo. The year was 1897! The first republic in Asia. (ASB, 420) 
The Dutch Indies have not reached that stage, but Minke can find humanism in the stories 
of the people he meets, people who are fighting for their rights and dignities.  
Two characters are given extra attention in Minke’s stories: Surati and 
Trunodongso. The first is a female teenager who is about to be handed over as a mistress 
to a sugar factory director in Tulangan, a Dutch man with a bloated stomach named Frits 
Homerus Vlekkenbaaij, or ‘Plikemboh’ in Javanese tongue. Understanding the risk to her 
family of refusing the request, she agrees to become Plikemboh’s concubine. Before 
submitting herself to him, however, she goes to a village that is infested with chicken 
pox. She consciously contracts the disease in the hope of giving it to Plikemboh when he 
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takes her. Three days after her journey to the disease-stricken nearby village, she is in 
front of Plikemboh’s door. 
She came [up the stairs] with Plikemboh by her side, submitting herself to be brought into a 
room – a room which forever will become the divide between being a virgin and a concubine. 
Take, take everything you can from me, she thought, and die instantly. 
When she arrived, the pox had started to show its rage. Her strength had been sucked completely 
out of her body. From the moment she laid on Plikemboh’s bed, she could not rise. And it 
happened so fast that Plikemboh contracted the disease. 
In the last few days both of them just laid on the bed, waiting for death to come. (ASB, 227) 
Plikemboh dies but Surati survives with scars all over her body. She has won the fight for 
her dignity; the ugly scars are her trophy.  
Resistance can mean different things to different people. For Trunodongso, it is 
about the physical survival of his wife and children. A farmer whose best land had been 
bought by a Dutch sugar factory at the lowest price is left only the most unproductive of 
his land. For the factory’s extension, the local colonial administration is after this meager 
piece of land as well. When Minke visits him, his household is on a high alert to defend 
their land – with violence, if necessary.  
If he could refuse to give away his farmland, why did he not refuse to give away his rice fields? 
It is because the farm is his last livelihood. He has to defend it with his life. Otherwise, his 
family have to live on the streets. (ASB, 244) 
This man is very interesting. Unlike most farmers, he has courage to speak his mind. Yes, even if 
he does it tortuously and is not able to give a straightforward answer. I think he is a farmer with 
quite a personality. And he likes to answer more than he likes to be questioned. (ASB, 253) 
 Minke’s heroes are not Javanese princes or kings with their high palace culture, 
but an ugly girl with scars and a hungry farmer with his family. Just as Gandhi brought 
the periphery of the Indian traditional social order to its centre,28 Minke brings the 
marginalised in Javanese society to the centre of his definition of the Javanese spirit. 
Javanese high culture has no relevance in Minke’s search for humanity among his people. 
In his particular emphasis on Surati and Trunodongso’s brave acts, Minke re-defines 
what culture means for the Javanese. For him, culture no longer stands for a set of 
sanctioned rituals and mannerisms. Culture, at least one worthy of appreciation, now 
refers to one’s sense of dignity and attitude towards repression. His contact with the 
                                                 
28 Ashis Nandy, Bonfire of Creeds: The Essential Ashis Nandy (India: Oxford University Press, 2004), 69. 
 138
Western world has made him curious about the other side of the Javanese culture, a 
dimension which had not been the main focus when people talked about Java as a socio-
cultural category. The West has now sensitised him to look for Javanese pride and rage 
targeted at repression perpetrated by both the Whites and the Browns. The hybrid East is 
on its way to making its fiery appearance. And as it strives to achieve its sense of 
humanity, the repressors have shown themselves more clearly, and they bear no particular 
colour.29  
After Minke remarries, this time to a Chinese girl who was previously engaged to 
Khouw Ah Soe, a conversation with her spoils his admiration for the Japanese. 
“What is there to admire?”, she says in a cold tone. “Whether a Russian or a Japanese victory, it 
is not a victory for humanity. If Russia is to lose the war, its loss is not a loss of humanity, either. 
Both are wolves attacking their prey”. … 
“Minke, I think it is no coincidence that you told me about [the venereal bacteria of] treponema 
palladium – I hope I’m pronouncing it correctly – and gonococcus. These are British and 
Japanese imperialism. Both of them are turning this world into a sick body.” (JL, 202) 
In this second book of the tetralogy, Minke has actually come to a conclusion. He 
verbalises this conclusion when he is about to start writing Trunodongso’s story: “But the 
first line did not go as I had planned: Atrocity comes from all nations and at all times”. 
(ASB, 248) 
With regard to Europe, it needs to be repositioned as it has simultaneously 
become both a teacher and a greedy monster:  
The power of Europe….– it is a giant who gets hungrier as he eats more. All of the sudden I am 
imagining Buto Ijo, the giant in a story passed down by my ancestors. … 
And now I have learned my lesson: White power is greedy no matter where it is…. 
Greedy! Greedy! Not only a word, its meaning is now ringing out as it strikes my brain.… No… 
I still need European teachers…. Only with your strength can people confront you. (ASB, 419-
22) 
                                                 
29 See, as an example, John Pemberton’s work on the contribution of the contact between the Javanese 
courts and the colonial Dutch to the creation of what we now understand as the Javanese culture and the 
repression of common indigenous population within the Dutch colonial system in On the Subject of ‘Java’ 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 51-53. 
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 The West now represents colonialism and one can only face up to the West by 
using its methods. In learning from the West, however, one should know how to “refuse 
Europe’s diseases”. (ASB, 105)  
A nation used to be able to live safely in a desert or a jungle. It cannot do that anymore. Modern 
science has uprooted everyone from their security and peace. As both social and individual 
creatures, humans can no longer feel safe. They are always chased, because modern science has 
provided them with the inspiration and the desire to control both nature and their fellow human 
beings at the same time. There is no power that can stop this lust for power except for science 
itself, the one that is more potent – in the hands of wiser human beings. (ASB, 123) 
The way forward is not to abandon the West but to refashion what it has to offer, in a 
wiser manner. 
 
5.3.3 The Third Stage: When the West is Faced with Itself 
Eventhough our protagonist chooses to refashion the West instead of abandoning it, in the 
third book of the Tetralogy there is a tendency among the colonial subject to dismiss as 
lip service the claimed universal values offered by the West, such as human rights and 
democracy. The West is often considered hypocritical due to the double standard it 
applies to its own people and those of the colony; justice and freedom often only apply to 
Westerners but not the indigenous people. It is thus easier for non-Westerners to dismiss 
those values simply as lip service and instead to focus only on imitating Western science 
and technology; to appropriate the West means to master its science and technology in 
order to decolonise oneself. This stance is represented by Nyai Ontosoroh’s character 
who “thinks that the modern age brings no gift other than progress in tools (peralatan) 
and methods (cara)”. (ASB, 279) 
 But for Minke the West simultaneously means values, methods, as well as its 
colonial propensity. In his engagement with the West Minke is exposed to all three 
elements. All three are available for appropriation, but for Minke, the task of the 
colonised is to take the first two, mould them to one’s need and use them to confront the 
colonial aspect of the West. It is within the conflict between the first two and the colonial 
aspects that the act of appropriation is located.  
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 Since the West most often does not realise the presence of its colonial propensity, 
contrasting its own values to its own actions terrifies it. When the lofty ideals it thinks it 
bears upon its shoulders are turned against itself, it trembles. This is what happens when 
Maurits Mellema is scolded for the death of Annelis under his supposed care. He comes 
to Nyai Ontosoroh with the intention of bringing back the late Annelis’s old suitcase and 
her belongings, but is greeted with protests and cries. He is blamed for being unjust and 
greedy in his acts and for causing Annelis’s death. 
Lieutenant Colonel Engineer Mellema now looks like a giant toddler being scolded by his 
mother. He has even lost the spirit to leave this place. The big suitcase beside his foot is left 
untouched.… Engineer Maurits Mellema then points at the suitcase. But no sound comes from 
his mouth. The end of his finger is shaking. He turns his back on us, walking heavily, leaving the 
front chamber. His left hand is holding his sword holster.… He looks small, meaningless. … 
“Murderer! Murderer of your own step-sister!”… “Animal!” … (ASB, 531-35) 
 The terrible agony of the colonial Dutch comes to when they are accused of 
betraying their own grand ideals. It is imperative for the colonised, therefore, to recognise 
these ideals and use them to evaluate the West. Moreover, for Minke the values that he 
has learned from the French Revolution belong not only to the West. The pain for the 
colonised is thus inflicted not when the West behaves hypocritically by betraying its own 
ideals, but when the West acts against humanity and universal values. By absorbing these 
values, Minke admits that he acts unlike any other Javanese. His admission does not 
come in an arrogant self-aggrandisement, but with sadness, a sense that there is no 
turning back from the modern dream which he has made his own. His own mother would 
find it hard to recognise her own son. In a conversation with her (her name is never stated 
anywhere in the whole tetralogy), we can find her expressing this sentiment: 
“Do not believe so much in the French Revolution. What did you say are its slogans? Equality, 
Fraternity, Liberty? If these are all true, son, where is the place for the Dutch in Java?” … 
I am sorry, Mother. I have taken a different path and made a different choice. I will write a long 
letter in Javanese to you. Verbally, I cannot do it. You are right, Mother, you are looking at a son 
whom you have not recognised anymore, except for his name…. (JL, 87)30 
                                                 
30 It is interesting to compare this modern dream of Minke with that of Dr. Soetomo who was occupied with 
“how to proceed into the colonial Western world without imitation; at a deeper level, how to imitate one’s 
forebears without imitating them”. (Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures 
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 267.) Closer to Dr. Soetomo than to Minke is 
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Western ideals are no longer owned solely by the West.  
As for the Western methods, Minke lists three items: modern science, modern 
organisation, and modern gadgets. (JL, 257) In the tetralogy, there are at least three 
modern methods that Minke focuses on: journalism, modern organisation, and boycott. 
While in the first two stages of treating the West as a teacher and finding the West in the 
East, Minke had been occupied with comprehending what the West means and separating 
its methods and values from its colonial propensity, in this last stage he uses those 
methods and values to counter the colonial Dutch. In the remainder of this section we will 
see how Minke uses these three modern methods. 
 
5.3.3.1 Journalism 
Minke’s fondness for writing has brought him to the world of journalism. When he was 
still studying in high school he had started to write for a Dutch newspaper which he later 
found out was funded by the sugar industry. (ASB: 386) His articles to the newspaper are 
initially about the social landscape of Surabaya and its surroundings, and are imbued with 
the spirit of the French Revolution. He had also sent some articles explaining his position 
on the trial of his father-in-law’s murder. These articles were published in the newspaper 
with the endorsement of its chief editor. But when Minke starts to write about the the 
colonial economic situation, the reception is not so friendly.  
 His article on Trunodongso’s plight is refused. Upon this rude refusal, his friends 
and Nyai Ontosoroh suggest that he write in Melayu (the Malay language). At first, he is 
resistant to that idea because he considers the Malay language as a motley construction of 
words from other languages; a lowly language form. His change of mind comes with a 
realisation that the indigenous people of the Dutch Indies have never had a publication of 
their own. The use of the Malay language in his articles starts with the publication of 
Medan Priyayi (“The Field of the Nobility”), a publishing wing of the first indigenous 
organisation, Syarikat Priyayi.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Gandhi’s anti-colonial ideology that he took from both Hindu and Christian teachings. (Nandy, Bonfire of 
Creeds, 452.) 
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 Not only does Minke use the Malay in this weekly; he also opts for the vernacular 
form of the language to gain a better reception among the indigenous population of the 
Dutch Indies, who are mostly unaware of the scholarly form of Melayu. At this stage he 
has set a clearer target for his struggle: the enlightenment of his fellow indigenous 
people. Medan Priyayi is made into a newspaper that familiarises the colonised with their 
rights. The unspoken assumption of the newspaper is that the Dutch Indies government 
has restored the rights of the indigenous people by issuing laws to safeguard their 
interests. This is the same logic that is used in the implementation of the Ethical 
Policies31 with the aim of compensating the indigenous population for the profits the 
Dutch had collected during their colonisation of the archipelago. 
 The violations of the rights of the indigenous population, therefore, are 
supposedly accidental. They are considered mere accidents in the Dutch Indies colonial 
situation. Medan Priyayi’s mission is to bring these violations to light and to bring justice 
for the indigenous people. Lawyers are hired to help answer readers’ questions regarding 
their struggle for justice. This newspaper certainly provides fresh air for its readers but as 
the story progresses, there is a sense of a limit to what it can do to really advance their 
welfare. In a letter to Minke, Nyai Ontosoroh criticises Minke’s journalistic work. 
Tend to every claim that demands justice. They trust only you to deal with their cases…. 
However, if you keep doing this service, you would be nothing but a servant to the Government, 
[funding the service] with your own money. It is not only ridiculous, but also sad for a man like 
you. Newspapers! Life is not only about laws and regulations!” (JL, 300) 
Unlike Bahari’s analysis of Minke’s use of Dutch,32 I argue that, on the one hand, 
Minke’s works in Dutch are pleas for the colonial system to be truthful to its civilising 
mission. Minke’s work in Malay, on the other hand, begins his efforts to delegitimise this 
system. This is not easy, for he often finds himself trapped in the colonial structure and 
thus only perpetuates the colonial system with his Malay writings, as stated above by 
Nyai Ontosoroh. However, his eventual use of Malay helps him play the role of an 
                                                 
31 The Ethical Policy was issued in 1901 during Queen Wilhelmina’s reign. It consisted of three 
programmes – education, irrigation, and migrations – that serves both the ethical consideration of the Dutch 
government (these programmes were thought to be the compensation by the Dutch for their “debt of 
honour” to the indigenous people of the archipelago) and its economic interest (these programmes serve to 
expand Dutch plantation in Indonesia along with the available labour). See Adrian Vickers, A History of 
Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17-18. 
32 Bahari, “Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Buru Tetralogy,” 75. 
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interlocutor between Western ideas and the indigenous people, a facilitator of the 
reproduction of hybridity. His writings in Malay, in this context, cannot but be political:33 
its usage by the population of the East Indies had turned it into a medium for anti-colonial 
propaganda and, consequently, for imagining the creation of an East Indies nation.34 
 
5.3.3.2 Modern organisation 
Minke then realises that his journalistic work has to go hand-in-hand with organisational 
work. There are two organisations which Minke establishes: Syarikat Priyayi and 
Syarikat Dagang Islam. The members of the first organisation come mainly from the 
nobility. Minke’s reason for this is the fact that most educated indigenes in Indonesia 
came from this background. They are the ones who are both permitted and can afford 
access to modern education and, therefore, an organisation for the nobility might become 
a pioneer for further organising efforts for the indigenous people. As explained above, 
Minke has no intention of making the nobility and their high culture the base for the 
future nation of the Dutch Indies. 
 But Syarikat Priyayi, whose members are supposedly independent, is a far cry 
from a modern organisation. (JL, 554) It turns out that the nobility joins the organisation 
because of orders from their superiors. They are not aware of the importance of self-
organising for the colonised; a feudal mentality still dominates the organisation. A 
financial fraud also contributes to the failure of this organisation, but the main lesson for 
Minke is the hopelessness of the nobility. 
                                                 
33 Maier, “Stammer and the Creaking Door,” 66. 
34 The use of Malay (later to be known as “Indonesian language”) by Pramoedya after Independence, 
however, was problematic. In the fifties Pramoedya supported the use of local languages in Indonesian 
literature for they provide the vocabulary that can convey one’s feelings more intimately (Day, “Between 
Eating and Shitting,” 219-25.). His eventual preference for a standardised Indonesian language in his works 
some decades after, the writing of the Tetralogy is one, thus can be seen as a sign of his acceptance of the 
reality of Indonesia’s post-colonial situation where the old, “language of family” needs to give way to the 
mechanic, dull Indonesian language in order for the nation to exist, and where the intimacy of ordinary 
people needs to give way to a universal humanism (Day, “Between Eating and Shitting,” 234.), a choice 
more or less parallel to his move from the stammering Malay to the canonical Indonesian (Maier, 
“Stammer and the Creaking Door,” 80-82.) and from the Bohemian Gelanggang circle of writers to the 
communist-affiliated, social-realist Institute of People’s Culture/LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat); 
See Martina Heinschke, “Between Gelanggang and LEKRA: Pramoedya’s Developing Literary Concepts,” 
Indonesia 61 (1996): 166. 
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I once offered to hold a conference. A supportive response never came. At the moment 
organisational fees cannot be collected anymore. …. Expenses started to come out of people’s 
personal pockets. This organisation is ill. And the nobility would rather occupy themselves with 
dances and gambling. Fees eventually stopped coming. Members of the nobility returned to their 
previous attitudes. (JL, 321) 
 More and more organisations appear within the colonial environment. These 
organisations, however, are based on a single ethnic grouping. The Javanese are grouped 
in Budi Oetomo, as do other ethnicities in each of their organisations. This fact gravely 
concerns Minke.  
The goal to create a pluralistic nation … will be forgotten. People will not care if those coming 
from other ethnic groups – be it Bali or Sumba or Minangkabau – are being oppressed by the 
Dutch, or by a neighbouring nation. It looks like [Governor General] Van Heutsz with his 
weapons and canons will be able to unite and consolidate the Dutch Indies territory. Responding 
to this surge in colonial power, isn’t it logical for the colonised ethnic groups of the Dutch Indies 
to unite? (JL, 390) 
 His choice of a common denominator for the new and modern organisation falls 
on Islam, the religion of the majority of the Dutch Indies population. Minke is trying to 
be realistic with his choice. By choosing Muslim traders as the base for the newly formed 
Syarikat Dagang Islam (JL, 394), he does not mean to use the organisation as a tool for 
racial competition. (JL, 604)  His choice to have Muslim merchants form the base of the 
organisation is intended to strike at the economic foundation of Dutch colonialism. He 
does not mean it as an exclusivistic organisation only for merchants. His commitment to 
a multi-ethnic nation remains. Through his responses to the incidents of intra-
organisational conflict, such the Arabs versus the indigenous members, or merchants 
versus farmers, or conflicts with the Chinese (JL, 543, 626, 604), Minke’s has shown his 
commitment to this national vision.  
 
5.3.3.3 Boycott as an economic method 
The ultimate aim of having a press and a modern, non-elitist, organisation for the 
indigenous people is to forward their interests in a colonial system. The advantages of a 
widely read publication and a big organisation come when a coordinated boycott is 
needed.  
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 Minke is first introduced to the method of boycott when a group of Chinese 
traders in Surabaya decides to boycott the sales of merchandise from big European 
merchant companies. (JL, 395-96) The boycott is triggered by an insulting dismissal of a 
Chinese merchant from the premises of a European company. Initiated by the 
organisation Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, all Chinese traders in Surabaya refuse to buy 
merchandise from big European companies. Within a few months, the European 
company is closed down. Three more European companies then meet the same fate. 
 Using the same tactic, he coordinates boycotts in sugar cane plantations. He learns 
about the farmers’ plight from the news he receives for Medan Priyayi. His mode of 
boycott involves spreading phosphor powder on cane leaves. With the help of sunlight, 
the plantations that have robbed farmers of their livelihood have their precious 
commodities burned so that they are of no use even after the fire stops. The boycott stops 
only with the coming of the rainy season. (JL, 651) 
The choice of boycott is taken by Minke because of his concern for the real 
material needs of the indigenous people. He also shows his concern for the Dutch Indies 
nationalism, but for Minke, the real needs of the people come first before what he 
considers an abstract notion. (JL, 650) It is for this reason that he uses Syarikat Dagang 
Islam mainly to advance the economic interests of its members and not necessarily to 
develop the idea of nationalism. For Minke, destablising the colonial system must start 
with its economic interests. 
 
5.4 The Hybridity that Disturbs the Colonial System 
We should not therefore be content to delve into the people’s past to find concrete examples to 
counter colonialism’s endeavours to distort and depreciate.35 
Small holders, petty tenants, and landless laborers are continually using the values and rationale 
of that earlier social order to press their claims and disparage the claims of their opponents.36 
There are two related arguments posed so far in this chapter. The first is that the colonial 
context provides a few alternatives for resistance, and the one that is most likely is the 
                                                 
35 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 168. 
36 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 336. 
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emulation of the West to resist the West, or what I call the “appropriation of the West”. 
The second is that this appropriation has created a sort of hybridity in the characters of 
the colonised, and that this disturbs the colonial system.  
 Referring to Scott’s arguments and learning from the story of colonialism in the 
Buru Tetralogy, there are at least four reasons why the world of the Dutch Indies 
managed to avoid violence as its main mode of anti-colonial resistance and make the 
appropriation of the West the most likely form. The first reason is that the colonial Dutch 
did not totally exploit the colonised. The Ethical Policies introduced by the Dutch social 
democrats in the archipelago had opened up possibilities for social mobility. Wider 
opportunities for a modern education meant that there were still chances to climb the 
colonial ladder. 
 The second reason is related to various forms of exploitation in the colonial Dutch 
Indies. The Europeans often ruled over the indigenous people through indigenous elites. 
The additional presence of Chinese and Arabs in the colonial situation manages to act as 
a buffer against a solely targeted resistance on the Dutch. The third reason is related to 
the opportunity to move out of one area to another and find a new livelihood. For 
indigenous elites, the chance to leave for the Netherlands was always open, provided that 
they could afford the sea passage. For others, the internal migration program within the 
territory of the Dutch Indies was provided as a part of Ethical Policies. 
 The fourth reason is the fear of repression of the colonial apparatus. The 
hegemony of the Dutch Indies administration, both in ideational and material senses, acts 
as a deterrent for the colonised to wage open confrontation. And I focus on this fourth 
reason to explain why the colonial context left the colonised with appropriation of the 
West as the only available alternative for resistance.  
Open confrontation with a colonial power means facing the colonial army and its 
weaponry. While the imminent danger to one’s survival of doing this is clear, the 
Gramscian sense of Dutch hegemony means that the colonised are also limited in their 
imagination of possible modes of resistance. Just as the peasants in Scott’s work “do not 
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simply vacillate between blind submission and homicidal rage”,37 so do the colonised in 
the Buru Tetralogy opt for everyday forms of resistance through the appropriation of the 
West. Colonialism does show its most dominating grip in its act of colonising the mind of 
the colonised,38 but in doing this it has provided them with a weapon to challenge it.39 At 
first glance, the fact that appropriation as the only available mode of resistance might 
look like a weakness on the part of the indigenous population but as we will see below, 
appropriation creates hybrids that serve as a strong disturbance to the whole colonial 
discourse. 
The colonised might have been tempted at some stage of their resistance to look 
for the pure or original national culture on which they could base their struggle but upon 
finding out that the colonial situation has transformed the so-called national culture into 
what Fanon called a state of rigid and petrified atrophy,40 they are left with no choice but 
to abandon the dream of a nativistic revival. They are now faced with the question of 
what “type of social relations they will establish and their idea of the future of 
humanity”.41 It is naïve to expect the colonised to be content with the colonial situation, 
but it is equally difficult to imagine that they would jettison the West in their search for 
humanity. 
 Moreover, it is not Darsam’s machetes that makes Maurits Mellema tremble in 
front of an indigenous mistress and a brown-skinned Javanese man, but the reference to 
European ideals of justice, equality, and compassion. It is not the image of an irrational 
indigenous person that shocks Maurits Mellema; it is the inculcation of the West within 
the colonised that speaks to his conscience. Since the West has always been simplistic in 
its treatment of the lethargic and ignorant indigene, the presence of Westernised 
indigenous people who are aware of the plight of their people wakes it up from its 
comfortable colonial slumber. When the Westernised indigenous people surface to show 
how they do not fit the categorisation within “the colonial sanctuary” (JL, 579), the West 
is forced to reconstruct that colonial situation.  
                                                 
37 Ibid., 304. 
38 Couze Venn, “Altered States: Post-Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism and Transmodern Societies,” Theory 
Culture Society 19 (2002): 68. 
39 Gyan Prakash, “Orientalism Now,” History and Theory 34, no. 3 (1995): 205-6. 
40 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, 172. 
41 Ibid., 169. 
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 A new bureau thus had to be established within the colonial administration to deal 
with the symptoms of this appropriation of the West by the colonised. This bureau is 
charged with the task of creating a new and neater understanding of the colonial situation 
inside a rumah kaca (“house of glass”). It is this fourth novel in the Tetralogy that gives 
us a portrait of how the colonial government is disturbed by the presence of the colonial 
hybrids as the products of the appropriation of the West with their “irresolvable” and 
“borderline” culture whose identity can only be understood as a “disjunctive temporality” 
of “cultural displacement”.42 
 Unlike the previous three novels, the voice in Rumah Kaca is not of Minke but 
Jacques Pangemanann, a colonial agent assigned to this newly established bureau. His 
background as a Christian native – adopted by French parents, educated at the Sorbonne, 
married to a French woman, and his choice to come back to the Dutch Indies upon the 
completion of his studies speaks further of the multi-coloured situation in the colonial 
world. His soul, torn between the European ideals in which he has been educated and the 
colonial reality in which he finds himself, tells a story of ambivalence within the colonial 
system. 
 Rumah Kaca is Pangemanann’s way of apologising to Minke, of whose exile he 
had approved. It is a story of his haplessness in the face of the colonial system, and his 
role in mending the fissures in the colonial discourse in the face of the West-
appropriators. The ambivalence between his support for European ideals and the reality 
of his job is clear in his comments regarding the activities of Minke. 
Firstly: Minke’s activities are not illegal. There is no law that can stop his activities, neither the 
colonial law nor the law of the Netherlands. But every movement in the Dutch Indies that can 
lead to the concentration of power will always be a danger to colonial administration. … 
Secondly: Minke’s activities are natural for any indigene in any colony, even more so for those 
who have been introduced to European knowledge and science. His acts are the logical 
consequence of knowledge and science. He is the bearer of new elements in the life of the 
indigenous people, the reflection of the awareness of European knowledge. The fruits of 
European education and teaching in any colony will be the same: trouble for the colonial 
administration. … 
                                                 
42 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 322. 
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The shock comes when I have to face the fact that I have come to a conclusion: Minke with his 
[Syarikat Dagang Islam] moves too fast and unpredictably. This sort of concentration of power is 
a sword of [Damocles]. This is a kind of situation that will have to be confronted beyond the law. 
(RK, 14-15) 
 The only way to deal with these activities is through extra-legal procedures 
because the colonial Dutch do not intend to have their laws used to betray their own 
ideals. Moreover, legal channels will not be able to stop those bent on appropriation since 
their activities are conducted in accordance with the colonial law. In its efforts to keep the 
Dutch East Indies in a stable colonial structure (RK, 101), Minke must be sent into exile. 
 But his exile does not stop the development of modern journalism and 
organisation among the indigenous people. On the contrary, the publication of 
newspapers and magazines flourish, as well as modern organisations. (RK, 352, 471) 
Arranging them in a house of glass has become more and more difficult. Syarikat Dagang 
Islam does not die with Minke out of the picture. Its reduced reliance on individual 
factors, for Pangemanann, marks the sign of a modern organisation among the 
population. (RK, 217) 
 Unlike previous groupings among the indigenous people in their fight against 
colonialism, modern organisations depend not on violence but on the “mouth and pen” in 
their effort to create a nation out of the Dutch Indies. (RK, 512) Violence might have 
worked for traditional resistance, such as the one applied to fight Pitung, the leader of a 
violent indigenous rebel group around Batavia, and his men (RK, 73), but it would be 
inappropriate to use it to deal with legal organisations.  
 New colonial categorisations are needed for these modern organisations. In the 
colonial mindset, there are only two kinds of organisations: those that are dangerous and 
those that are tame. The dangerous kinds are ideologically opposed to the perpetuation of 
Dutch power over the archipelago and able to speak in the language of the masses. 
Syarikat Dagang Islam used to be a danger for the colonial Dutch in its ability to relate to 
the needs of its members and its anti-colonial policies. It used to be dangerous precisely 
because of its embodiment of the West in the interests of the colonised, a form of 
hybridity that challenges the existence of the colonial system. 
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 Boedi Moeljo attracts a large number of members from the Javanese community, 
but it is cooperative in its approach on the colonial Dutch. (RK, 459-60) Indische Partij, 
with its goal of overturning the dominance of the Whites and their descendants, and 
which later renamed itself Insulinde, is considered arrogant and unable to interact with 
the indigenous majority. (RK, 243) For this sort of organisation, the colonial 
administration reacts either by spoiling its leaders with colonial privileges or by simply 
ignoring them. (RK, 626, 221) 
 For Syarikat Dagang Islam, it is a totally different story. Its leader has to be exiled 
and its image marred (RK, 221) while a new leader who is sympathetic to the colonial 
cause is elected. (RK, 224) Pangemanann is fascinated with the achievement of 
hybridised indigenous people, as can been in his comments on Minke’s so-called spiritual 
pupil, Wardi, and on Nyai Ontosoroh. 
I cannot imagine in the future the result of European influence in its both constructive and 
destructive capacity. A village boy, after only a few years of living with an educated indigenous 
man, has been able to absorb European ways of writing, and then challenge Europe. He never 
once mentioned [mythical stories surrounding the Javanese] world that are filled with tales of 
ghosts and demons. He only talks about his writing and his activities. What will happen in the 
next quarter of a century, if European education and human contacts become more widespread, 
and transportation networks become denser, eliminating distances and gaps between the 
indigenous people? 
That writing also reminds me of Minke’s texts on Nyai Ontosoroh, a pure Javanese girl who was 
illiterate. For more than ten years she had been a mistress [of a Dutch man], was then able to 
control a big company with European methods, and then according to this text, chose French 
citizenship, instead of being a citizen of the Dutch Indies with no legal certainty. Consciously! 
Not just because she was married to Jean Marais. (RK, 341) 
He had this to say about Minke: 
A Javanese who has rid himself of Javanism can mean nothing but a man who has understood 
the world of Javanese illusions and abandoned them. He’d prefer to face the world as it is and 
accept it and develop it as it is. A Javanese who is no longer Javanistic is nothing other than a 
revolutionary in my lifetime. … (RK, 549)  
Pangemanann’s fascination, however, only seems to be founded on the individual level 
and not on the mass level. On his success in taming most anti-colonial organisations in 
the Dutch Indies, this colonial agent brags, 
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[Semaoen]43 believes too much in the effectiveness of Europe’s teachings. He never saw…that 
the indigenous people are not Europeans, who are always well organised. The people here are in 
darkness, caught up in their own thoughts, so that everything European thrown at them will 
create new chaos and internal conflicts. (RK, 611) 
 The appropriation of the West seems to be on the verge of losing the colonial 
battle, with the hybrids either exiled or unable to convey their anti-colonial messages to 
the masses. For a period of time they manage to send the colonial Dutch into a spasmodic 
state, but a ‘spasm’ only lasts for a short period of time. The colonial power seems to 
recover soon after. Through the establishment of a bureau of which Pangemanann is a 
staff, the colonial government manages to once again tame indigenous resistance and 
recover from the shock caused by Western-minded indigenous population, or a hybrid, of 
which Minke is one. 
Let us consider two possible sorts of spasms wrought upon the colonial system, 
first by the indigenes’ rejection of the West – and, second, by the hybridity the 
appropriation creates. I will argue that each spasm has its unique source and impact on 
the colonial system. While the first spasm makes the colonial system tremble out of fear 
and fascination, the spasm coming from the appearance of hybridity devastates the 
survival of colonial categories. 
An example of the act of rejection by indigenous people of anything Western is 
the story of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the leader the Haitian revolution for independence 
and the source of myth in the minds of Haitians. Once a slave of a White Frenchman, 
Dessalines fought the White army to create a Haiti that is for the “blacks” only, the word 
referring to the Negroes and other people who are sympathetic to their fight. In covering 
his body with magic talismans and surrounding himself with sorcerers and magicians, he 
defied any notion of Western rationality. His hatred for the Whites and the exploitation 
they represent is widely known. The idea of the Black supremacy that he espoused made 
him a national hero and his life story became part of voodoo history, one where “purity 
                                                 
43 Semaun is one of the young Indonesian intellectuals in the story who was to become the leader of the 
Indonesian Communist Party. But Pangemanann’s general assessment in this sentence refers not only to 
Semaun but to educated indigenous people in general. 
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and defilement became mutually adaptable” and is used to “destroy the illusions of 
mastery, circumventing and confounding any master narrative”.44 
The history of Dessalines within the Haitian anti-colonial counter-narrative is an 
act of total rejection of the West as the standard by which the “Other” is to be assessed. 
In Dessalines’ story of resistance, the Whites and their narratives would be subject to the 
Blacks. The tremor that Dessalines brought to the colonial system came from his 
obsession with the abolition of the Whites, in both their discursive and bodily presence, 
and the inauguration of the Blacks as the new master of the land. The White/Black racial 
dichotomy no longer corresponds to Good/Bad dualism where the White is associated 
with the good and vice versa. The Dessalinian dichotomy is where Black equals Good as 
opposed to White equals Bad. 
The first spasm for the colonial system comes with the realisation of its 
categorisation of humans into Self and Other, Civil and Savage. The colonial 
compartmentalisation of races is created with the imagination of the “Other” as 
everything that is in contrast to the Self. However, when the imagination comes to life, 
when the cannibals actually do what they are supposed to do, it turns into a nightmare – 
although not without some fascination on the part of the colonial system.45 This is a sort 
of fascination that arrives as one’s dream (or nightmare) comes true. The second spasm 
for the colonial system, however, does not share the same source. It disturbs the colonial 
structure by refusing to give in to the dichotomy of West and East, and therefore by 
rejecting the identification of one’s character based on one’s skin colour. 
The appropriation of the West in Pramoedya’s tetralogy starts with the dissection 
of the West into its various parts: values, methods, and its colonial tendency. By firstly 
identifying the aspects of the West that are worthy of appropriation, the tetralogy then 
finds them also in the East, especially in Java.46 At this stage the demystification of the 
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(Emphasis in original) 
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46 Keith Foulcher, “”Bumi Manusia and “Anak Semua Bangsa”: Pramoedya Ananta Toer Enters the 
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West is intensifying. The identification of the colonial characteristics of both white and 
brown skins completes the process. The dichotomy is no longer between the West and the 
East, but between the coloniser and the colonised.  
If Westernisation is parallel to modernisation, it is tempting to see hybridity as 
multiple modernities, a notion of how the project of modernity does not only give way to 
different interpretations of its “core transcendental visions and basic ontological 
conceptions” but also to “the possibility of multiple visions that could, in fact, be 
contested”.47 The erosion of the East/West dichotomy as a result of appropriation of the 
West by the East also implies that the compartmentalisation of the modern against the 
traditional be abandoned. To refer to the notion of “multiple modernities” when one 
speaks of hybridity, however, becomes counter-productive because the hybrids are 
simply an entity desiring to be neither exoticised nor modernised; they refuse to play the 
colonial game. In the eyes of the hybrid, both exoticisation and modernisation are 
authoritarian in their attempt to lock people into neat displays in colonial museums where 
purity is the prime target, even if this display is cloaked in the rhetoric of safeguarding 
tradition.48 In other words, hybridity refuses rigid categorisation of identity and opts for 
an ever evolving one.  
Moreover, exociticisation is entailed in the modernity project itself. According to 
Arnason, modernity is torn between “two equally basic cultural premises: on the one 
hand, the vision of infinitely expanding rational mastery; on the other hand, the 
individual and collective aspiration to autonomy and creativity”.49 Therefore, even 
though “colonialism … has been a necessary condition of possibility for the initiation of 
the project of homogenization and transformation of cultures to produce a cosmopolitan 
culture”,50 it desperately needs the East to retain its “orientalness” in order to justify 
colonisers’ civilising mission, as well as to be faithful to the idea of pluralism in 
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modernity. Colonialism needs to walk between the universal and the plural aspects of 
modernity. It needs them both in sustaining its exploitation, either materially or morally. 
The fate of the colonial system hangs on the essentialisation of identities, either 
traditional or modern but not in-between; the hybrids are forever a menace to its 
assignment of identities among the colonised. 
 
5.5 Concluding Comments: Appropriation as a Story of Failure? 
The appropriation by non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns of the 
original Western modern civilization societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, 
and reformulation of these imported ideas. These brought about continual innovation, with new 
cultural and political programs emerging, exhibiting novel ideologies and institutional patterns. 
The cultural and institutional programs that unfolded in these societies were characterized 
particularly by a tension between conceptions of themselves as part of the modern world and 
ambivalent attitudes toward modernity in general and toward the West in particular.51 
Minke: I did not realise that I was bare-footed. (JL: 721) 
At the end of Jejak Langkah, our non-White Orientalist Jacques Pangemanann forces 
Minke to leave his house immediately for exile. Minke is given no time to write a letter to 
his wife explaining his situation. He can only send his message through his housemaid. 
Being rushed, he does not even realise that he has left his house bare-footed – as neither a 
Westerner nor a Javanese aristocrat. 
 The Buru Tetralogy can be read as a story of failure, a failure of the East’s 
appropriation efforts because the West would do anything to send the East back to its 
place within the colonial dualism. With its power, the colonial power strips Minke of his 
shoes, having to return from his exile wearing his selop, before passing away in Batavia 
without proper acknowledgement as the founder of the first modern indigenous 
organisation in the Dutch Indies, Syarikat Dagang Islam.  
Before being stripped of his shoes, however, Minke has witnessed his first wife 
Annelis taken from his side to die in the Netherlands. His second wife, Ang San Mei, dies 
of hepatitis. His third wife is never allowed to return to her husband. Each of his wives 
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inspires him to see how the East could steal the West but Minke is not permitted to keep a 
reminder of how he can find the West in the East. Approaching the end of the third book 
of the Tetralogy, Minke finds out that he is sterile. (JL, 590) 
Has the East lost the battle?  
Not only did the West refuse to award the East with a part of itself, the East 
showed its capacity of catching West’s colonial disease. In the treatment of the Papuans, 
for example, consecutive political regimes in Indonesia have behaved like a colonial 
power. Just as the West did to the East, so have various Indonesian administrations 
forcefully incorporated West Papua into its territory, its people into a homogenising 
culture, and its resources into the wealth of the imagined communities called 
“Indonesia”.52 With respect to Japan, between the early twentieth century and the end of 
World War II, it intensely used anti-colonial rhetoric to gather domestic support for its 
colonial expansion abroad.53 
But does the East have another option? 
I have mentioned in early section of this chapter that there are three possibilities 
for the East to respond to the colonial system: submission, rejection, and appropriation. 
While total rejection of the West is possible, by so doing the East only perpetuates the 
patronising dualism created by the West. In denying itself the possibility of emulating the 
West to fight the West, it allows the West to define it, to speak for it, and therefore to 
mute it. 
By appropriating the West, the East refuses to be defined by the West. It learns 
from the West but does not succumb to it. By appropriating the West, the East wipes off 
the mythicial ambience surrounding the West in order to see the West as it really is. 
Moreover, in Minke’s situation where the East has been acquainted with the West, the 
East does not possess the luxury of imagining things beyond the West. Appropriation is a 
way of accepting the superiority of the West in order to change the balance. The hybridity 
created out of the act of appropriation is the only response from the colonised to really 
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disturb the West because hybridity defies the colonial categorisation of the man and the 
savage, the colonial fantasy of the inextricable fusion between the biological and the 
cultural.54 
With respect to the questions of whether the East has lost the battle or whether it 
has another choice other than appropriating the West, my answer is, firstly, no: the East 
has not lost the battle because the idea of hybridity allows it to see the contemporary 
world as “a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural 
programs”.55 There are many pieces of the West to be appropriated and appraised by the 
East that make what seems to be a failure looks just like the result of an experiment. 
Secondly, if we are to assume that societies are in constant contact with each other, we 
have to say, no, the East has no other option but to steal from the West, and vice versa. 
The East will thus be influenced by the West and it will certainly influence the West. For 
example, as India’s modern democracy is a product of “the encounter between Western 
modernity and the cultural traditions and historical experiences of these societies”, the 
idea of modernity itself is evolving as a result of various encounters between different 
societies.56 
Thus the West is always open for dissection and selection as long as one is willing 
to see beyond the rigid distinction in opposition to the East. The East, in its contact with 
the West, chooses the most appropriate aspects of the West for appropriation. Minke 
steals from the West in his effort to resurrect the long interred humanity of the indigenous 
people of the Dutch Indies. The story of Minke’s life is one about overcoming the 
narrative of victimhood and coming up with a “creative and powerful opposition to the 
powerful”,57 even when it means engaging the (powerful) West and its narratives.  
In this story, we can see that Minke faces a crisis situation with regard to his 
familiar field and the way he responds to the crisis. To return to our analysis of the 
present-day Muhammadiyah, the organisation’s members are also facing a crisis with 
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respect to the presence of a perceived strong “Other”. In the next two chapters I will draw 
a comparison between the situation of crisis that Minke perceives with the situation faced 
by members of Muhammadiyah, along with the comparison between Minke’s response to 
the crisis and those of the proponents of both the status quo and reform. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE STATUS QUO CAMP’S PERCEPTION OF THE WEST 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed what hybridity means with regard to the story of 
Minke, the protagonist in the Buru Quartet, and explained how hybridity defies the 
dichotomy of resistance and dominance. For both the colonial power and the indigenes of 
the Dutch Indies, hybridity can be an indication of either dominance or resistance, of 
either emulation or opposition, and of mimicry in its capacity both to revere and to 
deprecate. In this chapter and the next, I will use this type of resistance, the one that I 
refer to as “the appropriation of the West”, to examine what is happening to the present-
day Muhammadiyah. Against this typology, I will measure how Muhammadiyah’s 
members deal with the presence of what they refer to as the West.  
 In this dissertation I use two typologies in categorising the perceptions of 
Muhammadiyah’s members: those supporting the status quo and those supporting reform. 
I define the proponents of the status quo as Muhammadiyah’s members who associate the 
presence of Western influence with a crisis within their organisation. This presence is 
perceived to be dangerous and should thus be scrutinised. For these supporters, Western 
influence is not to be emulated unconditionally and should be subjected to what they 
understand to be the right Islamic perspective. This response from the proponents of the 
status quo camp is an example of what Bourdieu refers to as “hysteria of habitus”, a 
condition where social agents are unable to look at the changing world without 
employing the lens of their old, familiar habitus.1 
 I define the proponents of the reform camp as having the opposite characteristics 
from those of the status quo. Firstly, the supporters of the reform camp are those who see 
the crisis that Muhammadiyah is currently facing as coming from globalisation; and as 
globalisation occurs in all parts of the world, it affects Muslim as well as Western 
societies. Secondly, the supporters of the reform camp are those who believe that in order 
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to find a solution to the crisis, or to mitigate its effects, Muslims should be willing to 
engage with various perspectives, including Western ones. In this regard, the supporters 
of the reform camp address their “hysteria of habitus” and envision a “margin of 
freedom”2 which allows them to imagine reform projects that will help Muhammadiyah 
deal with a crisis situation. 
This chapter will elaborate the status quo’s view of the West while the next 
chapter will deal with the view of the reform projects. In each chapter I will, firstly, look 
at various images that each camp has with regard to the West. I will then analyse these 
images by reflecting them to the practice of appropriation as explained in the previous 
chapter and note their differences from Minke’s images of Europe. 
 From the particular way each camp views the West, I would argue that each has 
developed its own unique sense of crisis. My analysis will continue by looking at the 
particular sense of crisis that belongs to each camp and how each sense of crisis relates to 
a unique perception of change in their field. As we have seen, I define the term “field” in 
this dissertation as the world in which social agents live. It is therefore a bounded and 
contextual term with boundaries that depend on the extent to which social agents are able 
and willing to limit the scope of their environment. By so doing, I maintain this 
discussion’s association with Bourdieusian sociology. 
My main conclusion in both Chapters Six and Seven is that while the proponents 
of the status quo see the crisis of Muhammadiyah as defined by the penetration of 
Western worldviews into the minds of the organisation’s members, the proponents of 
reform projects see the crisis that Muhammadiyah is currently facing as caused by 
globalisation – with both the East and the West as its victims. It is, in other words, a 
global crisis. These different senses of crisis then contribute to each camp’s insistence on, 
respectively, the importance of maintaining the status quo or of conducting reform, as 
was explained in Chapters Three and Four. 
 Before comparing the images of the West that the status quo and reform camps 
have at the end of Chapter Seven, I begin my analysis with the status quo’s perceptions of 
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the West and how they are deeply associated with their understanding to be a crisis facing 
Muslims in general and Muhammadiyah’s members in particular. 
 
6.1 The (Un)Democratic West 
I will start this section with Dahrendorf’s definition of democracy and use it to 
understand how the supporters of the status quo camp in Muhammadiyah view 
democracy both in Western countries and in Indonesia. I choose Dahrendorf’s definitions 
of democracy because I find them, especially his insistence on the malleability of 
democracy, relevant to the discussion of democracy among the supporters of the status 
quo camp. 
In his 1980 article on the seeming ungovernability of democracies, Ralf 
Dahrendorf contrasts effectiveness and legitimacy in democratic governments.3 In his 
view, democracy is a system that provides legitimacy to governments, and not necessarily 
effectiveness. With regards to legitimacy, governments need it for two reasons. The first 
is to satisfy their citizens’ need of general moral imperatives, such as respect for human 
rights. The second reason is more local. Governments need to be considered as the 
embodiment of values that are local in nature and particular to the group of people they 
govern. For Dahrendorf, democracy as a method of establishing governments satisfies the 
second, local, reason due to the variety of ways that a democracy can be implemented. In 
this article, Dahrendorf perceives democracy as a general tool that needs to be 
particularised according to local context before it can be implemented. 
 In a later article, Dahrendorf defines democracy as “an ensemble of institutions 
aimed at giving legitimacy to the exercise of political power by providing a coherent 
response to three key questions”.4 Those three questions are: how can we achieve change 
in our society without violence; how can we, through a system of checks and balances, 
control those who are in power in a way that gives us assurance that they will not abuse 
it; and how can citizens have a voice in the exercise of power? If these three questions are 
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 161
restated respectively as the right to a peaceful life, the right to equal treatment in the face 
of law, and the right to political involvement, democracy can be seen, by referring to 
Dahrendorf’s two functions of democratic legitimacy above, as a tool to bring legitimacy 
to government on the general level. 
In these two articles, Dahrendorf only refers to democracy in the Western world. 
His general definition of democracy, however, can also be used to assess the situation of 
democracy in the non-Western world. With regard to the relations between the Western 
world and democracy, for example, the proponents of the status quo acknowledge that the 
West as a civilisation did manage to formalise a form of government that we can now call 
democracy, which is distinct from other political systems. The basic idea of democracy, 
however, does not belong only to the West. According to the chairman of Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Saleh Daulay, Islam, in its insistence that 
Muslims practice shura (public deliberation) as a method to reach decisions on public 
matters, contains in itself the spirit of democracy. For him, Islam is compatible with 
democracy.5 
 On the relation between democracy and Islam, Robert Hefner points at two 
perspectives in Western discourse. The first perspective sees that there is no resonance 
between democracy and civil liberty anywhere in Islam.6 This thought dominated 
Western political thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. The second perspective sees that the 
success of democratisation efforts in any Muslim population will depend significantly on 
local resources and how, by using these resources, people approach their social and 
political organisations.7 There are three implications to this second perspective: first, 
Muslim societies must not be viewed as monolithic and that each society’s response to 
democracy must be analysed in its own terms. Second, an interaction between local and 
global aspects plays an important party in determining the form the relation between 
Islam and democracy takes. Thirdly, democracy is more than just parliament and general 
elections. It also involves people’s culture and perspective of society and politics. The 
third and last implication resonates well with Daulay’s opinion on democracy, for Daulay 
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sees democracy as a term coined by Western civilisation to refer to a certain mode of 
government. This particular mode of government, therefore, may not belong only to the 
West. 
 This viewpoint is also shared by Pasha and Darban, members of Muhammadiyah 
from Yogyakarta, who assert that “Islam teaches the use of the principles of democracy 
in government”.8 For them, this assertion does not come only from Muslims but also 
from Western observers of Islam. With respect to Dahrendorf’s three functions of 
democracy, and from the point of view of the proponents of the status quo, Islam never 
objects to these functions. Throughout the history of Islam, for Pasha and Darban, some 
Muslims rulers are seen to have deviated from the democratic method of governing in 
Islam and therefore led their societies into decadence.9 
 In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, Islam agrees on the basic rules of 
democracy such as public deliberation and public elections. The three functions that 
Dahrendorf defines as the grounds for the establishment of democracy are shared by the 
proponents of the status quo. For these supporters, every society should be allowed to 
determine details of how these three functions will be implemented. Within the status quo 
camp, democracy serves a general guidance for the inclusion of public deliberation in 
political processes. For the proponents of this camp, democracy in its bare form contains 
no ideology and therefore should be implemented contextually. 
Daulay likens democracy to a text that “can be translated and interpreted by 
anyone according to one’s taste and faith”.10 For him, there is no fixed interpretation of 
what democracy should be. Even among Western countries, argues Daulay, one will find 
different practices of democracy. There is no need for the West, therefore, to dictate its 
version of democracy on Indonesia because democracy is a method that can suit various 
perspectives. 
 As each society has its own unique “nature, culture, and history”, Daulay argues 
that Indonesia does not need to imitate an interpretation of democracy that comes from 
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the West. Indonesian democracy, argues Daulay, respects religions. With regard to the 
case of the ban on the Ahmadiyah sect,11 as an example, the West should not see it as a 
result of an undemocratic system. The ban on Ahmadiyah is caused by the sect’s 
persistence in claiming its teachings as Islamic while at the same time bluntly 
acknowledging the presence of another prophet after Muhammad. This teaching of 
Ahmadiyah is an insult to Muslims, so, based on the respect for religions in Indonesian 
democracy as attributed by the proponents of the status quo, it is only natural that 
Indonesian Muslims demand that either the government ban this sect or that it admit to 
the un-Islamic nature of its teachings, stop using the label “Islam”, and create an entirely 
new religion. In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, as the sect refuses to do this, 
it was only imperative for the government to issue the ban. Thus, the banning came out of 
a democratic process. For the supporters of the status quo, this is a democracy, 
Indonesian-style, in its respect for religions.  
In general, the status quo camp believes that respect for religion is considered as 
an indispensable element to the proper functioning of a democracy. A good democracy, 
for one of the proponents of the status quo camp, is based on the fulfilment of three 
conditions on the part of citizens and leaders alike: good morality, consciousness of one’s 
obligation (and not just preoccupation with one’s rights), and the willingness to respect 
opinions different from one’s own. Unless these three conditions are met, democracy is 
not better than any other method of government.12  
 Yet, according to the proponents of the status quo, Western democracy has 
abandoned these three conditions for the sake of majority votes. Because of the trauma 
caused by the hegemony of the Church during the Dark Ages, Western democracy sees 
no need to include morality in the application of democracy.13 As a result, religion is 
separated from politics; it is sent to the private realm and is not allowed to intervene into 
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public matters. Consequently, in the eyes of the supporters of the status quo camp, 
secularism has become such an inseparable part of Western democracy that it is thus 
almost impossible to talk about Western democracy without assuming the presence of 
secularism. 
 And with secularism comes pluralism, which treats every religion on the same 
level and considers each as having the same divine message. The status quo sees 
pluralism as an ideology caused by the softening of the Christians’ religiosity at the dusk 
of religious conflicts in the history of Europe in the seventeenth century. With the 
intention not to repeat the same catastrophe, religions are cast aside, with their claims to 
salvation tamed, if not made entirely irrelevant for public life. 
 Furthermore, for the proponents of the status quo, the West has no intention to 
keep secularism and pluralism to itself. It considers Islam as a religion that is still prone 
to fanaticism, and therefore needs to be domesticated under the discourse of secularism 
and pluralism. In the project of secularism and pluralism conducted by Western-leaning 
Muslims, the West aims at the accomplishment of two goals simultaneously: the 
transformation of Islam in the image of the West and, consequently, an Islam that is 
friendly towards the West.14  
The narcissistic and hegemonic West is what the status quo can discern from what 
it understands as the West’s energetic efforts to transform Islam in Indonesia. Through 
the funding of various non-governmental organisations and think-tanks in Indonesia,15 
the proponents of the status quo camp believe that the West is trying to create an Islam 
that is non-exclusive in its claim to salvation and the one that acknowledges the presence 
of salvation outside Islam.16 A fervent supporter of the status quo camp, Adian Husaini, 
calls this effort “brainwashing”.17 In forcing its perspective on others and disregarding 
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17 Adian Husaini, Islam Liberal, Pluralisme Agama & Diabolisme Intelektual (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 
2005), 133. 
 165
other ways of life, the democratic West is considered undemocratic by the proponents of 
the status quo. 
Unfortunately, by defining Indonesian democracy with regard to the country’s 
respect for religions and by justifying the banning of religious teaching, namely 
Ahmadiyah, on the basis of a democratic argument, the proponents of the status quo have 
allowed no further contestation on the meaning of Indonesian democracy. Indonesian 
democracy, as any other democracy in the world, is an evolving system. This evolution is 
precipitated by the fact that societies change, as do their values and therefore their 
interpretation of democracy. For the proponents of the status quo, however, Indonesian 
democracy never changes in its respect for religions and its consequent prohibition of 
disrespectful acts against religions. Since Ahmadiyah, in their eyes, denies the basic 
teaching of Islam and thus insults the feeling of Muslims, it is only natural that the 
Indonesian government, in the name of Indonesian democracy, bans it. In doing this, it 
can be seen that while accusing the West of forcing its definition of democracy onto 
Muslims, the proponents of the status quo are committing the same mistake by enforcing 
their own definition of Indonesian democracy on their fellow citizens. 
 
6.2 The Christian West 
Secularism and pluralism notwithstanding, the status quo still sees the West as the 
representation of Christianity. There are two reasons why the proponents of this camp 
keep the image of the Christian West. The first is related to the history of contact between 
Christianity and Islam. On a more global level, this contact is epitomised in the image of 
the Crusades. The proponents of the status quo believe that the Crusades were caused 
mainly by the hatred of Christians towards Muslims. Pasha and Darban, for example, 
keep repeating the benign nature of Muslim soldiers during the Crusades as opposed to 
the barbarism of Christian soldiers in their telling of the story of the Crusades.18  
The Crusades, however, are not just past history for the supporters of the status 
quo camp. The recent war on terror by George W. Bush, for the status quo, is a more 
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recent Crusade on the part of the Christian West.19 On the global level, argue Pasha and 
Darban, the Christian West is conducting a war on Muslims on two fronts. The war is 
waged through the penetration of secularist and pluralist thoughts on Muslims’ minds 
while still maintaining the spirit of its Christian Crusades in its physical war on what it 
sees as terrorism. 
On the national level, the Christian West has never stopped its evangelistic efforts 
in Indonesia. The most favoured quote used by the proponents of status quo in 
establishing this notion is an assertion made by former Indonesian foreign minister and a 
scholar on Muhammadiyah, Alwi Shihab, that the main goal for the establishment of 
Muhammadiyah by Ahmad Dahlan was to defend Muslims from the efforts of Christian 
missions. Below is a quote from Shihab’s book as used in an article written by two 
proponents of the status quo: 
The presence of Christian missions, their penetration into this nation and their influence were the 
main factors triggering the emergence of the fiery religious spirit of KH Ahmad Dahlan, which 
eventually drove him to establish Muhammadiyah. The presence and penetration of Christianity 
was first and foremost the result of Dutch colonial efforts in facilitating the spirit of Christian 
missions.20 
It is believed within the status quo camp that ever since the inception of its 
colonial rule in Indonesia, the Dutch had always been supportive of the idea of 
Christianisation of the natives of the archipelago. As part of its colonial mission, 
Christianisation was aimed both at “saving the lost sheep” among the Dutch Indies 
population and at creating loyal Christian subjects who would serve the interest of the 
Dutch Crown.21 It is believed by the supporters of the status quo that Christian missions 
were mostly supported during the administration of Governor General Idenburg from 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 23. 
20 Alwi Shihab, Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Misi Kristen di Indonesia 
sejak November 1912 hingga Masa Kini (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), 195; This paragraph has often 
been quoted to support the status quo’s stance with respect to the relation between Muhammadiyah and 
Christianity. One of these quotations can be found in Arif Wibowo and Mohammad Damami, “Misi Kristen 
melalui Budaya Jawa: Tantangan bagi Muhammadiyah,” in 1 Abad Muhammadiyah, 200. The title of 
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1909 to 1916 with his Kristening Politik program. It was during his rule that Ahmad 
Dahlan established Muhammadiyah.22 
Ahmad Dahlan’s initiative and the establishment of Muhammadiyah should be 
understood as a reaction towards the efforts of Christian missions in the Dutch Indies, 
argue the proponents of the status quo. Reflecting on the seriousness of the situation in 
the Indies, Dahlan is quoted as saying that “even though Islam will never vanish from the 
face of the earth, it is still possible that Islam will be obliterated completely from the face 
of the Dutch Indies”.23 Ahmad Dahlan could not stand idly in the face of this threat to 
Islam. 
For the supporters of the status quo, the Christian West was aware of the potential 
of Islam as an anti-colonial force in the East Indies. From its colonial history, the 
Christian Dutch had learned that the worst threat to its colonial rule had always been the 
natives’ Islamic spirit and that the centre of anti-colonial resistance in the East Indies has 
always been the santri communities,24 due to their religious fervour against what the 
members of these communities saw as oppressive infidels. In the face of that threat, the 
Dutch employed the famous orientalist, Snouck Hurgronje, to advise the colonial 
government on how to weaken this potential. He recommended the “policy of 
association” to deal with this problem. With this policy, the natives would have been 
introduced to and intensively familiarised with Western culture and religion in the hope 
of steering them away from Islam.25 The end result would not necessarily have been the 
abandonment of Islam by the natives; it is always sufficient for the Christian West if the 
indigenous Muslims hesitate about their choice of Islam and their pre-Islamic cultures.26 
In the eyes of the supporters of this camp, even until today, the Christian West still sees 
the opposing binary between Islam and the pre-Islamic associations of Javanese culture 
(budaya Jawa) as a necessity.27 
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24 Pasha and Darban, Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam, 74. 
25 Hidayat et al., Studi Kemuhammadiyahan, 51.  
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 If the first reason to maintain a negative image of the Christian West is to make 
Muslims aware of the on-going efforts of Christianisation of Indonesian Muslims, the 
second reason is that the status quo finds an ally in this image of the Christian West when 
it opposes both secularism and pluralism. For the status quo camp, the Christian West is 
both an enemy and an ally in its fight against efforts to undermine Islam. In arguing 
against pluralism, for example, Pasha and Darban refer not only to the voices among 
Muslims that see in this idea an irreverent tendency towards Islam’s claim to salvation 
but also to the voices among Christians who still insist on its exclusive claim to salvation 
through faith in Jesus Christ.28 What might be considered a sort of “unholy” alliance with 
the Christian West can also be found in the story told within this camp of how the 
Catholic Church had rejected pluralism.29  
In mentioning the above narrative about the tension between the Catholic Church 
and pluralism, Husaini states that it is natural for every religion to have an exclusive 
claim to salvation. Thus, for Pasha and Darban, pluralism as an ideology that undermines 
this exclusive claim is abnormal. There is a part of Western societies that understands this 
argument, namely those Christians with a more extreme leaning. To strengthen this 
argument, Husaini and other proponents of the status quo camp do not hesitate to use the 
opinions of these Christians and establish the “unholy” alliance with this stream of 
Christianity. 
 
6.3 The Permissive West 
For the status quo, the Western worldview is confused about how to properly position 
God and men. In its denial of the existence of ultimate morality, the permissive West has 
put men in a role that is supposed to be given to God. In the words of one of the 
supporters of the status quo, 
Human beings, in the Western worldview, have ultimate freedom. They can rule their own lives 
and obtain the authority to determine for themselves what is good and what is bad. Even God has 
no say in this determining [good and bad].30 
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In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, the Western societies have an 
understanding that human beings’ ultimate freedom can only be reached if they manage 
to overcome the repressive power of social norms, of religion, and of God: only when 
God is made irrelevant in determining the values that human beings hold to be important, 
then human beings can claim their happiness. The source of happiness for Westerners, 
argue the proponents of the status quo, is when they are able to oppose social norms. The 
dichotomy of domination/resistance for the West in its definition of freedom and 
happiness is the source of the status quo’s criticism of the West. The West, for example, 
cannot understand that for some women the acts of dedicating oneself to one’s husband is 
a source of their happiness.31  
 The West and its tendency to consider different roles attributed to different sexes 
as differences in terms of hierarchy is, for the status quo, misguided. The status quo 
employs a qualitative perspective in looking at different roles given to men and women in 
Islam. These roles, its proponents argue, should not be regarded as differences in terms of 
hierarchy, as if those accorded to men are higher than those accorded to women, but 
instead as different roles prescribed with regard to different biological endowments. Two 
supporters of the status quo camp, for example, quote a Muslim woman of the same 
conviction: 
A feminist once told me, “There is not one single verse in the Qur’an that states that only men 
can lead shalat [prayer]. My goal is to persuade women to want to lead prayers and to persuade 
people to accept women as imam [leader] of prayer, even though the prayer is held in a mosque”. 
She added, “I have taught this to my daughter, so that she can be an imam in a shalat among 
men. Otherwise, women will continue to be repressed by men”. I then told her that I did contrary 
to what she did. If my husband were not at home, I taught my son, who was 12 years old then, to 
be an imam in front of me. However, I did not feel even for a bit that my son can oppress me. As 
a matter of fact, my son is even more scared of me than of my husband because I spend more 
time at home. And of course, I have more authority in front of my children than my husband 
does.32 
The roles prescribed to women and men are not meant to give a higher position to 
men compared to women. Islam is fully aware of the nature of women and men. It 
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therefore assigns different roles for each of them. In other words, the roles prescribed by 
Islam to each sex are in accordance to what nature has endowed them. The donning of 
veil for women, as an example for the status quo, is a natural thing to do in order for them 
to “guard their dignity”.33 In terms of marriage, the natural kind is that between a man 
and a woman. Homosexuality is therefore considered as “contradicting one’s nature” 
(“menyalahi kodrat”).34 
 To be moral is to live according to what nature, and consequently Islam, has 
prescribed. Putra and Husaini, for example, argue that the differentiation between gender 
and sex, as suggested by Western feminism, contradicts the existence of nature since 
everything is up for deconstruction in feminism. If everything is a cultural construction, 
they argue, “the limits and roles of being ‘men’ and ‘women’ cease to exist”.35 With this 
extreme viewpoint on the issue of gender, argue the proponents of the status quo, there is 
consequently no need to differentiate men and women any longer. Sexual division of 
labour is made irrelevant and men, as a sex that is considered a leader in human societies, 
cannot automatically assume this role. For the proponents of the status quo, this situation 
means chaos due to the lack of prescribed roles for men and women in society. 
 The status quo sees feminism as an idea that supports an unnatural mode of life 
for human beings, such as the abandonment of a family life and support for abortion and 
free sex.36 Morality, for the proponents of the status quo, means living a family life, 
experiencing sex only within the institution of marriage, and respecting life. This moral 
life is perceived to be under attack by the power of international funding supporting 
programs that aim at deconstructing the concepts of Muslim family and society. One such 
program that receives considerable attention from Putra and Husaini is the Program for 
Gender Equality and Justice within the Ministry for the Empowerment of Women.37 For 
Putra and Husaini, this program aims at incorporating foreign immoral views on marriage 
and society into the fabric of Indonesian society.38 
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6.4 The Scientific West 
Saleh Daulay asserts that God manifests His greatness in two things. The first sign of His 
greatness is what he calls kauniyah, the texts of the Qur’an. The second sign is kauliyah, 
the universe. Since it is the task of Muslims to understand His greatness, they are obliged 
to understand how the universe works as well.  
Muhammadiyah considers that these two signs have an equal importance in showing the 
greatness of Allah. Therefore, the development in science and technology, in social sciences and 
natural sciences, are equally important for expressing the greatness of Allah and serving Him. 
There is no contradiction between religious sciences from those sciences considered as secular. 
That is why for Muhamadiyah, exact sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics, etcetera are also 
the sciences of God.39  
Islam is not against science. For Islam, science provides another way besides 
religion to find the truth of the universe. In fact, in the course of history, Islam has been a 
religion “pregnant with the teachings that encourage the growth of science”.40 The 
decadence of Muslims in the face of the progress of the West was not caused by Islam 
but by the misunderstanding of Islam by most Muslims. It is therefore not unnatural that 
Muslim philosophers such as al-Afghani and Abduh were appreciative towards the 
progress of science in the West, and learned from it. 
 For the proponents of the status quo, the process of learning from the West, 
however, must be conducted selectively. Jamaluddin al-Afghani, an example they pose, 
warned Muslims not to accept the materialism of Western science. According to Pasha 
and Darban, he instead urged Muslims to take Western methods but imbue them with 
Islamic ethics.41 Ahmad Dahlan is the prime example of this selective borrowing from the 
West. In emulating the Western method of modern education, for example, Dahlan was 
careful to take what is good and leave behind its un-Islamic aspects.42 
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 The appropriation of the Western method, in the case of the status quo, should 
then be conducted conditionally. What Muhammadiyah can learn from the West is 
therefore limited to its methods, while it should jettison its values. Even when it comes to 
Western methods, Muhammadiyah should practise caution not to ruin the foundations of 
Islam for the sake of employing a certain Western method. In this light, it is logical to 
expect the proponents of the status quo to be critical of the employment of hermeneutical 
methods for interpreting texts.43 While being appreciative of the Western method of 
natural science, the status quo is critical of its humanities and social sciences due to their 
potential to undermine Islamic values and perspectives. 
 The image of the scientific West, for the status quo, must not bedazzle Muslims 
and make them imitate the West unconditionally. Muslims should be proud that their 
religion is highly supportive of the development of science. Science for Muslims, 
however, is a science that is in accordance to what the Qur’an prescribes. The scientific 
West and its material achievements should be appreciated, but Muslims should know 
better than to learn from it unconditionally. 
 
6.5 The Hegemonic West 
Within those four images of an (un)democratic, Christian, permissive, and scientific 
West, the status quo see examples of ideals and values that should be critiqued by 
Muslims. Except for the image of the Christian West with its exclusive claim to salvation, 
the proponents of the status quo view the West as something that Islam should avoid. As 
long as the West keeps its ideology to itself, the supporters of the status quo see no 
problem. In their eyes, however, the West is unwilling to do this and instead aims at 
exporting its culture to non-Western societies. 
For the proponents of the status quo, this extension of Western influence has 
resulted in a global clash of worldviews. The status quo puts a high emphasis on the idea 
of ghazwul fikri (“clash of worldviews”), an affirmative response to the thesis of the clash 
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of civilisations.44 For Muhammadiyah, argue the proponents of the status quo, the reality 
of the existence of various worldviews makes this clash inevitable. The following quote 
comes from a text book on the study of Muhammadiyah used by undergraduate students 
in various Muhammadiyah universities. The section on ghazwul fikri is part of the last 
chapter of this book on the social roles of Muhammadiyah.  
The image of ghazwul fikri, or clash of civilisations, might be an unpleasant scenario for many 
people, but this image reflects reality. The reality is that human beings are separated into various 
nations and civilisations. Because each civilisation has its own distinctive characteristic, the way 
people who belong to those different civilisations think will be different. If the way people of 
one civilisation think, or their viewpoint or moral values, is imported from or exported to other 
civilisations, it is certain that a chaos would occur within this civilisation. On a social level it will 
create a cultural shock and clash of perspectives. On the individual level it will cause conceptual 
confusion, and on the civilisational level it will cause a clash of civilisations or, to be more exact, 
a clash of worldviews.45 
 On the one hand, the proponents of status quo see the diametrical differences 
between Islamic and Western worldviews explained in the book as an inevitable cause of 
the clash between the two civilisations. In other words, the clash of civilisations is a 
natural thing to happen amidst these differences. According to the book, the Islamic 
worldview is based simultaneously on revelation (as contained in the Qur’an and the 
Hadith), human reasoning, experience and intuition, while that of the West is 
characterised by rationality, speculation, and philosophies. In terms of approach, the 
Islamic worldview uses the principle of tauhid (Islamic understanding of the unity of the 
universe under the rule of one God), while the Western worldview uses a dichotomous 
approach, where materialism is opposed to idealism. The Islamic worldview is depicted 
as emphasising authenticity of revelation and is therefore closed to new interpretations, 
while the Western worldview is open-ended and ever-changing. Islamic worldviews 
contain the elements of the concept of God, the concept of revelation, human beings, 
science, religion, values and morality, while the Western worldview has the elements of 
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religion, morality, philosophy, politics, freedom, equality and individualism. From these 
differences, the proponents of the status quo camp argue that the Islamic worldview puts 
religion as the basis for the entirety of its civilisation, while the Western worldview sees 
religion as only one element, among many, that builds civilisation.46 Considering these 
differences, it is always certain that Islamic and Western worldviews, upon contact with 
each other, will clash. 
 On the other hand, the notion of the clash of civilisations as mainly promoted by 
Samuel Huntington, for the status quo, is a part of the many efforts of the West to repress 
Islam. In this sense, the notion of the clash of civilisations is formulated by the West to 
justify its programs of transforming Islam into a religion that is more Western-friendly. 
One proponent of the status quo says that “the present, rampant, discourse on religious 
pluralism is a new perspective that is produced as a result of the modern West’s cultural 
and intellectual penetration into Islam”.47 For the status quo, the natural clash of 
civilisations has been turned into a legitimation for the West to launch its attack on the 
Islamic worldview. The present clash of civilisation between Islam and the West, 
therefore, is conducted on an uneven playing field.  
The Western worldview is intruding into the Islamic world, but the opposite is not 
happening. The motivating factor for this intrusion is the Western world’s fear of the rise 
of Islam. 
Reality shows that at the end of the twentieth century the Islamic world started to rise and wake 
up from its long sleep. This phenomenon created fear in the Western world. This fear was 
marked by, among others, the view of Huntington that puts Islam as the biggest enemy of 
capitalism after the end of the Cold War.48 
The main goal for the West in the present clash of civilisations is the disunity of Islam:  
To anticipate the rise of the Islamic world, the West started to spread the issue of democracy in 
the form of Islam Liberal [Liberal Islam]. They created all kinds of terms to lure the Islamic 
world into their traps. Purposefully, the West also created a number of dichotomies, such as 
traditional-Islam/modern-Islam, moderate-Islam/fundamentalist-Islam, legalistic-formalistic-
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Islam/normative-substantive-Islam, cultural-Islam/structural-Islam, inclusive-Islam/exclusive-
Islam.49 
 To do this, the West floods the Islamic world with a considerable amount of 
funding.50 This funding is given to various non-governmental organisations and think 
tanks that are willing to accommodate the agenda of the West in creating a friendlier 
Islam. In Muhammadiyah, one of the funding sources that intruded into it came from The 
Asia Foundation for the publication of Jurnal Tanwir (“The Journal of Enlightenment”) 
by Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban (“The Centre for the Study of Religion and 
Civilisation”).51 The dominance of Liberal Islam over the true Islam is the goal of this 
funding: 
Therefore it is fair to say that the problem of the Liberal Islam is rooted in the idea of Western 
democracy. Other thoughts as its derivates are obviously based on this concept of democracy, 
such as the prescriptions for the separation of religion from the state, for women’s rights to 
political leadership and power, for freedom in the interpretation of religious texts, for freedom of 
thoughts and opinions, for religious tolerance, dialogue, and inclusivity, for pluralism, for 
religious democracy, etcetera.52 
For the proponents of the status quo, Western societies have used democracy to an extent 
that it is no longer just a general tool of governance but an ideology that supports the 
eradication of religions from public life and the permissiveness of human beings. It is this 
ideological democracy, argue the proponents of the status quo, which the West is keenly 
spreading towards non-Western societies, particularly the Muslim ones. 
 The status quo, moreover, does not expect the West to be consistent in dealing 
with Islam. On the one hand, the West tries to deconstruct Muslims’ morality in order to 
follow the precepts of the West.53 On the other hand, the West is setting double standards 
in dealing with Muslims. Ever since colonial times, 
every feeling and aspiration of Muslims has been insulted and misrepresented by the Christians. 
What the Europeans call ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ in their own countries, if it is found in the 
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East, it is dubbed “fanaticism”. And what is called ‘pride’, ‘honour’ and ‘national glory’, is 
dubbed ‘chauvinism’ if it is found in the East.54 
The Western efforts in transforming Islam are, for the status quo, both interventionist and 
hypocritical. 
 
6.6 Concluding Comments: Status Quo’s Crisis of the Field  
This hypocrisy of which the status quo accuses the West is to an extent comparable to 
what Minke experiences when he is faced with the discrepancy between Western ideals 
and the reality of the Dutch rule in the East Indies. Minke’s uneasiness comes after he 
sees that the West that he admires has contradicted its own ideals when dealing with the 
indigenous people. The comparable similarity between Minke and Muhammadiyah’s 
status quo, however, stops at this allegation of hypocrisy. 
 While Minke sees the hypocrisy of the West in terms of its universal ideas of 
freedom and justice, the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah see this 
hypocrisy in terms of the particularistic elements of Western culture: of nationalism and 
patriotism. While Minke urges the West to be true to these universal ideas in dealing with 
the indigenous people, Muhammadiyah’s status quo longs for a West that acknowledges 
its own particularity as it also appreciates the particularity of others. What is worthy of 
being universalised by the West, for the status quo, is the appreciation of the 
particularism of each civilisation, starting with its own. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
among the various images the status quo has of the West, the only one that it can 
positively relate to is the image of the Christian West with its exclusive claim to salvation 
through its faith in Jesus Christ. 
 On another note, the act of appropriation prescribed in the story of Minke is 
different from the appropriation by the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah. 
For Minke, the East can emulate the West in terms of both methods and values. Minke’s 
appropriation is extensive, while the appropriation by the proponents of the status quo is 
minimal. Islam, for them, can only benefit by emulating Western methods, not its values. 
In terms of methods, nevertheless, Muslims should be careful not to appropriate any 
                                                 
54 Pasha and Darban, Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam, 73. 
 177
method that will be detrimental to the foundations of Islam. The appropriation of the 
West by the status quo is highly selective. 
 The West, for the proponents of the status quo, needs to understand that what it 
has considered to be universal values are actually particular ones that were the products 
of its specific histories. Its insistence on spreading them is thus misguided for two 
reasons. First, as has been explained, the specificity of its values will not be welcomed by 
people with another set of values. A fiercer clash of civilisations is unavoidable if the 
West keeps pushing its agenda of universalisation. Second, what the West considers as its 
own achievement worthy to be universalised has in fact been achieved by other 
civilisations as well. The basic principle of government by the people in democracy, for 
example, is also recognised in Islam, as well as the principles of science and the 
empowerment of women, among others. The West should understand the possibility of 
qualitative differences between civilisations. Islamic democracy, as well as Islamic 
discourse on scientific progress and Islamic dictates on the role for women, for example, 
does not necessarily coincide with what the West understands. The West, nevertheless, 
needs to appreciate these qualitative differences and let Islam develop on its own course.  
By way of conclusion, the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah 
perceive the crisis in their organisation as stemming from the hegemony of the Western 
worldview over the Islamic worldview. The fear invoked by this sense crisis is caused by 
the perceived intrusion of the Western worldview into the Islamic field. Unlike the story 
of Minke, the enemy for the status quo is neither injustice nor oppression: it is the West 
itself with its hegemonic, universalising, and therefore unjust and oppressive, tendencies.  
With regard to Bourdieu’s sociology, the status quo perceives its familiar field as 
being threatened by the intrusion of Western values. The camp’s supporters see their 
familiar field as being threatened and their field’s boundaries as under threat of being 
destroyed by the presence of Western influence. With the fear of the intrusion of the 
Western worldview into their own, the proponents of the status quo are experiencing an 
uncertainty to the boundaries of their old and familiar field. With respect to this 
experience of uncertainty, Figure 6.1 provides a visual description of the status quo’s 
perceived crisis and the impact of this crisis on their old habitus.  
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Figure 6.1 The Status Quo’s Crisis of the Field 
 
 
The efforts of the West, through the works of highly-funded non-governmental 
organisations, blur the limit of the status quo’s field through the intrusion of the Western 
worldview. The boundaries of the familiar field are therefore no longer firmly 
established. With the intrusion of the Western worldview, the old boundaries are being 
shaken and undermined. In this respect, the proponents of the status quo are experiencing 
what Bourdieu calls “hysteria of habitus”, a term that refers to an inability of social 
agents to adjust their predispositions, as part of their habitus, to the changing field. For 
social agents with hysteria of habitus, the solution for this crisis lies only in the 
consolidation of their old field. The status quo’s fight at the moment is therefore aimed at 
reconsolidating the limits of their old, familiar, field. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE REFORM CAMP’S PERCEPTION OF THE WEST 
 
The West is not necessarily bad. The Middle East is not necessarily good….1 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, we can identify five distinct reform projects in 
Muhammadiyah, which I refer to as the theological, pluralism, socio-economic, cultural, 
and gender projects. In the above quote, Mohammad Shofan, a former lecturer of 
Muhammadiyah University in Gresik who was expelled because of publication of his 
reformist writing in a local newspaper, implies that some ideas on reform in 
Muhammadiyah do come from the West. Contrary to the status quo camp, Shofan sees 
the presence of the West as an invigorating source of energy for a reinterpretation of 
Islam. Reinterpretation, for him, does not mean the abandonment of Islamic practices and 
duties. He asserts that there is no proof that reform projects are transforming Islamic 
practices. In fact, reinterpretation strives to give relevance to Islamic rituals and if, in 
updating the relevance of Islam, the proponents of reform borrow Western methods, this 
should be welcomed and not rejected. The main focus of reinterpretation should be on the 
relevance of Islam, not the origin of the method it employs. Indeed, should the methods 
used in the Middle East for reinterpreting Islam bring irrelevance and not relevance to 
Islam, Muslims should still be critical of that method, even though the Middle East is the 
birth place of Islam. 
 The argument in this chapter is that the proponents of the reform camp in 
Muhammadiyah have a different sense of crisis compared to their status quo counterparts. 
Contrary to the latter, the reform projects do not see the West as an enemy. As a 
civilisational entity, the West has many faces that should be properly understood before 
one can judge its contribution to humanity.  
                                                 
1 Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011. 
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In this respect, reform projects have a set of more diverse images of the West; 
most are positive but there is a negative one as well. The West cannot be easily 
categorised as the enemy of Islam. At best, the West should be considered as one source 
of knowledge, among many, from which Islam can learn.  
 
7.1 The Comrade West 
The supporters of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah see the West as a partner in a 
search for a better world. To give one example, the gender project sees Western feminism 
as its partner in its efforts to empower women and to liberate them from socially 
sanctioned oppression. The current chairwoman of the female wing of Muhammadiyah, 
Aisyiyah, comments, 
I see that there is no contradiction [between Islam and feminism]. Feminism is in tune with the 
values inherent in Islam on how to see women. The real point [of feminism] is the struggle to 
bring about justice for women. This struggle [includes] the removing of oppressive social and 
cultural constructs in order to create a sense of justice for both men and women, as expressed in 
programs of gender mainstreaming…. If we look at feminism from the perspective of Islam, 
there is no problem. Whatever stream of feminism one belongs to, whether radical or otherwise, 
it is only a matter of strategy. Every group, every person, will take note of [their environment] 
and accordingly set the right strategy [for that environment].2 
The goals for both Western feminism and the gender project of the reform camp are one 
and the same: the liberation of women from oppressive social constructs. The West, with 
its specific situation, requires a specific interpretation by feminist movements in order to 
achieve this goal, while specific situations in Islam require a contextual strategy from 
Muslims. 
 For the proponents of the reform camp, the West is not an enemy that should be 
fought. The West is a comrade in a common struggle for the creation of a just world. The 
proponents of this camp see the West as having gone through various changes. In this 
regard, Dzuhayatin, one of the women championing the cause of a gender-sensitive 
Muhammadiyah, regards Christianity, of which Muhammadiyah had been critical during 
the time of the organisation’s inception, as a religion that has gone through the same 
                                                 
2 Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011. 
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struggle that Muhammadiyah finds itself in at the moment. Christianity was confronted 
with secularism and only managed to make peace with it after a long and arduous 
process.3  
The result of this process is Christianity’s stance that secularism must not be seen 
as a threat to religion and that secularism should not be responded to negatively. Yet even 
at present, Christianity’s struggle with secularism in the West cannot be said to have been 
completely resolved. The emergence of militant anti-religious sentiment in some parts of 
Europe is an example of the tasks that the West needs to resolve.4 For the reform projects, 
both Islam and Christianity in the West are in the same boat in their common struggle in 
a changing world.  
The critical attitude of Muhammadiyah towards Christian missions in the early 
twentieth century can no longer be used to justify the organisation’s anti-Christian spirit. 
The emulation of the Dutch method of Christian education and health services by 
Muhammadiyah in its early years should be considered as the organisation’s participation 
in the performance of good deeds. Haedar Nashir, as quoted in an article titled “The 
Pluralis Islamic Face of Muhammdiyah: From a Theology of Praxis to a Theology of 
Pluralism”, comments, 
[Muhammadiyah] opposed Christian missions by emulating what they had done, such as by 
establishing schools, hospitals, and orphanages. At this point I think Muhammadiyah’s resistance 
to Christian missions should be understood not as resistance in a violent sense.5 
In this respect, it is inaccurate to see Muhammadiyah as an anti-Christian movement. 
What Muhammadiyah has done is compete with the Christian West to perform good 
deeds for fellow human beings. Syamsul Arifin, as quoted in an article titled “Post-
Puritanism Muhammadiyah”, goes further by saying that this competition eventually can 
                                                 
3 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan ‘Aku Serahkan Muhammadiyah Padamu’,” in 
Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan, ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin 
(Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), 42. 
4 As an example of this sentiment, Dzuhayatin mentions the case of extreme secular ideology movement in 
France. (Ibid, 43.) 
5 Zuly Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis,” Tanwir 1, 
no. 2 (2003): 22. 
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be considered as a form of cooperation between religious communities in their 
contribution to the creation of “a true brotherhood”.6 
 Moeslim Abdurrahman adds to this debate by asserting that it is of no use to 
worry about Christianisation or Islamisation at the present moment since both conversion 
efforts occur simultaneously. Abdurrahman urges Muhammadiyah’s leaders to 
understand this fact and use their reason to respond to it. He also states that what should 
be the main concern for all humanity at the moment are the negative effects of 
globalisation that not only hurt Muslims: 
It is necessary to understand that the injustice brought by globalisation is happening everywhere, 
not only among Muslims. There are Muslims who are being marginalised, as there are also 
Muslims who are oppressing other people, Muslims who are rich, and Muslims who are hungry. 
The problem is not whether you are a Muslim or non-Muslim; we are all part of human 
civilisation. The unjust process of globalisation, I think, should be transformed collectively – and  
not only for Muslims.7 
 Abdurrahman disagrees with the idea of a “clash of civilisations”. From the above 
quote we can understand that he thinks of civilisation as a general concept comprising 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. As he said in the same interview, “from the start [of the 
idea of a clash of civilisations], I have considered it to be polemical and I do not agree 
with the notion that we can label something as either West or East”. Responding to the 
tendency of the proponents of the status quo to treat this idea as reality, he argues that this 
tendency is caused by the fear that Muslims will lose their Islamic identity in their 
admiration for what they consider as “the West”. More specifically, this fear is based on 
Muhammadiyah’s confusion on where to position Islam in the face of the seemingly 
diminishing relevance of religion in human lives. This fear, for Abdurrahman, will not 
benefit human civilisation. Instead, one has to embrace as many sources of knowledge as 
possible. 
                                                 
6 Hilman Latief, “Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah: Studi Pergulatan Wacana Keagamaan Kaum Muda 
Muhammadiyah 1995-2002,” Tanwir 1, no. 2 (2003): 83. 
7 Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. 
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There are too many windows that need to be looked through and too many wells [whose water] 
needs to be drunk…. If there is too much “self-blocking”…, shutting oneself off [from the 
world], it is as if there were ghosts everywhere.8   
What Abdurrahman means by “self-blocking” in the above quote is the act of consciously 
isolating oneself from the world. Some Muslims isolate themselves because they are 
scared that foreign worldviews might make them lose their faith. Isolation, for 
Abdurrahman, is not the answer. As globalisation is a phenomenon affecting all parts of 
the globe and all human communities, the correct and proportionate response is to invite 
as many people as comrades and as many methods as possible into humanity’s common 
struggle. 
 
7.2 The West as a Teacher 
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, reform projects adopt many thoughts and 
concepts from Western philosophical vocabularies, such as liberalism, pluralism and 
gender, in their arguments for the need of transformation in Muhammadiyah. With 
respect to the importance of learning from Western civilisation, on the one hand, Shofan 
believes that there are many positive aspects from Western culture that can be borrowed 
for the progress of the Islamic world. On the other hand, Abdurrahman reminds us that 
learning from Western culture is as imperative as learning from any other culture in the 
world. The uniqueness of the West, however, lies in the fact that it has dealt earlier with 
those issues presently affecting Islam in general and Muhammadiyah specifically.  
History has shown that many Muslim thinkers have looked to the West when they imagined a 
civilised and progressive community. For example, Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal, the 
founders of Pakistan and modernist Muslim figures par excellence, took the West as the model 
for their political ideas.9 (Emphasis in original) 
What Shofan means by Western-inspired political ideas are no other than the secularism 
in which religions are not allowed to intimidate the lives of human beings. Islam, for 
Shofan, already contains the idea of secularism. The presence of the West that has 
already experienced secularism only sensitises Muslims to secularism in Islam. 
                                                 
8 Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. The term “self-blocking” here comes 
from Abdurrahman. The meaning of this term is close to “self-screening”. 
9 Mohammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: ‘Matinya Pembaruan’ dalam Bingkai ‘Kembali ke al-
Qur’an dan al-Sunnah’,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah, xxvi. 
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Secularism is really about the separation between worldly affairs and religious affairs…and 
Islam teaches this separation. For an example, there is a hadist that says, “work in the world as if 
you will live forever, and serve your God as if you will die tomorrow”. Muslims must not only 
work diligently with regard to worldly affairs, but also imagine that they may die tomorrow so 
that [they] will be sincere in [their] religious practices. This is what most Muslims do not 
understand.10 
 Besides secularism, the West also teaches Islam about liberalism and again 
sensitises Muslims to the potential of a liberal Islam. Shofan has this to say with regard to 
this idea: 
Liberalism emerged as a reaction towards the situation at the time of its birth. Liberalism was 
born from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment…. With regard to Islam, the ideology of 
liberalism is used as a language to represent the “West”, to remind Muslims about the West, and 
to invite Islam to join the liberal, free, and rational world. As a reaction to the situation 
surrounding its birth, Liberal Islam offers an approach that is non-rigid and non-scriptural for 
presenting progressive Islamic ideas. The ideology that it offers starts from an acknowledgement 
of the situation at present.11 
For the proponents of reform projects, the Western Enlightenment has become the 
property of all humanity, including Muslims. The projects are highly appreciative of the 
idea of the Enlightenment. For its proponents, the myth of enlightenment in the history of 
Muhammadiyah as well as any idea of reform in the organisation is similar to the specific 
event of the Enlightenment in Europe a few centuries ago.12  
The difference between the proponents of reform projects and those of the status 
quo is obvious. As explained in the previous chapter, the latter views the birth of 
secularism and pluralism in the history of the West as a defensive reaction to the trauma 
of the church’s totalitarianism, while the proponents of the reform projects see the 
Enlightenment that gave birth to both secularism and pluralism as a positive event. 
Consequently, the proponents of the status quo would like to see the West keep its idea of 
the Enlightenment to itself while those of the reform projects see the universalisation of 
that idea as a good thing. 
 
                                                 
10 Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011. 
11 Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah,” xxix. 
12 Iqbal Hasanuddin, “Kritik dan Utopia: Telaah atas Gagasan M. Dawam Rahardjo,” in Satu Abad 
Muhammadiyah, 57. 
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7.3 The Misguided West 
The reform projects’ admiration of the West, however, does not come unconditionally. In 
this third image of the West, the proponents of the reform projects see that there are some 
negative aspects of the West that need to be addressed. This criticism does not make the 
proponents of the reform projects see the West as their enemy. On the contrary, the 
“disease” from which the West suffers is considered the disease of the whole of humanity 
and therefore needs to be tackled together. Furthermore, these proponents see the West’s 
disease as affecting Islam as well. 
 The first critique from the reform projects is related to colonialism in the West’s 
history. With regard to the Dutch Indies, the presence of colonialism had benefitted the 
efforts of Christian missions in the archipelago and simultaneously marginalising Islam. 
The unfair treatment of Islam under colonialism had planted the seed for anti-Christian 
sentiment in Muhammadiyah. Ahmad Dahlan complained about this colonial bias: 
Muslims can also ask for subsidies for their schools as long as they fulfil the same requirements 
as Christians. However, to establish elementary schools or schools for teachers, conditions are 
set that make it difficult for Muslims to do this…. Our land is the land of Islam but both the 
Catholics and the Protestants are given better opportunity to propagate their religions. They get a 
lot of money, a lot of subsidies. They think of this land as their own.13 
For the proponents of the reform projects, Christianity is not the enemy of Islam. 
Colonialism, as the local context when Muslims had first contact with Christianity in the 
Dutch Indies, is another case. The history of colonialism tainted what could have been a 
harmonious relationship between Muslims and Christians. As a result of this 
entanglement of colonialism and Christianity, the violence and oppression of colonialism 
has also been associated with Christianity whenever the history of Muhammadiyah is 
concerned.14 
 The second critique is directed towards the issue of modernity. Western 
modernity is considered to be neglectful of the question of spiritualism. The proponents 
of the reform camp find in Western modernity the tendency to view religions as a thing of 
                                                 
13 As quoted in Latief, “Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah,” 49. 
14 Abdul Rohim Ghazali, “Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah,” Tanwir 1, no. 2 
(2003): 8. 
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the past and therefore of no relevance to progress, as explained in an article titled “Why 
is Muhammadiyah’s Modernity Put in Doubt?”.15 As a result, Western modernity is 
considered to be misguided while irreligiosity is seen as leading human beings astray. An 
anecdote from a proponent of the reform projects below might explain the projects’ 
assumption of the spiritual aridity of Western modernity: 
As an example, many of those who believe in secularism and have a huge amount of wealth are 
confused about what to do with their wealth as they grow old. It is not rare to find these people 
eventually make a will with detailed instructions of what to do with their funerals and how to use 
their money to take care of their pet dogs until they die.16 
Modernity is also considered to be exclusivist in its claim for the truth. The 
proponents of the reform camp see modernity as “Euro-centric” and mainly concerned 
with the generalisation of the history of humanity in accordance with the standardised 
history of Europe and the Western world in general.17 Dzuhayatin asserts that “there is 
one thing about modernity that is now in need of a review: its exclusive claim to 
validity”.18 Modernity’s truth claim, based on the convergence of the ideas of positivism 
and empiricism,19 is considered by Dzuhayatin to be an ailment that has kept it from 
engaging other points of view. 
This “disease” has also affected Muhammadiyah in its efforts to emulate the 
West. Among the proponents of the reform projects there is doubt about the 
appropriateness of keeping the label “modern” for Muhammadiyah as an organisation. 
There are two factors that underpin this doubt. The first is the perception that at present 
Muhammadiyah is no longer representing Islamic modernity, an identity that has so often 
been attributed to this movement, as explained by Dawam Rahardjo in his article titled 
                                                 
15 M. Saad Ibrahim, “Mengapa Modernitas Muhammadiyah Digugat?” in Menggugat Modernitas 
Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy 
(Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 30. 
16 Muhadjir Effendy, “Membincang Modernisme Muhammadiyah,” in Menggugat Modernitas 
Muhammadiyah, 23. 
17 Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan,” 39. 
18 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. Dzuhayatin is a strong 
supporter for gender reform efforts in Muhammadiyah and is critical towards the label “modern” often 
attached to the organisation. Due to her strong stance with respect to reform efforts in Muhammadiyah, 
Dzuhayatin is often dubbed the “Lioness of Muhammadiyah”. 
19 Ibrahim, “Mengapa Modernitas Muhammadiyah Digugat?” 30. 
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“Revisiting Muhammadiyah as an Islamic Organisation Oriented towards Renewal”.20 If 
modernity is defined as a state of mind that is oriented towards progress, the present 
Muhammadiyah is far from it. The dominance of the pro-status quo viewpoints in 
Muhammadiyah, for Dzuhayatin, has brought stagnation within this organisation.21 In her 
view, Muhammadiyah is not modern.  
Furthermore, the proponents of the reform camp are not certain that it is 
modernity that Muhammadiyah should try to attain. The factor reinforcing this doubt is 
related to the general disease of modernity in its exclusivist claim to the truth. For the 
proponents of the reform projects, this exclusivist claim is not much different from the 
puritan tendency present within Muhammadiyah today. Instead of modernity with its 
right/wrong dichotomy, argues Dzuhayatin, this organisation should assess any opinion in 
terms of what is relevant for Muslims at a certain time and place. Dzuhayatin gives an 
example when she explains her opinion of Amina Wadud, an American feminist Muslim 
famous for her encouragement for Muslim women to lead Islamic prayers, “If I were 
asked if Indonesia should join Amina Wadud in allowing women to be leaders in prayers, 
I would suggest that we firstly consider whether this issue [of allowing women to be 
imam] is relevant for Indonesia.”22 
The third critique of the reform projects of the West is related to what they see as 
its misconception of Islam. With regard to the issue of terrorism particularly, the West 
has often simplified Islam as a religion that promotes terrorism. On the American “War 
on Terror”, Qodir argues that 
the accusation that the 11 September incident was related to Islam as a “religious institution” is 
certainly unacceptable for Muslims. This notion, coming from the United States of America, of 
                                                 
20 M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Mengkaji Ulang Muhammadiyah sebagai Organisasi Islam Berorientasi 
Pembaruan,” in Satu Abad Muhammadiyah, 16. 
21 Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan,” 37. 
22 Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. Dr. Amina Wadud is an American female 
Muslim scholar who has written many works on the status and role of women in Islam. One of her 
assertions is the permissibility of women to become leaders (imam) in a prayer (shalat); see Trisha Sertori, 
“Dr. Amina Wadud: For a Progressive Islam,” The Jakarta Post, November 19, 2009, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/11/19/dr-amina-wadud-for-a-progressive-islam.html.  
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the new chapter of the Crusades (the Second Crusade)23 by George W. Bush is considered a 
“cheap issue” that is aimed at discrediting Islam, even after this notion was corrected.24  
In fact, Qodir continues, Islam is a religion of tolerance, a religion that  
appreciates all human beings regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Islam is a religion that 
loves peace. Islam does not recognise discrimination. As a matter of fact, Islam is a religion that 
defends the weak and the oppressed, and a religion that strives to liberate human beings from 
ignorance and poverty. Therefore, it is unacceptable that Islam is considered a religion that 
spreads terror and does not appreciate pluralism.25 
For supporters of the reform projects, the true Islam respects the same values as 
Western civilisation. The problem lies in the perception of the West towards Islam. Islam 
does not need to change or justify itself to the West. Islam, if practiced truthfully, 
acknowledges the plurality of human beings. What need to be changed are Western 
perceptions of Islam. 
 
7.4 Concluding Comments: Reform’s Crisis of the Field 
Unlike the status quo, the reform projects thus have a more varied set of images of the 
West. In the first two images the West is depicted positively, both as teacher and comrade 
for Islam. As a teacher, the West has much to offer Islam. Learning about the West’s 
Enlightenment might help Islam understand how to cope with the present world. 
Pluralism, secularism, and liberalism as the products of the West’s Enlightenment have 
been worthy insights from which Islam can learn. In the context of Indonesia, where 
plurality is a reality, Muslims should be willing to engage in a dialogue with other 
religious communities on how to construct a social system that would allow each 
community to flourish and consequently contribute to the progress of the nation. For 
reform projects, the set of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism, as understood from the 
Indonesian perspective and contextualised in the spirit of Islam, can provide a way out of 
the religious tension that has marred Indonesia’s post-1998 history. 
                                                 
23 In this quote Qodir generalised eight (or sometimes nine) Crusades focused on Jerusalem during the 
Middle Ages as the First Crusade and the War on Terrorism as the Second Crusade. 
24 Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah,” 13. 
25 Ibid., 13-14. 
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 Also unlike the status quo, the reform projects do not recognise the validity of the 
notion of a clash of civilisations. The proponents of the reform projects indeed use the 
word “West” in expressing their opinions, but the use of this word is intended to show 
that beneficial results can also come from foreign lands and foreign perspectives. By 
using this word, the proponents of the reform projects assert that the West and its 
foreignness are worthy of appropriation by Muslims in their common search for the 
universal good. 
 The comrade West is not different from Islam in its struggle to find what 
constitutes a good life for humanity. For the reform projects, the West and Islam are in a 
common struggle in their search. As Muslims are trying to find their place in a world that 
pays less and less attention to spirituality, the West is facing the same challenge. The 
place of religion in this evolving world is a question that is faced equally by both the 
West and Islam. In this light, we can understand that despite its misperception, the West 
should not be considered an enemy. The misconception of the West is a misconception of 
all humanity. Muslims can learn from these mistakes – as the West is also struggling to 
overcome the effects of these mistakes. 
 In the face of globalisation, the differences between the West and Islam dissolve 
and any faith in the notion of the clash of civilisations is doubtful. Within the ongoing 
process of globalisation and the rolling back of the welfare state system, both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike are affected by the rampant individualisation of risk.26 Moeslim 
Abdurrahman’s work tells us that the effects of globalisation in the form of privatisation 
are not only experienced by the people of the Western world. In this regard, 
Abdurrahman extends the notion of late modernity27 to a non-European terrain28 with its 
trait of individualization of risk as welfare states retreat from the lives of their citizens.29 
At stake in this process of globalisation, argues Abdurrahman, is the relevance of 
community life. 
                                                 
26 Sam Binkley, “Governmentality, Temporality and Practice: From the Individualization of Risk to the 
‘Contradictory Movement of the Soul’,” Time & Society 18, no. 1 (2009): 88. 
27 Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonns, and Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: 
Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme,” Theory Culture Society 20, no. 2 (2003): 7. 
28 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Politik Umat, Politik Pemberdayaan,” in Menggugat Modernitas 
Muhammadiyah, 73. 
29 Binkley, 88. 
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 Compared to the status quo, the reform projects are closer to the appropriation of 
the West as exemplified by the life of Minke. The West at one point is a teacher for the 
reform projects, while at another it makes the latter realise that the universal values 
offered by the West are not its exclusive property. On contact with the West, Muslims 
should derive as many benefits as possible. In this light, I characterise the appropriation 
of the West by the reform projects as extensive. 
 If one would visually depict the differences between the status quo and reform 
projects in terms of their assessment of the worthiness of the West for appropriation, one 
can achieve it with two different diagrams. Figure 7.1 shows how the status quo sees the 
almost diametrical differences between Islam and the West. Intersection between the two 
exists but it is kept to a minimum. The situation with the reform projects is different. This 
camp sees both Islam and the West as identities with indistinct borders. The borders 
between the two are always open for rearrangement. The possibility for intersection 
between the two is wider than the status quo’s and therefore provides ample space for the 
renewal and reinterpretation of Islam. 
The enemy of the reform projects, as Minke also realised, is not the West but 
injustice and oppression. In the Buru Tetralogy, the injustice and oppression that Minke 
faces are the result of the colonial policies of the West. During the time of the proponents 
of the reform projects, these two vices are brought in by a new form of globalisation. 
Poverty, marginalisation, hedonism, consumerism, and socio-economic gaps are some of 
the negative effects of globalisation that both Islam and the West need to address at 
present. 
        Figure 7.1 Status Quo’s Islam vs. West                               Figure 7.2 Reform’s Fluid Identity 
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In terms of Bourdieu’s notions, globalisation has brought the challenge of the 
extension of the field. With this change, it is impossible for Muslims to isolate 
themselves in their old, familiar, field. Similar to the status quo, the reform projects see 
the boundaries of the old field as disintegrating. Contrary to the status quo, however, the 
reform projects see this process not as an intrusion but a necessity to adjust to a new 
globalised condition; the breaking down of the old field’s limit is caused by a changing 
world, not by the hegemonic invasion of a Western worldview. The transformation of the 
old field, for the proponents of these projects, is therefore unavoidable. Any effort to 
reconsolidate the old field and therefore to detach oneself from on-going changes in the 
field is counterproductive. Instead of insisting on reconsolidating the old field, Muslims 
should accept and adapt to this extension of their field.  
As Figure 7.3 shows, the crisis of Muhammadiyah for the reform projects does 
not lie in the extension of the field but on the stubbornness of the old field to relocate its 
boundaries. The old boundaries should be extended in order to adapt to the reality of the 
globalising world. By expanding the limit of one’s field, it is more likely that a solution 
to the challenges of globalisation can be found. In this respect, while the response of the 
status quo to the disintegration of the old field springs from a “hysteria”, that of the 
reform camp arises from “a margin of freedom” that allows its proponents to envision a 
Muhammadiyah that is progressive.  
This freedom, however, should be understood in a Bourdieusian way: it is bound 
to the reflective habitus of Muhammadiyah’s members. As explained in Chapter Four, 
this boundedness can be discerned from the reform projects’ insistence on the relevance 
of rationality in their search for the solution to globalisation’s negative effects, as well as 
on the reform projects’ maintenance of old vocabularies, such as “infidels” and “idols” – 
albeit with new meanings attached – to convey their message.  
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Figure 7.3 The Reform Project’s Crisis of the Field 
 
 
With regard to the issue of the changing field, both camps realise the existence of 
other fields belonging to other communities. The distinctive response from the 
proponents of the reform projects, however, lies in their willingness to embrace the 
expansion of their field as a necessity. For the reform camp, the expansion of the field’s 
limits is a double movement on the part of the particularity of Islam. On the one hand, 
Islam, by accepting the newly extended field, is subjected to a higher standard of 
assessment. The solution that can come out of accepting the newly extended field will go 
beyond the particularity of Islam because of its inclusion of other ways of thinking, 
especially those coming from the West.  
On the other hand, the subjection of Islam to a more diverse set of benchmarks 
does not mean that Muslims should abandon the particularity of Islam. Instead, it will 
bring to it a higher level of relevance. By engaging in a wider field, the reform projects 
assert, Muslims will have a greater chance of bringing Islamic particularity into wider 
relevance; and by this engagement, Islam will be transformed into a religion of more 
universal significance. The way forward for Muslims should be to work together with the 
West and other particularities, and not against them. By doing so, Islam and its 
particularity can contribute to finding the solutions to the challenges presented by the 
present world.  
Habitus 
Reflexivity 
Field of Muhamadiyah’s 
members 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are two main theses elaborated throughout preceding chapters. The first one is 
related to the place of habitus as a generative structure in Muhammadiyah. Defined as a 
set of predispositions shared by members of a society, the Muslim habitus in 
Muhammadiyah contains the potential for generating a set of practices among its 
members. Both the proponents of the status quo and those of reform projects have their 
own distinct definition of what constitutes true Islamic practices; however, these different 
practices stem from a shared predisposition, a predisposition that is reflective in nature. 
 The second thesis extends the first one by relating a crisis within the field of a 
society to the presence of what is considered to be a foreign element. The presence of the 
“Other” in the once familiar field necessitates a response from that society. As expected, 
the proponents of the status quo have a response to this change in the field that is 
different from the supporters of reform projects. How each of the camps perceives crisis 
in their field in turn determines how they respond to the idea of reform within 
Muhammadiyah.  
 This chapter will review research findings surrounding those two theses. The first 
part of this chapter will summarise the arguments of each chapter, followed by my 
responses to the two research questions posed at the beginning of my research. The last 
part will suggest a useful direction for future research in relation to the study of both 
Muhammadiyah and the discourse of habitus. 
 
8.1 Summary of the Arguments 
After setting the background for my research in Chapter One, this dissertation continues 
by establishing the basic predisposition of members of Muhammadiyah in Chapter Two. 
There are three basic mental predispositions that constitute Muslim habitus in 
 194
Muhammadiyah, which I argued in Chapters Two and Four are exemplified by the life of 
Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah whom I dub “the exemplary Man”, and 
his experience of enlightenment (pencerahan). The first predisposition is belief in human 
capacity to reflect on one’s environment and to gain consciousness of one’s basic 
missions in the world. The second predisposition is belief in the presence of divine 
providence in the daily lives of human beings, with this presence manifest through the 
fruit of human actions. The third predisposition is faith in the possibility for human 
beings to attain enlightenment when God acknowledges the worth of human effort. 
 Understanding Muhammadiyah’s history thus requires us to comprehend the 
emphasis that history places on both human actions and God’s deliverance. As Chapter 
Two shows, the history of Muhammadiyah as formalised in The Profile perfectly reflects 
the three ideas mentioned above. These three ideas did not emerge for the first time in 
The Profile. In his Seven Philosophical Teachings, recorded by his youngest student 
Hadjid, Dahlan himself, as the exemplary Man, taught that the capacity of human reason 
to understand the truth is not contradictory to divine revelation.1 In Dahlan’s seven 
philosophical teachings, both divine revelation and human reason are parallel channels to 
reach the truth. 
 The assumption of human ability to get a clear understanding of one’s 
environment is a symptom of what I call reflectivity in Muhammadiyah. Chapter Three, 
which deals with both reform and status quo projects, is an introduction to the discussion 
on reflectivity in Muhammadiyah. Faith in human reason as the key to progress is evident 
in both camps; the choice to support either the status quo or reform projects is based on 
the use of what each camp considers to be the acceptable method in interpreting the 
Qur’an. In expounding both camps’ opinions with respect to the need for reform, I have 
also shown how each camp realises the limits to its freedom in interpreting the Qur’an. 
While the proponents of the status quo urge a more restricted method in this 
interpretation, the supporters of reform projects see the status quo’s methodical restriction 
as a refusal to bind Islam to a higher standard, a standard that is set not by the 
traditionalist religious scholars but by people of different conviction, namely the West. 
                                                 
1 See K. R. H. Hadjid, Pelajaran KHA Dahlan: 7 Falsafah Ajaran & 17 Kelompok Ayat Al-Qur’an 
(Yogyakarta: Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2008), 26-27. 
 195
Notwithstanding their differences, both camps acknowledge the limits to human 
interpretation of the text as well as the limits to human freedom. In other words, both the 
status quo and reform camps admit to the boundedness of human interpretation to a 
particular habitus. 
 The idea of a bounded freedom resonates well with Bourdieu’s understanding of 
the concept of habitus. Employing Bourdieu’s sociology, the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation is an explicit elaboration of the reflective predisposition in Muhammadiyah. 
Reading this chapter, one should relate it to my earlier elaboration in Chapter One on the 
difference between reflectivity and reflexivity. What I mean by reflectivity is the 
assumption of social agents’ capacity to treat themselves as autonomous of their 
environments. With this capacity, it is assumed that human beings will be able to analyse 
their environment in a rational manner and to determine what is to be executed within 
that environment.  
 Meanwhile, reflexivity is the capacity of human beings to analyse their 
surroundings by always assuming one’s position within, not outside, that environment. 
Bourdieu refers to this environment as the field. Reflexivity belongs to each and every 
habitus. The strategy a social agent employs to live in the field cannot be separated from 
his/her predisposition. How one perceives the game one plays inside the field, to use a 
sports analogy, depends on one’s habitus. In the case of Muhammadiyah, the habitus of 
its members is marked by the illusio of reflectivity. It is reflectivity, and the assumption 
of human rational capacities that goes with it, which predisposes Muhammadiyah’s 
members to a certain set of practices, and not others. To put it differently, the 
spontaneous predisposition of Muhammadiyah’s members, or their reflexivity, is tied to 
their reflective inclination. 
 As the next wave of works on habitus2 suggests, the next direction in the study of 
reflexivity and habitus should include the notion of hybridity in order to understand 
better the complex relations between habitus and social resistance. Following this 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Loic J. D. Wacquant, “Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of 
Bourdieu’s Sociology,” in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 24; Lois McNay, “Gender, Habitus and the Field” Theory Culture Society 
16, no. 1 (1999): 104-5; and Lisa Adkins, “Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender,” Theory Culture 
Society 20, no. 6 (2003): 37. 
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suggestion, the next three chapters of my dissertation extend the issue of habitus in 
Muhammadiyah to the topic of hybridity. These chapters are consequently concerned 
with the images of the West that both the proponents of the status quo and reform 
projects harbour, and how these images contribute to each camp’s responses to the 
presence of the West. These responses, in turn, influence their perception of the crisis of 
their field. 
 Employing Bourdieu’s analysis again, I argue that the status quo’s fear of the 
intrusion of the West and the reform projects’ anxiety over globalisation are caused by a 
crisis of the field, a crisis that refers to the gap between the objective situation of the field 
and one’s subjective expectation of the field to which one is predisposed by one’s 
habitus.3 In the case of Muhammadiyah, it is the presence of the West that serves as a 
catalyst for the change in the field.  
 Before dwelling on various images of the West that belong to each camp in 
Chapters Six and Seven, Chapter Five provides an elaboration of the notion of hybridity. 
Taking the example of the story of the Buru Quartet of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, this 
chapter argues that in the presence of the dominant West, the non-West has to adapt itself 
to the methods and values of the West in order to use them to resist colonialism. The 
story of Minke as the main protagonist in this quartet is an example of how, through 
emulating Western methods of modern organisation and journalism and through 
appropriating its values of justice and freedom, the indigenous people managed to create 
a fissure in the colonial discourse. 
 The story of the Buru Tetralogy represents the breaking down of the opposition 
between submission and resistance, and also of the contradiction between self and the 
“Other”. The appropriation of the West and the abandoning by the indigenous people of 
their traditional worldview, on the one hand, can be seen as submission to Western ways 
of thinking. On the other hand, this emulation is targeted at attacking colonialism, and 
thus can also be considered an act of resistance. This resistance, however, is not directed 
toward the West as the enemy. On the contrary, it is directed at colonialism. The West is 
simultaneously an ally in the struggle against injustice and also a colonial enemy at the 
                                                 
3 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234. 
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moment the indigenous people decide to employ a Western worldview in their anti-
colonial struggle. The contradiction between self and “Other” is blurred in this act of 
appropriation. It is this contradiction in the attitudes of the Buru Quartet’s protagonist 
towards the West that will be the basis of my elaboration of the status quo and reform 
camps’ perceptions of the West in the next two chapters. 
 Chapter Six discusses the status quo camp’s images of the West. Perceived as 
(un)democratic, Christian, permissive, scientific, and hegemonic, the West for the status 
quo is all that Islam needs to avoid. Among these mostly negative images of the West, 
however, the status quo finds an ally in a particular stream of Christianity that still 
persists in its exclusive claim of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. The appropriation 
by the status quo is, therefore, minimal and highly selective. Instead of a more extensive 
appropriation of Western civilisation, the proponents of the status quo limit their 
appropriation to Western scientific methods while warning Muslims of the danger of 
importing Western values. Even this appropriation of Western methods is conditional on 
the provision that these methods will not create any confusion among Muslims with 
respect to the foundations of Islam. 
 The proponents of reform projects, contrary to those of the status quo, suggest an 
extensive appropriation of Western methods and values. Their image of the West as a 
teacher provides a reason for their argument that Islam should benefit from a more open 
world and learn from other civilisations, including the West. This position assumes no 
subordinate position of Islam to the West because the proponents of the reform projects 
believe that civilisations can learn from each other. Furthermore, the image of the West 
as an ally in the struggle for a better world for humanity sees the West as being in the 
same boat as Islam. In this situation, it is counterproductive to fight each other and lose 
sight of the real adversary that humanity is facing. The proponents of reform projects are 
still critical about the hegemonic and materialistic potential of the West, but this criticism 
does not stop them from engaging the West in their struggle for a more just world. 
 Chapters Six and Seven suggest how different views of the “Other” have created a 
different sense of crisis of the field for both camps. As it sees the West as a threat to 
Islam, the status quo camp perceives the intrusion of the Western worldview as the cause 
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of the crisis in their field; they perceive their field to be under threat of disintegration due 
to this intrusion. To escape the crisis, the proponents of the status quo urge 
Muhammadiyah to assert the particularity of Islam against the Western worldview and, 
by so doing, reconsolidate their organisation’s old and familiar field.  
Things are different within the reform camp. The enemy of Islam for this camp is 
not the West but the negative effects of globalisation. These negative effects affect not 
only Muslims because the Western world is facing the same challenges. For the 
proponents of reform projects, the solution to the crisis of the field is not isolation but the 
inclusion of as many perspectives as possible in humanity’s common struggle. Learning 
from the West should give Muslims a new perspective that is useful for addressing 
problems in their societies. The crisis of the field for this camp, therefore, is not the 
disintegration of the old field but the persistence of the boundaries surrounding that field. 
For them, the solution to the crisis is to extend the old field to cover other perspectives. 
By so doing, they believe Muslims will be able to create a new relevance for Islam as a 
religion for all humanity; in other words, a religion from which all humanity can take 
inspiration. 
 
8.2 Research Findings 
This dissertation started with two research questions: How did two opposite tendencies 
favouring status quo and reform emerge in post-1998 Muhammadiyah, and, secondly, 
why did they emerge? With respect to the first question, the first part of this dissertation 
(from the second to the fourth chapters), suggests that the reflective predisposition that 
belongs to the habitus of this organisation’s members is the source of these two different 
views. The myth of the capacity of human beings for reflectivity in Muhammadiyah, with 
its treasured concept of the exemplary Man in its narrative of enlightenment, is at the root 
of the support for both the status quo and reform projects. The support for both camps is 
based on faith in human consciousness, belief in how this consciousness creates 
sensitivity in the mind of Muhammadiyah’s members towards their environment and 
how, eventually, this sensitivity guides the organisation’s members to the true path of 
Islam. 
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 The proponents of the status quo direct this sensitivity to a focus on the correct 
Islamic practices. They see their environment as a realm to be analysed in terms of the 
Islamic worldview. Islam, as they understand it, is the religion based on the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah with Muhammadiyah as the embodiment of the scriptural spirit of Islam. The 
proponents of this camp see the distinctiveness of Muhammadiyah as arising from the 
event of enlightenment, along with the story of the exemplary Man’s consciousness, 
within the history of this organisation. This distinctiveness is what makes 
Muhammadiyah different from other Islamic organisations, such as the Justice and 
Prosperous Party, even when that party also shares its puritan tendency. 
For the status quo camp, Muslims’ reflection on their environment will eventually 
lead to an assessment of the Islamic nature of that environment. If it is already Islamic, 
religious propagation is needed to maintain this condition; if it is not yet Islamic, 
propagation is necessary to win it over to an Islamic worldview. Consequently, what the 
proponents of the status quo are most concerned about are those who claim to be 
Muslims but have yet to implement the Islamic worldview as a guide to their daily lives. 
These self-professed Muslims are either still practising pre-Islamic rituals or are admirers 
of the West to the extent that they are willing to deconstruct Islam. Both syncretic and 
Western-minded Muslims are no less the target of Islamic propagation than non-Muslims. 
Since its inception, Muhammadiyah has occupied itself with this issue of Islamisation of 
those self-professed Muslims. For the supporters of the status quo, staying on this course 
of undertaking is the best way that Muhammadiyah could proceed in the future and keep 
its relevance as an Islamic movement. The maintenance of the status quo is the worthy 
goal to be reached by Muhammadiyah. 
 Across both camps, reflectivity is seen as entailing criticism directed at the 
spiritual practices of Islam. It is built on the assumption that if human beings try hard 
enough, they will be able to think rationally and objectively. It is indeed one of the traits 
of the proponents of reform projects in Muhammadiyah to be more appreciative towards 
Muslims’ local culture, especially when it comes to the cultural project within this camp. 
This appreciation, however, is limited to respecting this local culture that the proponents 
of the status quo often refer to as un-Islamic, and to the understanding that different 
human beings attach different meanings to different symbols. This appreciation from the 
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proponents of the reform projects towards local culture does not necessitate participation 
in assigning the same meaning to the same symbol. It is purely an anthropological 
appreciation that is aimed at excavating the affects dedicated to a symbol in order to 
arrive at a deeper meaning of a symbol, a meaning that may not necessarily be shared by 
members of other societies. Even though this deeper meaning of the symbols often turns 
out to be Islamic, the proponents of reform projects see them as an expression of local, 
and therefore particular, culture. 
 In summary, with respect to the first research question, namely how both the 
status quo and reformist tendencies emerged in Muhammadiyah, this dissertation sees 
reflectivity as the basic mental predisposition that builds Muslim habitus in 
Muhammadiyah. This predisposition is shared by members of this organisation and, since 
habitus is a generative structure, it can give rise to various practices of the people who 
share this particular habitus. In the case of the present day Muhammadiyah, the reflective 
predisposition has resulted in two different stances on how Muhammadiyah should 
proceed. Whereas the proponents of the status quo emphasise the importance of 
maintaining Muhammadiyah on its present course in the face of the widespread influence 
of Western cultures, the supporters of reform projects see the need for the organisation to 
transform itself in order to adapt to changing circumstances. For the latter, it is the task of 
Muhammadiyah to be more inclusive and to engage itself with foreign elements because, 
they argue, one can also find Islam in the worldview of the “Other”. Both camps are 
reflective in their view of the present environment of Muhammadiyah but come up with 
two opposing conclusions. 
 With respect to the second research question of why the two opposite tendencies 
in Muhammadiyah emerged, my answer is that different perceptions of crisis cause these 
two opposite tendencies to occur, as elaborated from Chapters Five to Seven. There is a 
tendency among some members of the organisation to fear the changing circumstances in 
the world that allow for the intrusion of a Western worldview, one which in their opinion 
is totally opposite to the Islamic worldview. For this group, the crisis that 
Muhammadiyah is facing at the moment is the fragility of the limits of the old field. 
Meanwhile, for another group of Muhammadiyah’s members, what this organisation 
needs to be cautious about is the negative effects of globalisation. The West, in the 
 201
opinion of the second group, should not be seen as a threat for Muhammadiyah and 
Islam, but should instead be taken on board as an ally in the common struggle of 
humanity. While the first group urges the consolidation of the old field, the second group 
recommends the total breaking down of the limit of the old field to make way for the 
extension of this field. 
In providing this answer to the second question driving my research, I see the 
need to draw on a scholarly development on the employment of reflexivity to enrich 
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus. Different from those works that see reflexivity as a late 
comer in social agents’ habitus,4 I see reflexivity as the capacity of social agents to 
perceive the field, and their positions in the field, along with the necessary “feel for the 
game”. As explained in Chapter 4, this dissertation sees reflexivity as based on the 
habitus of social agents. Any image of reflexivity founded on the assumption that social 
agents can take themselves out of their environment and therefore perfectly reflect upon 
their unconscious minds is a myth of reflection. A social agent can hold on to this 
assumption of reflectivity, as the explication of the reflective mental predisposition of 
Muhammadiyah’s members in this dissertation tells us. However, we have to bear in 
mind that this assumption is part of the illusio that constitutes his habitus. This notion is 
no less mythical than, for example, the traditional belief in the social differentiation 
between sexes that belongs to the Kabyle Berber community in Algeria.5 Reflexivity is 
always bound; and because of this boundedness, reflexivity belongs to all habitus. 
What happens during times of crisis is the intensification of reflexivity in order to 
make sense of the changes in the field. In the case of Muhammadiyah, this intensifying 
reflexivity due to the perception of the changing world results in two opposite alleged 
solutions. The first solution is the maintenance of the status quo, while the second 
solution demands reforms within the organisation. These opposite responses from the 
status quo and reform camps inform us that reflexivity does not necessarily produce 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Paul Sweetman, “Twenty-first Century Dis-Ease? Habitual Reflexivity or the Reflexive 
Habitus,” The Sociological Review (2001):543; and Sam Binkley, “Governmentality, Temporality and 
Practice: From the Individualization of Risk to the ‘Contradictory Movement of the Soul’,” Time & Society 
18, no. 1 (2009): 88. 
5 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 146. 
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reform.6 In the face of crisis, some social agents might opt to return to their old way of 
life while others might demand a reform. In the case of Muhammadiyah, while the status 
quo camp aims for the reconsolidation of the old field, the reform camp imagines a 
reform as a solution to the crisis in the field. Different from the status quo camp’s 
experience, the intensification of reflexivity during what is perceived to be a crisis 
situation within the reform camp allows the proponents of this camp to imagine a “utopia, 
project, programme, or plan”.7 
While the supporters of the status quo camp insist on the maintenance of their 
familiar habitus, the solutions that the proponents of the reform camp offer are neither 
based on the transformation of their old habitus. These solutions are still thought of 
dependently on the basis of reflective mental predisposition that belongs to the habitus of 
Muhammadiyah’s members. As I explained above, even in their efforts to be more 
inclusive of the cultural “Other”, the proponents of reform projects still rely on their 
reflective tendency to base their argument. This point proves that reflexivity does not 
entail a rupture to the old habitus but is simply a continuation of it. It is reflectivity that is 
being used by the reform camp to formulate its solution to the crisis.  
Another new direction that this dissertation has taken in terms of our 
understanding of habitus is the issue of hybridity. The inclusion of what is commonly 
recognised as a concept from post-colonial theories is useful in problematising an 
important question in the recent development in the study of reflexivity: does resistance 
necessarily mean rejection of the dominant system? By taking an example from the story 
of the Buru Quartet, I would answer this question with a negative. In my exposition of the 
story, in the face of a dominant system, the underprivileged can choose to emulate the 
methods and values inherent in the dominant system and use it to resist this system. 
 
8.3 Possible Directions for Future Research 
Based on the findings of my research as elaborated above, there are some notes that can 
be made with respect to the implications of these findings to the general study on Islam in 
                                                 
6 See McNay, “Gender,” 111. 
7 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 234. 
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Indonesia. The first note is related to the issue of the present convergence of democracy, 
the de-Islamisation of formal politics, and increased demand for Islamic law in Indonesia, 
as discussed in Chapter One. It is clear from the findings in this research that 
Muhammadiyah’s members, regardless for which camp they throw their support, agree 
that democracy is the only legitimate way to obtain power in Indonesia. Although 
differing on details of how democracy should be implemented, the supporters of both 
camps agree on the importance of the rule of people contained in a democratic system.  
On the issue of de-Islamisation of formal politics, during the course of its history 
Muhammadiyah had shown various approaches. It had been a supporter of MASYUMI 
(Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), the Islamist political party whose emergence can be 
traced back to the Japanese occupation, until its dissolution in 1960. In 1950, however, 
the organisation allowed its members to vote for non-Islamic parties, with the proviso 
that their votes strengthen Islamic, and especially Muhammadiyah’s, aspirations, before 
changing this decision in 1953 to allow its members to vote only for Islamic parties.8 
After the dissolution of MASYUMI, Muhammadiyah decided that it would be politically 
independent. It upheld this decision until PARMUSI, an Islamic political party deemed as 
MASYUMI’s successor, was established in 1967. After the amalgamation of various 
Islamic political parties, one of which was PARMUSI, into Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (The United Development Party) in 1975, Muhammadiyah once again 
stated its political independence. Since 1985 Muhammadiyah has accepted Pancasila as 
its ideological base and thus abandoned Islam as the ideological base of its constitution. 
This policy continued to the present-day Muhammadiyah: since 1985 Muhammadiyah 
has maintained this independence and been supportive of further de-Islamisation of 
Indonesia’s formal politics. 
Through its support for MASYUMI from 1945 to 1960, Muhammadiyah had been 
demanding the establishment of an Islamic state, along with the implementation of 
shariah law for Indonesian Muslims. The present-day Muhammadiyah, however, has 
renounced this demand. Its support of Pancasila since 1985 has been accompanied by 
support for a pluralistic Indonesia. The support for this stance has mainly come from the 
                                                 
8 Majelis Pustaka Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Sejarah Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah, 1995), 26, 34. 
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reform camp. The supporters of the status quo camp, nevertheless, have accepted the fact 
of a pluralistic Indonesia. They still have some qualms when it comes to religious groups 
claiming to be Islamic but veer off from what they perceive to be the basic teachings of 
Islam, one of which is Ahmadiyah (See Chapter Three). Their demand is for the 
government to ban Ahmadiyah. In general, nevertheless, Muhammadiyah does not 
demand the implementation of shariah law in Indonesia. With respect to the present 
convergence of democracy, de-Islamisation of formal politics, and increasing demand for 
shariah law in Indonesia, therefore, Muhammadiyah’s members from both camps are 
supportive only of the first two trends. 
The second note is on the relationship between Islam and civil society. With 
respect to this relation, Muhammadiyah has been hailed as one among various civil 
society movements in Indonesia. Three characteristics of Muhammadiyah support this 
assertion: its cherished charity activities that are independent of government’s 
intervention; the ‘bottom-up’ approach of the establishment of Muhammadiyah’s ranting 
(village level) offices that encourages civic participation; and the organisation’s 
independence of any political interests.9 Based on these three characteristics and opinions 
of the proponents of both camps within the organisation about the independent and civic 
roles of Muhammadiyah in the present Indonesia, Muhammadiyah can fairly be seen as a 
civil society organisation that is based on religion. In this context, civil society is not only 
a Western aspiration.10 Non-Western societies produce their own civil society 
organisations that are, by definition, independent from political interests but at the same 
time can be dependent on religious sentiment as the motivating factor. 
In addition to Muhammadiyah’s role in the dynamics of civil society movements 
in Indonesia, and this will be my third note, is the organisation’s contribution towards 
democracy through their involvement in civil society movements. The presence of a civil 
                                                 
9 M. Amin Abdullah, “Muhammadiyah’s Experience in Promoting Civil Society on the Eve of the 21st 
Century,” in Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, eds. Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique, and Omar 
Farouk Bajunid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 44-45. 
10 Chris Hann insists that a non-Western model of civil society is possible; see Chris Hann, “Introduction: 
Political Society and Civil Anthropology,” in Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, eds. Chris Hann 
and Elizabeth Dunn (London: Routledge, 1996), 1-26; cf Serif Mardin, “Civil Society and Islam,” in Civil 
Society: Theory, History, Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 278.  
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society movement undoubtedly is not the only ingredient for a more democratic society,11 
but the process of democratisation can be helped by the presence of these movements. In 
the case of Indonesia, various Islamic civil society organisations have proven to play a 
positive role towards the country’s democracy. In one observation, for example, Hefner 
finds that Indonesian Muslims contribute to the general democratic process through the 
pluralistic aspiration of their civic organisations.12 This contribution, according to Hefner 
again, puts Indonesia as a harbinger in the establishment of a democratic Islam.13 
By way of conclusion, despite their differences, the supporters of both the status 
quo and reform camps have placed Muhammadiyah as an Islamic organisation 
sympathetic towards a democratic system for Indonesia. In each of their responses 
towards changes and other perspectives, both camps have shown that democracy is not a 
monolithic system and that it is a system that has to be established and maintained by 
taking advantage of local environments. As a civil society organisation, Muhammadiyah 
has proven to be able to put forward an Islam that is adaptable to both the Indonesian 
context and, particularly for the proponents of the reform camp, Western value systems. 
 The differences between the two camps on various issues, nonetheless, cannot be 
underestimated. Which camp is going to be victorious in their competition for influence 
in Muhammadiyah? Is the reform camp going to fail in its invitation for a reciprocal 
learning between civilisations? This dissertation argues that the answers to these 
questions will depend on which version of crisis will eventually take place. To put it 
differently, how severe the incidence of each version of the crises as evoked by each 
camp is, and the extensive impacts felt of each version of crisis on Muhammadiyah, will 
determine which camp will prevail in the future. 
Since this thesis does not develop a definite answer to the questions above, I will 
instead try to propose propitious directions for future research that might help us 
                                                 
11 See Mitsuo Nakamura, “Introduction,” in Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, eds. Nakamura 
Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique, and Omar Farouk Bajunid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2001), 13-14; and Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim Politics,” in 
Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 16. 
12 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 3-4. 
13 Robert W. Hefner, “Asian and Middle Eastern Islam,” Revue des Sciences Politiques 32 (2011): 196. 
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understand better the issue of habitus, Muhammadiyah, and also the general Indonesian 
studies. With respect to the study of habitus, future research would be more enlightening 
if it would elaborate the issue of hybridity further. Especially with respect to the relations 
between hybridity and habitus, it would be interesting if one could trace the presence of 
the old habitus within the practices of hybridity. Which predisposition would tend to slip 
away and which predisposition social agents would tend to keep during the time of crisis, 
as marked by the increasingly intense presence of the “Other” and its values and 
methods, are two topics that will shine a further light on the relation between habitus and 
hybridity. 
 In the study of Muhammadiyah, a wider opportunity to problematise the 
contradiction between the organisation’s tendency towards both puritanism and 
modernism should be encouraged. Based on the findings in this research, I would suggest 
that the incorporation of the concept of habitus can explain this ambiguity, but other 
concepts will also contribute toward explaining this contradiction that has puzzled 
scholars of revivalist movements, in Christianity and Islam alike. 
 The third direction that I would like to suggest, the one that has been implicit 
during the course of my research, is that future scholarly works on Indonesia should take 
into account the place of ambiguity. Traditional approaches that perceive Indonesians as 
unique and distinct from other human beings, namely the Westerners,14 should be 
abandoned to give place to those works that see the potential for Indonesians to learn 
from other civilisations. As the example of Muhammadiyah tells us, social agents cannot 
escape contact with different worldviews. Engagement with the “Other” is unavoidable in 
the modern world, particularly in a world of advanced information technology. With 
respect to Muhammadiyah, even its status quo camp cannot expect total isolation and 
therefore must, to some extent, respond to challenges posed by the Western worldview, 
albeit in a defensive way. Any worthy direction for further research in Indonesian studies 
must take into account this fact if it wishes to retain its relevance in a changing world. To 
borrow from the Foucauldian vocabulary, by opting for this direction, scholars will 
                                                 
14 As example of these approaches, see Anderson’s idea of power in Javanese culture (Benedict Anderson, 
Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
72.); and Geertz’s symbolic and abstract Indonesian Islam (Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious 
Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 116.) 
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perceive Indonesians as social agents whose identities are always in the process of 
“constitution” instead of being in a fixed state and thus only waiting to be “discovered.”15 
                                                 
15 Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” in Religion and Culture: 
Michel Foucault, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), 168. One work in Indonesian 
studies that uses this non-essentialist approach is Simon Philpott’s with its emphasis on understanding 
Indonesian identity as being in a constant process of making and remaking; see Rethinking Indonesia: 
Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity (London: Macmillan, 2000), 147. 
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Appendix 1 
Muhammadiyah’s Organisational Structure* 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL (PUSAT) LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
PROVINCIAL (WILAYAH) LEVEL 
 
 
  
DISTRICT/MUNICIPAL 
(DAERAH) LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
BRANCH (CABANG) LEVEL 
 
 
 
VILLAGE (RANTING) LEVEL 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 Executive hierarchy 
 Technical and administrative hierarchy 
 Supervisory hierarchy 
 
* Modified from the organisational chart of Muhammadiyah, Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah, Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 110.  
** Pimpinan is the executive body of Muhammadiyah. Its members are elected through Muktamar (of national level) or 
musyawarah (of lower levels). At national level, Muhammadiyah also has an annual meeting called Tanwir. At Tanwir, 
Muhammadiyah conducts annual organisational evaluations and formulates annual programmes. 
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ORGANISASI 
OTONOM 
ORGANISASI 
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Appendix 2 
Autonomous Organisations within Muhammadiyah* 
 
Autonomous organisations within Muhammadiyah are organisations that were established by 
Muhammadiyah and, with guidance and supervision, are given rights and obligations to 
manage their own administration to guide particular members of Muhammadiyah and in 
particular sectors in order to achieve Muhammadiyah’s missions. There are at the moment 
seven autonomous organisations within Muhammadiyah. These autonomous organisations 
can be located at every level of Muhammadiyah’s offices. Below are summary of each 
autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah.  
1. Aisyiyah 
Ahmad Dahlan and his first wife established Sapa Tresna, a Qur’anic-study group for girls 
and elderly women in the Kauman District of Yogyakarta. Sapa Tresna then was changed 
into Aisyiyah in 1917. In its development, this organisation became an organisation for 
mature female members of Muhammadiyah. It has been active in collecting resources from 
its members to build schools and health clinics. At the moment, this organisation has 33 
Pimpinan Wilayah, 370 Pimpinan Daerah, 2,332 Pimpinan Cabang, and 6,924 Pimpinan 
Ranting (See Appendix 1). Aisyiyah runs 4,560 educational institutions across Indonesia, 280 
health clinics, 459 social welfare institutions such as orphanages, 503 economic institutions, 
and 3,785 social development institutions such as badan zakat (alms-collection agencies). 
2. Pemuda Muhammadiyah  
Pemuda Muhammadiyah was established on 2 May 1932 with the goal of building a resilient 
youth of Muhammadiyah. Its vision has been to prepare Indonesian youth for diverse 
challenges. There are five basic principles in Pemuda Muhammadiyah movement: tauhid (the 
principle of the unity of universe under one God), the right moral system based on divine 
revelation, faith-based actions, justice, and the importance of mastery of science. Various 
programmes are implemented to meet the organisation’s vision. 
3. Nasyiatul Aisyiyah 
Different from Aisyiyah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah focuses on younger female members of 
Muhammadiyah. There is no strict age limit to differentiate Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. 
The younger female members of Muhammadiyah, however, tend to join Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. 
It was established in 1919 initially as Siswa Praja with the purpose of inculcating sense of 
unity among young female members of Muhammadiyah, to teach good morality, and to better 
understand Islam. This name was changed in 1929 into Aisyiyah Urusan Siswa Praja and into 
Nasyiatul Aisyiyah in 1931. During this time, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah was still part of Aisyiyah. 
In 1957 Aisyiyah was made autonomous of Aisyiyah and became one of the autonomous 
                                                            
* Summarised from Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Profil 1 Abad 
Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 120-54. 
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organisations within Muhammadiyah. Since then Nasyiatul Aisyiyah has developed various 
programmes to empower the younger female youth of Muhammadiyah. 
4. Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah 
Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was established on 18 July 1961 with the goal of 
strengthening Muhammadiyah’s movement through the empowerment of its youth, especially 
those studying up to the high school level. The effort to empower student members of 
Muhammadiyah was actually started long before Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was built. In 
1919 Siswo Projo was established for students in Madrassah Mu’allimin in Yogyakarta. In 
1926 Gabungan Keluarga Pelajar Muhammadiyah was built in Malang and Surakarta. In 
1933 the scout organisation of Muhammadiyah, Hizbul Wathan (Army of the Nation – now a 
separate autonomous organisation) was built. The 1960 Muktamar of Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah decided to establish a separate organisation to better tend to the needs and 
context of student members of Muhammadiyah. Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was 
established in 1961 as the implementation of this decision. This organisation now has its 
branches all over Indonesia.  
5. Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 
Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah was established on 14 March 1964, eight years after 
Muhammadiyah decided to build a higher learning institute. The aspiration to empower 
student members of Muhammadiyah was first announced in 1936 Muktamar in Betawi (now 
Jakarta) but had not been taken seriously until 1961 when in its Jakarta Muktamar 
Muhammadiyah decided to establish an autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah to 
accommodate its student members. Before 1964 it was assumed that the empowerment of 
Muhammadiyah’s student members was handed over to Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic 
Student Organisation), a nation-based organisation for Islamic students in Indonesia without 
any organisational linkage to Muhammadiyah. The structural leadership network for Ikatan 
Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah is similar to Muhammadiyah except for the village level. Instead 
of Pimpinan Ranting, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah refers to it as Komisariat. 
6. Tapak Suci Muhammadiyah 
Tapak Suci (Holy Palms) Muhammadiyah is an autonomous organisation that teaches Islam-
condoned martial art skills to its members. The history of Tapak Suci started with a martial 
art in Pesantren Binorong, Banjanegara with its famous teacher, Busyro Syuhada. Avoiding 
the search from Dutch colonial administration following his violent resistance, he took refuge 
in Kauman. In Kauman, he taught the youth martial art. A few of his students then built their 
own martial art organisation called Perguruan Cikauman. A few more martial art 
organisation, Perguruan Seranoman and Perguruan Kasegu, were built in 1930 and 1951 
respectively. Perguruan Tapak Suci was established in 1960 to consolidate various martial art 
organisations in the neighbourhood. It was not until 1967 that Perguruan Tapak Suci was 
admitted as an autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah. At the moment Tapak Suci 
focuses on the sports side of martial art. During its history, however, it was heavily involved 
in anti-communnist activities.  
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7. Hizbul Wathan 
Hizbul Wathan is a scout organisation within Muhammadiyah. Its main goal is to inculcate 
discipline in its members according to Islamic teachings. This organisation was established 
after Ahmad Dahlan saw the activities of boy scouts in Mangkunegaran Palace in Solo. These 
boyscouts were part of Javaansche Padvinder Organisatie, a Dutch-initiated scout movement 
in the Mangkunegaran Palace. Padvinder (scout in Dutch) method was chosen by Dahlan to 
give extra-curricular activities for students. During its history, Hizbul Wathan was invitied 
several times to join the Dutch padvinder organisation but refused most likely for anti-
colonial reason. There was a disagreement about whether Hizbul Wathan was established in 
1919 or 1921. However, during its history this scout organisation has contributed to the 
education of various prominent Indonesian profiles, such as General Soedirman and 
Soeharto. 
212 
 
Appendix 3 
List of Muhammadiyah Chairmen* 
 
No. Fora Locations of Fora Years Presidents 
1 1st Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1912 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan 
(1st Chairman) 
2 2nd Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1913 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
3 3rd Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1914 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
4 4th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1915 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
5 5th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1916 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
6 6th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1917 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
7 7th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1918 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
8 8th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1919 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
9 9th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1920 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
10 10th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1921 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
11 11th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1922 Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
12 12th Year Meeting Yogyakarta  1923 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
(2nd Chairman) 
13 13th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1924 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
14 14th Year Meeting Yogyakarta 1925 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
15 15th Annual Congress Surabaya 1926 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
16 16th Annual Congress Pekalongan 1927 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
17 17th Annual Congress Yogyakarta 1928 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
18 18th Annual Congress Surabaya 1929 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
19 19th Annual Congress Minangkabau 1930 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
20 20th Annual Congress Yogyakarta 1931 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
21 21st Annual Congress Makassar 1932 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
22 22nd Annual Congress Semarang 1933 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
23 23rd Annual Congress Yogyakarta 1934 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
24 24th Annual Congress Banjarmasin 1935 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
25 25th Annual Congress Jakarta 1936 Kiai Haji Ibrahim 
26 26th Annual Congress Yogyakarta 1937 Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur 
(3rd Chairman) 
27 27th Annual Congress Malang 1938 Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur 
28 28th Annual Congress Medan 1939 Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur 
29 29th Annual Congress Yogyakarta 1940 Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur 
30 30th Annual Congress Purwokerto 1941 Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur 
31 Emergency Muktamar Yogyakarta 1944 Ki Bagus Hadikusuma 
(4th Chairman) 
32 All-Java Congregation Yogyakarta 1946 Ki Bagus Hadikusuma 
33 31st Muktamar Yogyakarta 1950 Ki Bagus Hadikusuma 
34 32nd Muktamar Purwokerto 1953 Ki Bagus Hadikusuma 
35 33rd Muktamar Yogyakarta 1956 Buya AR Sutan Mansur 
                                                            
* Based on Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah 
(Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 56. 
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(5th Chairman) 
36 34th Muktamar Palembang 1959 H. M. Yunus Anis 
(6th Chairman) 
37 35th Muktamar Jakarta 1962 Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi 
(7th Chairman) 
38 36th Muktamar Bandung 1965 Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi 
39 37th Muktamar Yogyakarta 1968 
1968 
Kiai Haji Faqih Usman 
(8th Chairman) 
Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin 
(9th Chairman) 
40 38th Muktamar Ujung Pandang 1971 Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin 
41 39th Muktamar Padang 1974 Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin 
42 40th Muktamar Surabaya 1978 Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
43 41st Muktamar Surakarta 1985 Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
44 42nd Muktamar Yogyakarta 1990 Kiai Haji A. Azhar Basyir 
(10th Chairman) 
45 43rd Muktamar Banda Aceh 1995 
1998 
Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais 
(11th Chairman) 
Prof. Dr. H. A. Syafii Maarif 
(12th Chairman) 
46 44th Muktamar Jakarta 2000 Prof. Dr. H. A. Syafii Maarif 
47 45th Muktamar Malang 2005 Prof. Dr. H. M. Dien Syamsuddin 
(13th Chairman) 
48 46th Muktamar Yogyakarta 2010 Prof. Dr. H. M. Dien Syamsuddin 
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Appendix 4 
List of Important Documents in Muhammadiyah 
 
No. Name of Documents Authorising / 
Publishing Body 
Time of Issuance 
/ Publication and 
Present Status 
1 Tuntunan Mencapai Istri Islam yang 
Berarti (Guidance to Become 
Meaningful Muslim Wives) 
Kongres 
Muhammadiyah Bagian 
Aisyiyah  
1939 – Effective  
2 Muqaddimah Anggaran Dasar 
Muhammadiyah (Preamble to 
Muhammadiyah’s Constitution) 
Sidang Tanwir 
Muhammadiyah 
1961 – Effective  
3 Adabul Mar’ah fil Islam (Civilised 
Women in Islam) 
Majelis Tarjih Pimpinan 
Pusat Muhammadiyah 
1975 – Effective  
4 Tuntunan Menuju Keluarga Sakinah 
(Guidance towards Islam-approved 
Families) 
Pimpinan Pusat 
Aisyiyah 
1989 – Effective  
5 Tafsir Tematik Al-Qur’an tentang 
Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama 
(Thematic Interpretation of the Qur’an 
on Social Relations between Religious 
Communities) 
Majelis Tarjih dan 
Pengembangan 
Pemikiran Islam 
Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 
2000 – No longer 
effective 
6 Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah 
(Muhammadiyah’s Cultural 
Propagation) 
Sidang Tanwir 
Muhammadiyah 
2002 and 2003 – 
Effective  
7 Fiqh Perempuan dalam Perspektif 
Muhammadiyah (Interpretation of 
Roles of Women in Muhammadiyah’s 
Perspective) 
Majelis Tarjih dan 
Pengembangan 
Pemikiran Islam 
Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 
2005 – Effective  
8 Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah Nomor: 
149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 tentang Kebijakan 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
mengenai Konsolidasi Organisasi dan 
Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah (Decision 
of National Leadership of 
Muhammadiyah Number: 
149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 on Consolidation 
of Muhammadiyah’s Institutions and 
Charities) 
Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 
13 November 
2006 – Effective  
9 Revitalisasi Ideologi Muhammadiyah: 
Konsolidasi Bidang Keyakinan dan 
Cita-cita Hidup 
Sidang Tanwir 
Muhammadiyah 
2007 – Effective  
10 Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 
2010 – Effective 
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Appendix 5 
 
SURAT KEPUTUSAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH 
Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 
Tentang: 
KEBIJAKAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH MENGENAI 
KONSOLIDASI ORGANISASI DAN AMAL USAHA MUHAMMADIYAH 
 
MENIMBANG : 
1. Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam sejak kelahirannya hingga saat ini tetap 
istiqamah dan terus bergerak tidak mengenal lelah dalam melaksanakan dakwah dan tajdid 
melalui berbagai usaha (amal usaha, program, dan kegiatan) yang dilakukannya dengan 
maksud dan tujuan menjunjung tinggi Agama Islam sehingga terwujud masyarakat Islam 
yang sebenar-benarnya; 
2. Bahwa Muhammadiyah merupakan organisasi (persyarikatan) Islam yang memiliki 
prinsip-prinsip, sistem, dan kedaulatan yang mengikat bagi segenap anggotanya dan harus 
dihormati oleh siapapun sebagaimana hak-hak organisasi yang bersifat independen dan 
memiliki hak hidup di negeri ini; 
3. Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai organisasi dalam menjalankan misi dan usahanya harus 
bergerak dalam satu barisan yang kokoh sebagaimana perintah Allah dalam Al-Quran Surat 
Ash-Shaf (61) ayat 4, yang artinya ”Sesungguhnya Allah menyukai orang yang berperang 
dijalan-Nya dalam barisan yang teratur seakan-akan mereka seperti suatu bangunan yang 
tersusun kokoh”; 
4 Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam yang cukup tua dan besar sangat 
menghargai ukhuwah, kerjasama, toleransi, dan sikap saling menghormati dengan seluruh 
kekuatan/kelompok lain dalam masyarakat, lebih-lebih dengan sesama komponen umat 
Islam, karena itu Muhammadiyah pun berhak untuk dihormati oleh siapapun serta memiliki 
hak serta keabsahan untuk bebas dari segala campur-tangan, pengaruh, dan kepentingan 
pihak manapun yang dapat mengganggu keutuhan serta kelangsungan gerakannya; 
 
MENGINGAT : 
1. Al-Quran dan As-Sunnah sebagai sumber Ajaran Islam; 
2. AD/ART Muhammadiyah serta aturan-aturan lainnya yang berlaku dalam Persyarikatan 
sebagai landasan konstitusional; 
216 
 
3. Keputusan Tarjih, Muqaddimah AD Muhammadiyah, Kepribadian Muhammadiyah, Matan 
Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup Muhammadiyah, Khittah Muhammadiyah, Pedoman Hidup 
Islami Warga Muhammadiyah, dan prinsip-prinsip ideal lainnya dalam Muhammadiyah; 
4. Keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah ke-45 tahun 2005; 
 
MEMPERHATIKAN : 
Keputusan Rapat Pleno Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah yang dilaksanakan pada hari Senin 
tanggal 22 Syawwal 1427 H / 13 November 2006 M 
 
MEMUTUSKAN : 
MENETAPKAN : KEPUTUSAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH TENTANG 
KEBIJAKAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH MENGENAI KONSOLIDASI 
ORGANISASI DAN AMAL USAHA MUHAMMADIYAH sebagai berikut: 
1. Muhammadiyah dengan seluruh anggota, pimpinan, amal usaha, organisasi otonom, 
majelis dan lembaga, sekretariat/kantor, dan berbagai lini/struktur organisasi serta segala 
usaha yang berada di dalamnya harus bebas dari berbagai paham, misi, dan kepentingan 
pihak lain yang secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, terbuka maupun terselubung, dapat 
merugikan dan merusak Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah. 
2. Secara khusus seluruh anggota dan lini organisasi Persyarikatan termasuk di lingkungan 
amal usaha Muhammadiyah harus bebas dari pengaruh, misi, infiltrasi, dan kepentingan 
partai politik yang selama ini mengusung misi dakwah atau partai politik bersayap dakwah, di 
samping bebas dari misi/kepentingan partai politik dan organisasi lainnya sebagaimana 
kebijakan Khittah Muhammadiyah. Hal tersebut karena selain telah menjadikan kegiatan 
dakwah dengan institusi/pranata umat Islam seperti masjid dan lain-lain sebagai alat/sarana 
politik, juga secara nyata-nyata telah menimbulkan sikap mendua di sebagian kalangan 
Muhammadiyah, termasuk dalam melaksanakan Hari Raya Idul Fitri/Idul Adha, serta 
menjadikan Muhammadiyah sebagai sarana politik partai yang bersangkutan dan lebih jauh 
lagi dapat menimbulkan pengeroposan dan mengganggu keutuhan organisasi. 
3. Segenap anggota Muhammadiyah perlu menyadari, memahami, dan bersikap kritis bahwa 
seluruh partai politik di negeri ini, termasuk partai politik yang mengklaim diri atau 
mengembangkan sayap/kegiatan dakwah seperti Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) adalah 
benar-benar partai politik. Setiap partai politik berorientasi meraih kekuasaan politik. Karena 
itu, dalam menghadapi partai politik mana pun kita harus tetap berpijak pada Khittah 
Muhammadiyah dan harus membebaskan diri dari, serta tidak menghimpitkan diri dengan 
misi, kepentingan, kegiatan, dan tujuan partai politik tersebut. 
4. Seluruh anggota Muhammadiyah di seluruh lini Persyarikatan, termasuk yang berada di 
Amal Usaha, dituntut komitmen, integritas, loyalitas, pengkhidmatan, dan kiprah yang penuh 
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dan optimal dalam menjalankan usaha-usaha, menjaga dan berpedoman pada prinsip-prinsip, 
membela kepentingan, serta memajukan dan memperjuangkan Muhammadiyah menuju pada 
pencapaian tujuannya. Jika memiliki kelebihan materi/harta, pikiran, tenaga, relasi/hubungan, 
jaringan, dan rizki Allah lainnya maka kerahkan/jariyahkan secara maksimal untuk 
membesarkan, mengembangkan, dan menyempurnakan gerakan Muhammadiyah serta 
seluruh amal usaha, program, dan kegiatannya sehingga semakin mendekati pencapaian 
tujuan Muhammadiyah. 
5. Seluruh institusi dalam Muhammadiyah termasuk amal usaha, masjid/mushalla, fasilitas 
milik Persyarikatan, dan kegiatan-kegiatan yang berada di dalamnya tidak boleh digunakan 
untuk kegiatan-kegiatan partai politik mana pun. Larangan tersebut berlaku untuk kegiatan-
kegiatan yang diindikasikan dan memiliki kaitan dengan kegiatan/kepentingan partai politik, 
termasuk kegiatan-kegiatan yang mengatasnamakan atau mamakai simbol-simbol 
keagamaan/dakwah seperti pengajian dan pembinaan keumatan, yang terkait dan memiliki 
hubungan dengan partai politik mana pun. Maksimalkan/optimalkan seluruh institusi milik 
Muhammadiyah tersebut untuk sebesar-besarnya dan sebenar-benarnya bagi kepentingan 
Muhammadiyah. 
6. Seluruh anggota Muhammadiyah diminta untuk menghormati dan menaati Keputusan 
Muktamar ke-45 tahun 2005 di Malang, yang menyatakan ”Menolak upaya-upaya untuk 
mendirikan parpol yang memakai atau menggunakan nama atau simbol-simbol Persyarikatan 
Muhammadiyah.” (Lihat Lampiran I Tanfidz Keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah Ke 45 di 
Malang: Keputusan Muktamar ke-45 tentang Laporan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
Periode 2000-2005, VI. Bidang Politik poin 1). 
7. Seluruh media massa yang berada di lingkungan Persyarikatan diminta untuk benar-benar 
menyuarakan paham, misi, dan kepentingan Muhammadiyah serta menjadi wahana untuk 
sosialisasi paham, pandangan, keputusan, kebijakan, kegiatan, dan syiar Muhammadiyah 
serta menjauhkan diri dari paham, misi, dan kepentingan organisasi/gerakan lain. 
8. Sebagai langkah konsolidasi sekaligus pencegahan dan penguatan gerakan, seluruh jajaran 
Pimpinan Persyarikatan, Majelis/Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal Usaha 
diinstruksikan untuk melaksanakan berbagai kegiatan pembinaan keagamaan, 
kemuhammadiyahan, dan hal-hal yang menyangkut organisasi secara luas. Kegiatan-kegiatan 
tersebut antara lain sosialisasi dan pengamalan putusan-putusan Tarjih, Darul Arqam, Baitul 
Arqam, Gerakan Jamaah dan Dakwah Jamaah, Up-Grading, Refreshing, pengajian-pengajian 
umum dan khusus, pembinaan jamaah, pengelolaan kegiatan-kegiatan masjid dan mushalla, 
sosialisasi dan pengamalan Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah, peningkatan 
silaturahim, dan kegiatan-kegiatan pembinaan lainnya yang dilakukan secara sistematik, 
intensif, berkesinambungan, dan terorganisasi dengan sebaik-baiknya. Secara khusus 
ditugaskan kepada Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid, Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus, dan 
Majelis Pendidikan Kader dengan melibatkan Majelis/Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan 
Amal 
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Usaha terkait untuk melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut secara terpadu di bawah 
koordinasi Pimpinan Persyarikatan di masing-masing tingkatan. 
9. Segenap Pimpinan Peryarikatan, Majelis dan Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal 
Usaha Muhammadiyah diinstruksikan untuk menegakkan disiplin organisasi, merapatkan 
barisan/langkah, dan mengokohkan ideologi serta misi Muhammadiyah sebagaimana diatur 
dalam AD/ART dan peraturan-peraturan organisasi serta telah menjadi prinsip-prinsip 
Muhammadiyah seperti keputusan Tarjih, Muqaddimah Anggaran Dasar, Kepribadian, Matan 
Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup, Khittah Perjuangan, dan Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga 
Muhammadiyah serta keputusan-keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah. 
10. Pimpinan Peryarikatan, Majelis dan Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal Usaha 
Muhammadiyah diinstruksikan untuk mengambil kebijakan dan tindakan-tindakan yang tegas 
dalam menegakkan misi, aturan, dan prinsip-prinsip Muhammadadiyah serta dalam 
mencegah dan menyelamatkan Muhammadiyah dari berbagai tindakan yang merugikan 
Persyarikatan sebagaimana disebutkan di atas. 
 
Yogyakarta, 10 Zulqa’dah 1427 H 
01 Desember 2006 M 
 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
 
Ketua Umum,                                            Sekretaris Umum, 
       Prof. Dr. H. M. Din Syamsuddin, M.A.                  Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh 
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Appendix 6 
List of Interviewees* 
 
No. Name of Interviewees Organisational Position  (at the Date of Interview, unless otherwise stated) 
Place of 
Interview 
Date of 
Interview 
1 Abidah Mufllihati  Chairwoman, Pimpinan Pusat Nasyiatul Aisyiyah Yogyakarta 19 July 2011 
26 July 2011 
2 Abdul Mu’ti  Secretary, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Jakarta 23 June 2011 
3 Asep Purnama Bahtiar  Chairman, Majelis Pendidikan Kader Pengurus Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 
Yogyakarta 25 July 2011 
4 Erni Zuhriyati  Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 
 Co-Chairwoman, Pimpinan Pusat Nasyiatul Aisyiyah 
Yogyakarta 26 July 2011 
5 Fajar Riza Ul Haq  Executive Director, Maarif Institute Jakarta 12 July 2011 
6 Gunawan Hidayat  Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Mahasiswa 
Muhammadiyah 1999-2001 
 Secretary General, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah 2006-2010 
Jakarta 21 June 2011 
7 Haedar Nashir  Co-Chairman, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 29 July 2011 
8 Hajriyanto Y. Thohari  Chairperman, Badan Pengurus Lembaga Amil Zakat 
Infaq dan Shodaqoh Muhammadiyah  
 Vice-Secretary General, Pengurus Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 
 Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda Muhammadiyah 
1993-1998 
Jakarta 21 June 2011 
9 Masyitoh Chusnan  Rector, Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta Jakarta 7 July 2011 
10 Moeslim Abdurrahman  Chairman, Lembaga Pemberdayaan Buruh Tani dan Jakarta 5 July 2011 
                                                            
* This list is structured alphabetically according to interviewees’ first names. 
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Nelayan Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 
11 M. Amin Abdullah  Chairman, Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan 
Pemikiran Islam, Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 
2000-2005 
Yogyakarta 29 July 2011 
12 M. Dawam Rahardjo  Chairman, Majelis Ekonomi Pimpinan Pusat 
Muhammadiyah 1995-2000 
 Co-Chairman, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
2000-2005 
Jakarta 28 June 2011 
13 Mohammad Shofan  Ex-lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Gresik Jakarta 24 June 2011 
14 Noorkamilah  Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 
 Coordinator for Propagation Department, Pengurus 
Pusat Nasyiatul Aisyiyah 
Yogyakarta 2 August 2011 
15 Oneng Nurul Bariyah  Member, Majelis Tarjih, Pengurus Wilayah Jakarta Jakarta 12 July 2011 
16 Rizal Sukma  Chairman, Lembaga Hubungan Luar Negeri 
Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 
Jakarta 4 July 2011 
17 Said Tuhuleley  Chairman, Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat, 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
Yogyakarta 30 July 2011 
18 Saleh P. Daulay  Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda Muhammadiyah Jakarta 13 June 2011 
19 Siti Aisyah  Co-Chairwoman, Pengurus Pusat Aisyiyah Yogyakarta 30 July 2011 
20 Siti Noordjannah Djohantini  Chairwoman, Pengurus Pusat Aisyiyah Yogyakarta 28 July 2011 
21 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin  Member, Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan 
Pemikiran Islam, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
2000-2005 
 Member, Research and Development Institution, 
Pimpinan Pusat Aisyiyah 2005-2010 
Yogyakarta  29 July 2011 
22 Slamet Nur Achmad Effendy  Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Pelajar 
Muhammadiyah 
Jakarta 17 June 2011 
23 Sudibyo Markus  Member, Institute for Foreign Affairs, Pengurus 
Pusat Muhammadiyah 
Jakarta 30 June 2011 
24 Sugiarti  Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang Malang 16 August 2011 
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25 Ton Abdillah Has  Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Mahasiswa 
Muhammadiyah 
Jakarta 16 June 2011 
26 Tri Sulistyaningsih  Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang Malang 13 August 2011 
27 Vina Salviana  Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang Malang 16 August 2011 
28 Wuri Rahmawati  Member, Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat, 
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
Yogyakarta 23 July 2011 
30 July 2011 
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